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PREFACE 
This thesis attempts to trace the genesis and early history of the 
New Town of Peterlee. An introductory chapter on the 'New Towns Movement' 
has been written in order to place Peterlee into the perspective of the 
general history of the movement. The main body of the work lies in the 
chapter on the 'Genesis of Peterlee'. The rest carries forward the 
history in two particular directions. Firstly, a chapter has been written 
on the 'Coal Problem' which be-devilled the early years of the New Town. 
The second direction was to examine Peterlee in its regional context, with 
particular reference to the development of industry in the New Town. 
It was found on writing the introductory history that the recognised 
literature had overlooked the potential significance of New Towns for 
depressed areas. Therefore, even though most of the sources in this 
chapter are from standard works, some of the few particular references to 
depressed areas have had to be traced to original documents. 
The genesis of Peterlee was hedged around with a good deal of deceit. 
Some people intimately involved were indeed concerned that too much might 
be unravelled in such an investigation. Of course, personalities must 
play a considerable role in any history. They are in certain cases 
relevant to the subject matter here. Nevertheless, the persons concerned 
are still very much alive and to give an exhaustive account, as would be 
desirable, may have proved hurtfl;ll .. :j;o some of them. 
~-:·;~ 
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The history of the 'coal problem' is of acute interest as a study in 
administration. Where the government process runs smoothly its 
imperfections are misted and attract little attention. Over difficult 
issues, where the whole machine is operating under stress, its weaknesses, 
and for that matter its strengths also, are clearly highlighted. 
Many of the assumptions upon which the chapter on industry was written 
have not as yet been satisfactorily tested. All the same, it is hoped 
that to look at Peterlee under their light may have itself proved 
enlightening. This chapter looks at the history of the Peterlee industry 
problem and relates it to both trends in regional planning and national 
~ 
distribution of industry policy. 
One further planning problem which, as with the question of industry, 
ought to be viewed in relation to the whole regional distribution of 
settlement, is that of 'housing'. More research will be needed on this 
subject. 
Many thanks are offered to my tutors, the staff of the Durham 
Colleges Social Studies Department, and to the many officials of local 
and central government who placed services at my disposal. Especially am 
I grateful to Hr. C. W. Clarke, "the Founder of Peterlee", and Mr. Nicklin, 
the Chief Administration Officer of the Peterlee Development Corporation 
for the abundant information they have given me. 
CHAPTER I 
SHORr HISTORY OF THE NEW TOWNS .MOVEMENT 
CHAPTER I 
SHORT HISTORY OF THE N:Etll TOWNS MOnM.ENT 
Introduction 
If discussion of New Towns always begins with a reference to 
Ebenezer Howard, this is more than just; not because of the originality 
of his ideas, but because of the great proseletizing influence of himself 
and his followers. Many of his ideas live today in the New Towns, 
Peterlee included; most of them copies from his two practical experiments, 
the model Garden Cities of Letchworth (1903), and Welwyn (1921). 
After having, as it were, thus paid homage, it must also be stated 
that Howard had many predecessors, who deserve more than just a passing 
mention. Howard, like Adam Smith, in his field of study, was too often 
regarded as the sole parent. 
The importance of many of these predecessors can be minimised for 
our purposes because of the over-riding significance of the industrial 
revolution. There was incisive clarity in both the path traced by its 
movement through the nineteenth century and over the face of Britain, and 
in the counter reaction against it, which followed in the wake. The 
pioneers in new ideas often preceded the worst of the evils, and were 
consequently labelled by their fellow citizens as cranks. Any such 
proposal as the building of a new community would have been greeted by the 
capital markets with a very great deal of 'shyness'. The only persons or 
organisations with the necessary will and resources to build anything 
resembling a new town were the 'pioneer cranks' who happened to be at 
the same time well established industrialists. 
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The most significant names, and there were others, were Robert Owen, 
James Silk Buckingham, Titus Salt, George Cadbury, Joseph Rowntree and 
William Lever. All of these names have importance for the general 
history of new towns, but for the history of Peterlee, the first two are 
highlighted because they associated their ideas with the problem of 
unemployment. Most of the others were actuated by the needs of the 
moment. Their factories were ripe for expansion, and internal city land 
values were growing prohibitively high. New sources of power were being 
opened up giving greater mobility for industrial location. On the other 
hand, varying degrees of philanthropy were mixed with their egoism, and 
with Owen there was a conception of a utopian Socialist philosophy which 
tended to pervade the efforts of his inheritors. At least part of this 
social philosophy motivated all of them; this was the desire to provide 
sanitary and pleasant dwellings for their workers. The proposals of 
Owen, Salt, Cadbury and Lever were, though, not for new towns but for 
new 1 villages 1 • 
"The English are countrymen rather than town-dwellers by contracted 
habit", wrote Abercrombie in 1933. The unplanned housing thrown up by 
the industrial revolution lacked charm, sanitation or privacy. The 
weal thy were confirmed in their habit of clearing out of the town as quickly 
as they could every evening, and their garden residences and sea-side 
resorts existed as models for less fortunate ~yes. What the philanthropic 
industrialists did was to attempt to democratise the process. Later on, 
this paternal desire to share the inheritance became intertwined with 
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a 'romantic' and anti-urban, anti-industrial trend, the members of whlbch 
wished to return to the standards of an idealised eighteenth century. 
From this grew the concept of 'open development', as it is known 
today, twelve houses to the acre density and a garden to each house. 
Not only is this question important because of the vast suburban sprawl 
in the nineteen twenties and thirties, but also there is something of this 
tendency latent in the 'Garden City' idea and in the New Towns built since 
Secondly, for this account, a factor to note is that one of the 
only really determined attempts since 1945 to create a 'truly urban' 
1 town , was put forward by the first architect-planner for Peterlee. 
It was as if the fates were against such proposals. Just at a time and 
at a place where opinion would have welcomed the innovation, there arose 
unforeseen technical problems which proved insurmountable. Later, plans 
2 
and planners had to revert to the predominantly 'house and garden' layout. 
1The phrase 'truly urban' clearly involves an implied 'value judgement'. 
To illustrate what underlies this judgement would necessitate a long 
social, even philosophical, discourse on 'The Culture of Cities' • 
However, a passage from an article by Reyner Banham from 'Architectural 
Review' will have to suffice. (Architectural Review, Feb. 196o, P.100.) 
"The concepts we have of cities are as old as philosophy, and 
are so rooted in the language of cultural discourse that to say 
'Cities should be compact' is to commit a tautology - we cannot 
conceive of a diffuse city, and have invented other words, such 
as conurbation, subtopia, to underline our inability so to 
conceive it." 
This does not prove the point, which provides the field of battle for 
some of the most profound, but often 'hack' academic dialogues amongst 
architects and 'Planners'. Even so, notice that the theory of the 
'neighbourhood-area' has been commonly abandoned in favour of a compact 
town conception, as at 'Cumbernauld'. 
2 See Chapter III. 
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Owen and Buckingham 
More important even than Howard for Peterlee are the two afore-
mentioned visionaries, Owen and Buckingham, because since they wrote their 
contribution t~ New Towns and Employment theory, their ideas have receded 
into the background, only occasionally to reappear in odd and indirect 
ways. 
It is indeed difficult to classify the first, Robert Owen. He 
was more than just a paternal industrialist, though at New Lanark, his 
model cotton spinning mill town, he was all of this. But he was much 
more besides; a leader and prophet of many trends of the 'Working Class 
Movement', a visionary or crank, depending on how cold-bloodedly one views 
him, and "perhaps", as G.D.H. Cole wrote, "the easiest answer to the 
riddle of his personality is that he was a little mad". 1 
Mad or not, Owen was an innovator of ideas who had a very great 
influence on later generations. The story of New Lanark has been often 
told in the histories of planning2 -. the care for the welfare of his 
work-people through provision for education and sanitary housing, the 
limitation to the hours that children and women were allowed to work, and 
the general all round improvement on working conditions. Owen made clear 
the policy inherent in the 'economy of high wages'. Seldom are 'social 
costs' a complete waste, a fact which is too easily forgotten, even today. 3 
1 G.D.H. Cole - Introduction to the Everyman edition of Owen's works. 
2 Owen's own account in 'A New View of Society' is of course the best. 
3 See A.v. Williams' Paper, read to Institution of Gas Engineers, North 
of England Section, 24 Sept., 1958, para. 2- on the Treasury attitude 
to its obligations to supply finance under the 1948 New Towns Act. 
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More important for the history of New Towns are Owen's plans for 
industrial villages. Though details of these·often feature in the 
literature, there is little mention of Owen's association of his villages 
with a general cure for unemployment. The need for dispersal of population 
had not then presented itself as a problem, but for the first time, 
unemployment caused by an industrial depression had occurred in Britain. 
Primitive as Owen's suggestion was, it was the germ of an idea which is 
latent in some of the northern 'New Towns', and the significance of this 
1 
solution is also not sufficiently appreciated today. 
Owen's 'Plan' was that the unemployed were to be housed in villages 
modelled upon his New Lanark community, each to be self-supporting and 
largely based upon agriculture, but with a certain amount of industry. 2 
The villages were to contain 1,200 persons each, 3 at an estimated cost of 
£96,000 per village. 4 The details were first laid out in his 'Report to 
the Committee for the Relief of the Manufacturing poor', in March 1817, 
and until the end of his life he attempted to get them accepted with no 
success. Many associated his plan with his widely distrusted anti-
religious and socialistic doctrines and refused to consider it seriously. 
1 See Chapter IV on Industry. 
2 See the before-mentioned 'Report' (Everyman edition) p.162. Owen 
established a planning principle_of 'zoning' land use for agriculture 
and industry. 
3 Ibid., p.161. 
4 Ibid., p.164. 
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The principle established by Owen, important for the subject of this 
essay, is that local unemployment can be cured by the establishment of new 
agricultural and industrial communities in the areas concerned. 
The second relevant point put forward by Owen was the regenerative 
effect of manufacture, in this case on local agriculture. 
"A whole population engaged in agriculture, with manufactures 
as an appendage, will, in a given district, support many more, and 
in a much higher degree of comfort, than the same district could 
do with its agricultural separate from its manufacturing 
population. 111 
Many of the details of his 'Plan' are of fortui taus interest to 
twentieth century eyes; others are of doubtful practicability. In many 
respects his analysis of the economic situation and agricultural theory 
is faulty, and the important principles arrived at above were reached by 
very dubious routes. We know though the effect of his work on later 
generations was profound. Ideas in print, of minor significance perhaps 
to the author, become highly suggestive to readers who are faced with new 
problems for which the ideas could be solutions. All the basic 
characteristics of the 'New Towns' are to be found in Owen, the 'green 
. 2 3 belt', 'satellite offshoots', work places near.to residence, and many 
others. 
1 Ibid., p.266. 'Report to the County of Lanark'. 
2 Ibid., p.265. 
3 Ibid., p.267. 
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In 1849 a book was written which was to have profound effect upon the 
history of the New Towns idea. It was called 'National Evils and 
Practical Remedies' and its author was James Silk Buckingham. Historians, 
in writing of Buckingham, mainly concentrated upon the 'Remedies' and have 
tended to ignore the 'Evils'. The scorn which often follows the 
publication of a writer 1 s 1 Utopian dreams' and 1 crankish plans 1 , as 
equally often kills the sensible and useful proposals there contained. 
So it was with Buckingham. The fort-like appearance of his model town 
'Victoria',~ the puritanical streak which made him desire to prohibit from 
2 his town intoxicating liquor, tobacco, weapons of war and Sunday work, 
such plans as these turned balanced minds against him. Buckingham was 
not so shallow as to desire simply to cure people from the evils of drink, 
or from the crudities of man's nature. He saw the causal influence of 
environment, especially that of 1 unemployment' , and the main aim which 
lay behind his 'remedies' of a new town. was 'to absorb the labour of 
every unemployed man, woman and child of the kingdom' •3 
In Buckingham can be found a definite sense of what building a new 
Town and establishing industry could do to rejuvenate a region in economic 
decline, or to enliven an under-developed area. He compared Ireland of 
the North, with its manufacturing industry, and agricultural southern 
1 W. A. Eden- Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City Movement. 
Town Planning Review, Vol. 19, 1947, p. 131. 
2 James S. Buckingham, 'National Evils and Practical Remedies,' 'with 
the Plan of a Model Town. (London 1849). pp. 144-145. 
3 Buckingham, ibid., p. 153. 
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Ireland, \~th its many poor living below subsistence level. 1 Without 
understanding the theory of the 'Classical Economists' too deeply, he 
could see the existence of both an industrial poor as well as the poor 
of under-developed backward areas, and advocated for both groups public 
works and 'paternalism' on a large scale. 
'Paternalism' was defended on grounds of the country's long term 
self interest. The cost of 'model totms' could be borne because of the 
reduced poor relief and "a long catalogue of other expenses and drains 
on the con~unity, wrrich unemployed labour, vagrancy, crime and disease 
occasion on the public funds or private charity11 • 2 
The 'Remedy' that Buckingham suggested was for a model new town of 
'Victoria' "to combine within itself every advantage of beauty, security, 
healthfulness, and convenience •••• peopled by an adequate number of 
inhabitants, with such due proportions between the agricultural and 
manufacturing classes, and between possessors of capital, skill, and 
labour, as to produce .•.• the highest degree of health, contentment, 
morality, and enjoyment, yet seen in any existing community ••.• "3 
1. Buckingham, ibid., p. 481. 
2. See Buckingham, ibid., p. 88, for his ideas of 'paternalism', and 
bottom of same page and top of p. 89, for evidence of his 
comprehension of the industrial unemployed who "starve in the midst 
of wealth and abundance". 
3. Buckingham, ibid., p. 141. 
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'Victoria' was to be truly urban in character, with terraced housing, 
and a density of population of about 16 per acre. The reaction against 
'industrialism 1 had not dominated Buckingham with 'romantic 1 
preconceptions. The town would be 1~ miles square and the maximum 
population was to be 10,000; any further growth could only be allowed by 
the formation of a satellite at a distance, beyond a protective 
agricultural belt around the original town. 1 Suggestive also for later 
writers was the idea of segregating off farm and factory from the 
2 
residential areas. 
'Victoria' as a predecessor to Peterlee stands out in theoretical 
importance more than any other suggestion put forward by advocates of 
new to'WilS. Not only did Buckingham want his model town to absorb the 
unemployed, but he realised it would provide urban and new industrial 
facilities, available because of tlie:·"association of the division of labour 
with the employment of capital11 ,3 in areas of scattered and poor agricult-
ural settlement. In some important respects, mining and agriculture are 
very similar. Where one may need urban and new industrial facilities, so 
may the other. After Buckingham, these elements took a back place in the 
4 
writings on new towns, until the 1930's and beyond. 
1 Buckingham, ibid.' 142 and 152. PP• 
2 Buckingham, ibid.' 151. P• 
3 Buckingham, ibid.' pp. 133-138, and 201-203. 
4 A but moderately interesting and isolated exception was the 'Society 
for promoting Industrial Villages', for details of which see 
J. Saville - 'Rural Depopulation in England', pp. 158-159. 
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Ebenezer Howard 
'Tomorrow', Howard's book opened up a new era in the history of 
New Towns and the whole town planning movement generally. The main ideas 
expressed in it were, taken separately, none of them original. His plan 
was to purchase an estate of 6,000 acres and construct in the middle of it 
a town of about 30,000 people, occupying 1,000 acres. The rest of the 
area would be strictly reserved for agriculture, development, in what has 
come to be known as the 'green belt' being completely restricted. 
Howard suggested that the natural growth of a town should only be encouraged 
to the extent of helping it to colonise a satellite, far enough away to be 
a separate community and near enough to have cultural attachments. The 
profits obtained on the increased land values due to development would go 
to help to pay off the interest on the borrowed capital and also to further 
1 
more development. 
Inspiration for Howard's ideas came from the Socialist land 
reformers, Spence and Henry George, and especially from Bellamy through 
his book 'Looking Backward'; the substance came from, in Howard's own 
words, "(1) The proposals for an organised migratory movement of population 
of Edward Gibbon Wakefield and of Professor Alfred Harshall; (2) the 
system of land tenure first proposed by Thomas Spence and afterwards with 
an important modification by Mr. Herber~ Spencer; and (3) the model city 
of James Silk Buckingham. 11 Howard rightly adduces his own originality 
to the unification of these three ideas. Later assessment has placed 
1.. The appreciation of the importance of gleaning land values as an aid 
to financing development can be attributed to Howard as an original 
contribution. 
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less importance on the infiltrative influences of the book than on the 
personality of its author1 , his power to enthuse people with the idealisms 
involved, the moderation of the proposals2 , and above all, his ability to 
grasp the value of concrete practical examples as a weapon of persuasion, 
over and against any amount of written material. 
Only indirectly is Howard important for Peterlee. He made little 
reference to the possibility of Garden Cities being solutions to areas of 
unemployment, nor was his thesis mainly aimed at centralising scattered 
development. This latter theme was not dominant because with Howard it 
was either secondary to the main problem of decentralisation, or the 
solution of that problem would see the solution also of the problem of 
scattered development, as a complement to it. 
Howard's regional plan implicitly assumes, however, much that is in 
Peterlee. The satellite towns surrounding a central town would derive 
sustenance from the centre. This can as well be applied to the surrounding 
villages around Peterlee as it can to the 'new towns' around London. 
The idea of decentralisation 'per se' does not necessarily imply that the 
population, once decentralised, then needs to be recentralised at the 
second stage of the process. Migrating population could be rehoused in 
a series of existing or new 'villages 1 • Howard, though, knew and 
stressed the social and economic benefits of 'towns', and his ring of 
Garden Cities was to be a programme of recentralisation in a new and 
planned environment. 
1. F.J. Osborn, Introduction to 1945 ed., 'Garden Cities of Tomorrow'. 
2. For instance, the collaboration of ~rivate and public development. 
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In attempting to distinguish the theory latent in Peterlee from the 
basic pattern of the London 'new towns' , as is being done in this 
introductory history, harsher divisions between these theories may be more 
justified than in a less generalised study. But anyone attempting to 
put Howard into categories must work with caution. 
The Garden City and Town Planning Movements 
'Tomorrow' was re-issued under its better known title 'Garden Cities 
of Tomorrow', in response to the interest aroused. The time was not 
unreceptive to Howard's book. The idea of town planning in Britain was 
taking more positive shape under the academic influence of Patrick Geddes, 
who, even if he did not promote much activity, did start people thinking 
about city development; and also T.C. Horsfall, of whom it has been 
written that, "to him more than to any other man, town planning in England 
owes its origins" 1 The main argument being used by Horsfall was the 
strictly utilitarian one of 'unhealthy town dwellers resulting in trade 
2 losses to competitors such as Germany'. This came as a sequel to the 
disclosure that for the South African War, a high proportion of the 
recruits were rejected as physically unfit. 3 Attention was directed to 
the state of the towns from many quarters. As a trade rival, the 
planners' eyes were directed towards Germany, and especially to the new 
1. C. B. Purdom, 'The Garden City', p. 201. 
2. T. C. Horsfall; 'The Relation of Town Planning to the National Life', 
pp. 13-14. 
3. Department Committee on Physical Deterioration, 1904. B.P.P. XXXII 
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suburbs there which were arranged on decidedly 'open' lines. 1 Into such 
an atmosphere, Howard's book, lectures and enthusiasm were injected. 
The layout at Letchworth cannot be directly attributed to Howard. 
The strongest single influence came from the planner's pen of Sir Raymond 
Unwin, who helped design Letchworth as well as the other very influential 
planning project of the 'Hampstead Garden Suburb'. 2 It was through him 
and other close followers of Howard that 'Open Development' became the 
greater half of the meaning of the word 'Garden', instead of what one 
believes was Howard's original intention, which was that the word referred 
more to the 'Green Belt'. 
The year after Howard's book came out, the dedicated, but often 
independently-minded band of adherents, formed themselves into the 
1 Garden Cities Association' and it was through them that the book had its 
greatest impact. Some-in the Association could not resist the appeal of 
the planned suburb, which itself was for a time synonymous with planning, 
and was receiving support from many radical quarters.3 Significantly, the 
Association changed its name with the passage of Town Planning legislation 
to accord with the growth of the planning movement generally, and it was 
through that movement that the Garden City idea was revivified. The 
temporary eclipse until some undefined date after the first world war, 
1. W. Ashworth, 'The Genesis of British Town Planning', p. 178. 
2. Dame H. Barnett, 'The St9ry of the Growth of the Hampstead Garden 
Suburb, 1907-28. _ Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust, 'The Hampstead 
Garden Suburb, Its Achievements and Significance.'_ 
3. See faVian News, 1898, p.11, for critic of the Garden City idea. 
Also Fabian Pamphlet, 'The House Famine and How to Relieve it', p.43. 
Also Charles Booth's 'Improved Means of Locomotion', p.13. 
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was in part due to the fact that most of the Garden City enthusiasts were 
engaged in building Letchworth. 1 After the war, the Movement tried to 
carry their ideas to the post-war public, who were anxious to build 
'Homes for Heroes'. A 'New Towns Group' was formed mainly on the 
initiative of F. J. Osborn, which advocated the building of new towns in 
every region of the country. To achieve such an extensive programme, 
they realised that they would have to impress it upon the local and central 
authorities. Howard had no hope that they would succeed and on his own 
initiative proceeded to negotiate for the purchase of a site for a new 
Garden City at Welwyn. This brought to an end the intensive pressure on 
the authorities as the Group could not refuse to help the 'Grand Old Man' 
in his new project.2 It appears, on looking back, that Ebenezer Howard 
was right, for the two realities of Letchworth and Welwyn provided the 
single most potent stimulant over time to the slow moving reaction of 
British public opinion. The dilemma facing the Group also pointed the 
world of difference between building new towns by private enterprise and 
persuading the authorities to build them. It was that gap which had to 
be bridged because increasing urban growth, and new legislative planning 
powers of local authorities, made the enlistment of official aid, as the 
problems mounted, ever more necessary. 
1. The best account of the building and early difficulties of the two 
Garden Cities is C.B. Purdom's 'The Building of Satellite Towns'. 
2. F.J. Osborn, 'New Towns after the War', 1918, re-issued 1942, 
Preface pp.8-9. Osborn also quotes a characteristic comment by Howard 
on the situation: "If you wait for the authorities to build New Towns, 
you will be older than Methuselah before they start. The only way to 
get anything done is to do it yourself" • 
- 15 -
The Committee on 'Unhealthy Areas' 1921 
There was Ministerial notice of the problem of congestion in the big 
towns in the form of the appointment of a committee to enquire into the 
'Unhealthy Areas' in 1921. 1 Two prominent members of the Garden City 
Association were on the committee, George Pepler and Captain Reiss, who 
was the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Association. The 
report was very much in favour of the Garden Cities solution to the problem 
of congestion and they advocated that the only way to attract industry to 
the new towns before the population had built up is "by the intervention of 
the state and the investment of a considerable amount of capital11 • 2 
The conclusions of the committee were too advanced for the government and 
its report was shelved. It had, though, convinced its Chairman, Mr. Neville 
Chamberlain, and this was to have important repercussions in the future.3 
Since the 1919 Planning Act there had been statutory provision for 
giving state financed support for Garden City projects, which desired to 
acquire land. The provisions were faithfully copied into all succeeding 
planning Acts, and were as faithfully disregarded, because of the diffic-
ulties involved in the procedure. There was one notable exception. 
1. Interim Report of the Departmental Committee of the Ministry of Health 
to consider and advise on the principles to be followed in dealing with 
unhealthy areas, 1920. 
2. Final Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation Settlement, 
B.P.B., 1941-2, IV, p.4. Cmd. 6378 
3. Chamberlain appointed the Barlow Commission. 
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Welwyn Garden City Limited noticed the clause, which was written into the 
Housing Act of 1921. They.applied for a loan from the Commissioners, 
which was only grudgingly made available with many encumbering strings 
1 
attached. No-one else made use of the clause. 
Dormitory Towns and Trading Estates 
As the term 'Garden City' had been abused, so was Howard's other 
operative word 'satellite' often misapplied. A 'satellite' town should 
have been the name used to denote one of a ring of self-contained 'Garden 
Cities' which surround a central nucleus of original urban development. 
It became, in fact, synonymous with wh~t is better known today as 'dormitory' 
town, whose principal detrimental characteristics are that inhabitants 
travel into the central nucleus to work, and that it is too near,to be in 
any sense an independent community, to the central town. Some of these 
'dormitory satellites' were better planned than others. The L.C.C.'s 
attempt to move population into Essex at Becontree and Dagenham created 
2 
nothing more than 'working class suburbs' , with little industry until, 
in the case of the latter, Ford Motor Works set up there. Becontree also 
later improved, but from the first, all development was unplanned and 
carried out piecemeal.3 
1. See Osborn's 'Green Belt Cities', p. 107, and Purdom, pt. 11, 
ch. VII, Vlii, PP• 158-159, pt •. 111, ch. VII, VIII. 
2. Ashworth, op. cit., p. 209. 
3. T. Young, 'Becontree and Dagenham'. 
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More carefully planned, and genuine attempts at building 'satellites', 
were initiated by Manchester and Liverpool Corporations. The difficulties 
which arose in their case were illustrative of the obstacles which had to 
be overcome if local authorities were going to build new towns. 1 
In somewhat the same haphazard manner, privately run trading estates 
were springing up in the suburbs of the big towns. Unfortunately, planned 
internally, as some were, they were still located in patterns unrelated to 
the residences of their labour, and in many cases they added to the traffic 
problem by lining up along the newly-built arterial roads. 2 
It was increasing traffic congestion, the protracted unemployment of 
the twenties and thirties, and a reaction against suburban development, 
which brought the planning movement, and therefore the New Towns idea, 
into enlightened focus. Henceforward, New Towns' advocates could hang 
more on to the coat-tails of the planning movement because they ceased, 
for the most part, to pull different ways. 
Traffic Congestion 
The Locomotive Act of 1896 had preceded Howard's book by two years, 
and . 
but the motor car became important much later,/not only aided the spread 
of suburbia, but raised the new central urban problem of congestion. 
"Between 1903 and 1933, the number of passenger-miles travelled annually 
1. E. D. Simon and J. Inman, 'The Rebuilding of Manchester' • Journal 
of the Town Planning Institute, Vol. XXV, P• 164. 
2. D. G. Wolton (Ed.) 'Trading Estates. The Growth and Development of 
the Modern Factory Vnit'. 
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in Great Britain increased by 181 per cent, and most of this represented an 
1 increased burden for the roads." In the same period, the number of motor 
cars increased from 8,465 to 1,195,882. The main effect was in loss of 
working time and raised commercial costs, though part of the toll was in 
death and injury, and it was the latter which made the public more aware of 
the problems involved. 
Unemployment 
The later twenties and the thirties were dominated by the long periods 
of unemployment which left certain regions of the country permanently 
crippled, even though from 1933 general economic activity was steadily 
reviving. Two independent lines of approach of the central authorities at 
this time are worth charting; meeting in their recommendations at certain 
points, they both set out to find solutions to what appeared to be different 
problems. The first was the approach of the Special Areas Commissioner, 
Sir Malcolm Stewart, who held his office under the Special Areas Act of 
1934, and the second was that taken by the Departmental Committee of the 
Ministry of Health on Garden Cities and Satellite Towns, which reported in 
1935. 
It was the problems and suggestions dealt with by the Special Area 
Commissioners which gave significance to the Report of the Departmental 
Committee. Sir Malcolm's main object was to try to attract new industry 
to the depressed areas. In his Third Report, Sir Malcolm recommended that 
an embargo be placed on further factory construction in Greater London. 
1. Ashworth, op. cit., p. 216, figures taken from an unpublished thesis 
by E.J. Brester, on the 'Growth of Travel in Great Britain'. 
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The 'Marley Committee' Report was full, as has been written, of 
'amiable commonplaces•, 1 and like the 'Unhealthy Areas' Committee Report 
of 1920, it was shelved. Some of the Marley Committee's conclusions were 
not forgotten: its general recommendations for more Garden Cities, the 
fears about the growth of London, and the need for a National Planning 
authority to co-ordinate the location of industry and population. 
The conclusions of the Special Area Commissioners and those of the 
Departmental Committee were influential in promoting the setting up of the 
Barlow Committee, which will be discussed in a little more detail. It 
is curious, though, first to note that there was very little association 
made between attracting industry to the North - the principal reason for 
the other recommendations of the Special Area Commissioners - and the 
conclusion of the ~~ley Committee for more Garden Cities. Garden Cities 
were not seriously thought of as possible solutions to the problems of the 
depressed areas. Even though the Marley Committee did discuss how the 
two existent Garden Cities had helped to rejuvenate the countryside round 
2 
and about, and it did hear evidence advocating that a number of new towns 
be built in the north, these ideas received no further hearing. 
The First New Town for the North 
The person who made this,the first recommendation for definite new 
towns in the north, was, strangely enough, the same person who was partly 
responsible for the trading estate solution to the problem of depressed 
areas. He was Mr. Sadler Forster, who was then the Secretary of the 
1. Purdom, op. cit., p. 367. 
2. Evidence of First Garden Cit~ Ltd. to the Departmental Committee on 
Garden Cities and Satellite Towns. 
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1 Teeside Chamber of Commerce and Tees Development Board. The sites 
chosen were therefore in the area covered by his offices. The ideas 
expressed by Mr. Sadler Forster were firstly the economic unbalance between 
the north and the south, secondly how the sparsely developed regions of 
the north couldcbenefit from Garden Cities with light industry as their 
basis, and thirdly that sites should be found away from the congested 
areas, near enough to absorb the unemployed and far enough away to prevent 
the towns being simply residential dormitories. Mr. Sadler Forster, at 
this time, firmly grasped the double nettle of the problems of unemployment 
and congested areas. Few people since have thought of the problem so 
explicitly in this manner. The question which immediately arises is why 
Mr. Sadler Forster, when he saw so clearly the complete answer, put forward 
and pioneered the partial solution of trading estates? 
The Barlow Committee 
While Chairman of the 1921 'Unhealthy Areas' Committee, Neville 
Chamberlain became convinced of the soundness of the Garden City solution 
2 to the problem of urban slums. In 1937 he became Prime Minister. 
The publication of the Special Areas Commissioners' Third Report and the 
pressure of groups, such as the Town and Country Planning Association~ 
led him to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the problem of the 
location of industry and population ('to inquire into the causes which 
have influenced the present geographical distribution of the industrial 
1. Evidence of Mr. Sadler Forster to the Departmental Committee on 
Garden Cities and Satellite Towns, 18th May, 1933. 
2. See 'Town and Country Planning', Jan. 1959, p. 5. 
3. F. J. Osborn, Intro. to Howard's book, op. cit., p. 16. 
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population of Great Britain and the probable direction of any change in 
that distribution in the future; to consider what social, economic or 
strategic disadvantages arise from the concentration of industries or of 
the industrial population in large towns or in particular areas of the 
country; and to report what remedial measures, if any, should be taken in 
the national interest •••• ') 1 At its head he placed Sir Montague Barlow. 
The Barlow Commission laid down the following principles of national 
action (1 and 2 in this thesis were the 4th and 5th conclusions in the 
Report):-
1. (a) Continued and further re-development of congested urban 
areas, where necessary. 
(b) Decentralisation, or dispersal, both of industries and 
industrial population, from such areas. 
(c) Encouragement of a reasonable balance of industrial 
development, so far as possible, thoughout the various 
divisions or regions of Great Britain, coupled with 
approp.riate diversification of industry in each division 
or region throughout the country. 
2. The continued drift of the industrial population to London 
and the Home Counties constitutes a social, economic, and 
strategical problem which demands immediate attention. 2 
1. Royal Commission in the Distribution of the Industrial Population 
Report (Barlow Report) 194o. Cmd. 6153, pp. vii-viii. 
2. Cmd. 6153, para. 428, pp. 201-202. 
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These conclusions of the Commission formed the basis of all 
future planning policy. 1 
Dissension among the members of the Commission resulted in both a 
majority and a minority report being produced. The main difference, 
important for this thesis, was tP2t the majority report did not directly 
recommend the New Towns solution. It only put it forward in conjunction 
with other, perhaps competing solutions ("Garden Cities or Garden Suburbs, 
Satellite Towns, Trading Estates, and further development of existing 
small towns or regional centres11 ). 2 The minority report, however, did 
directly recommend the three, admittedly still competing aims, of Garden 
City, Satellite Towns and Trading Estates.3 Secondly, the minority 
report also associated these aims with the objective above of encouraging 
a reasonable 'balance of industry', though they did not, unfortunately, 
elaborate on this relationship. It is clear, however, that the majority 
saw the north as a solution to the problems of the south, rather than as 
a problem in its o~Jn right. The settlement pattern around London was 
partly due to over attraction of industry. The relevance of the 
depressed areas was solely that they had a deficiency of industry; their 
overall settlement problems did not receive equal emphasis. 
1. Lord Silkin's statement in the House of Commons on the 5th Varch, 1956. 
2. Cmd. 6153, p. 202. 
3. Competing in the sense that if Garden City is meant as a solution for 
dispersal and not centralisation, then Satellite Towns and Trading 
Estates are something less than complete communities, in the first 
case only being residential, and in the last, only industrial. 
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The Failure of Planning Legislation 
Up to 1932 only borough, urban and rural district councils could 
initiate planning projects, 1 and they were financially too weak and 
administratively too small. It was a great deal to ask of the little men 
of local government to initiate such bold and imaginative schemes as new 
towns entail. The financial side was entangled in the dilemma of 
'compensation'. Authorities,in their plans, just perpetuated existing land 
use in order to avoid having to pay compensation as a result of any 
radical planning, 2 and they themselves had no way of recovering their 
outlay by taxing the increase in land values which arose when their plans 
became known. 
For their part, the Central Government did not give a lead. 
"We owe the Ministry of Health little for the services it has 
performed as the Department supposed to be in charge of planning 
functions. It has been a drag on the wheels of progress; it 
has been preoccupied with incredibly trivial details; its 
capacity for leadership in this sphere has been conspicuous by 
its absence."3 
1. County Councils could take part on the 'Joint Committees'formed under 
the 1919 Act. They could also take over powers voluntarily 
relinquished by District Councils, an innovation of the Local Government 
Act of 1928. A fuller history of planning legislation can be found in 
the Report of the Committee on the 'Qualification of Planners', 
Cmd. 8059, 1950, PP• 1 - 12. 
2. Uthwatt, p. 4. Report of an Expert Committee on Compensation and 
Betterment. Cmd. 6386, 1942. 
3. Robson, W .A - "War and the Planning Outlook". Also, see F .J. Osborn's 
Introduction, 1945 Edition Howard's 'Garden Cities of Tomorrow', p.16. 
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The consequence was that planning~ which should logically come from the 
top downwards, grew as an administrative function in reverse. This was 
one of the principal reasons why it took so long to progress from private 
to public enterprise new towns. There was a clause in the Housing 
(Additional Powers) Act, 1919, and the Housing Act, 1921, which gave powers 
for the acquisition of land for the purpose of constructing Garden Cities. 
These clauses were faithfully copied into the ~lanning Acts of 1925 and 
1932, but because of the great difficulties which encumbered local planning, 
they remained as an unused mockery. 
The Second World War 
The Second World War for a time made planning respectable. The 
devastating bombing raids which created havoc in so many cities, turned 
the eyes of the authorities towards the plans and dusty reports which 
had, up till then, been confined to the uppermost shelf. The Barlow 
Report became the basis of enlarged plans for post-war reconstruction. 
Bombing was double-edged in effect, removing not only valuable 
property and homes, but also "many obstructive buildings which had 
' 
impeded improvement in civic design for centuries". 1 Resulting 
policies of evacuation accustomed people and industry to the benefits of 
other areas and the fact of being moved. 
The Influence of Lord Reith 
Planning for the future acted as a moral island of security in periods 
of deprivation and chaos. Lord Reith of Stonehaven was appointed Minister 
of Works and Buildings, a man who had both conviction and drive. 
1. W. A. Robson, 'War and the Planning Outlook', p. 9· 
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No mention of new towns occurs in his ful.l preparatory plan, drawn up as 
early as November, 194o, but on his newly instituted Consultative Council 
was F. J. Osborn, who played at that time a dominant role. 1 Further, 
it was Reith who persuaded the two sovereign planning committees in 
Greater London to work together with Sir Patrick Abercrombie. 2 
Also under Lord Reith, the Scott and the Uthwatt Committees were 
appointed, the one to deal with agriculture as the Barlow dealt with 
industry, and the other to tackle the vexing problem of compensation 
and betterment. 
Lord Reith had worked hard to put the recommendation for a National 
Planning Authority of the Barlow Committee into effect. On the eve of 
the creation of a ministry with overall planning powers, Lord Reith found 
himself 'dismissed' from office.3 
His successor, Lord Portal, carried on his work in the same 
direction, but at a reduced pace. An Interim Planning Act was passed in 
1943, extending development control to all areas; and in 1944, a Planning 
1. See Lord Reith's Autobiography, 'Into the Wind', p. 425. 
2. 1 Into the Wind', p. 427. See also Lord Silkin's speech in the Second 
Reading Debate_on the New Towns Bill 1946. Hansard, Vol. 422, 
PP• 1072-1186. 
3.'Into the Wind', p. 455· Conservative backbenchers had demanded 
Reith's resignation - "Moving too fast, too much planning all round, 
on both sides of my work, even fear of land nationalisation perhaps, 
and this at a time when Churchill was yielding to public pressure". 
F. J. Osborn (Letter to the author- 18th August 1960) claims it was 
behind the scenes pressure of the Town and Country Planning 
Association that saw the adoption of dispersal policies into all the 
Parties' programmes. 
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Act, which was less comprehensive than was Reith's intentions, was put 
through. This allowed the acquisition, reconstruction and r~development 
as a whole of areas (but only those areas) of extensive war damage. 
The legal groundwork of this Act was found very helpful later, and many 
clauses were incorporated without alteration into the New Towns Act of 
1946. All three political parties had included dispersal policies in 
their post-war programmes; nevertheless, there was distinct opposition 
from two main quarters. There was the farming and countryside 
preservationist interests and the advocates of 'high rise', high density 
solutions, who were an ever present counter pressure to the advocates of 
New Towns. 
The Greater London Plan 
In 1944 also, Forshaw and Abercrombie published their Greater London 
1 Plan. Certain assumptions were made in the Plan which inevitably led 
to the conclusion that a number of new towns needed to be built. These 
were, basically, that there was a need for large scale decentralisation, 
and that there were certain planning opportunities of embodying the latest 
in civic design, which should be taken. 2 The Plan recommended seven 
new towns which, under other 'central density' assumptions, could be 
increased to ten.3 
1. Greater London Plan, 1944, Abercromoie and Forshaw. 
2. Ibid., p. 14. 
3. Ibid., p. 15. The Plan gave 10 possible sites, allowing latitude 
of increased decentralisation if the lower density figure, of 100 
persons per acre, was adopted in the central areas instead of the 
recommended 136. 
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The Labour Government and New Towns 
A Labour Government was elected in 1945, and the heightened prestige 
of planning generally, made a favourable environment for New Towns 
'lobbyists'. The speed with which events then moved was very largely 
due to "the extraordinary personal dynamism of Lord Silkin" ~ who was 
appointed the new Minister of Town and Country Planning. By September, 
1945, decisions were taken to go ahead with one New Town immediately, 
that of Stevenage. A Master Plan was prepared as a matter of urgency 
and all preliminary work was carried through under the relevant clauses 
in the Planning Act of 1932.2 In October, 1945, a New Towns Committee 
was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Reith. The Government had 
a very crowded programme and Mr. Silkin was fortunate in managing to find 
an early and unexpected opportunity to introduce his Bill. The Reith 
Committee did not have sufficient time to submit a full report before the 
Bill went before Parliament, so it introduced two interim reports as 
soon as work on each group of subjects was completed.3 
The Reith Committee 
The Committee did not have within its terms of reference either the 
relative merits of New Towns, as against other methods of dispersal, or 
choice of sites.4 The principal disagreement between the Committee's 
1. Report of Proceedings of the Town and Country Planning School, 
Oxford, 1951, pp. 71-82, F. J. Osborn. 
2. American Society of Engineers - Proceedings, -"The New Towns Programme in 
Great Britain", T.C. Coote, p. 3. See also Section 35 of the 1932 Act. 
3. Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 1943-51, Cmd.82o4, p. 10. 
4. The Reith Committee wrongly refers to the Barlow Report for such a 
discussion. 
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Report and the Bill, as presented, was over the choice of agency - who 
should build the town. The presence of Lord Reith on the Committee 
assured that the 'Development Corporation' would have a fair hearing, 1 
and it was recommended as the main choice of agency. There were certain 
cases when other agencies could be allowed, for instance, when a local 
authority had sufficient finance or when one local authority had made 
an agreement with a co-operative neighbour. Mr. Silkin would not allow 
this qualification into the Bill because he feared that the New Town would 
be dominated by the local authority. 2 
Choice of Sites 
The responsibility for choice of site was retained by the ~unister. 
It was expected that the first proposals would come from the local authorities, 
and a decision arrived at after full consultation.3 
Of the ten possible sites mentioned by the Greater London Plan, only 
two were finally designated - Harlow and Stevenage. Redbourn, Harpenden, 
Stapleford, Margettering, were rejected as being too close to existing 
settlements and therefore unlikely to survive as separate entities. 
Holmwood was rejected because of the uprooting of a 'lovely stretch of 
countryside'; two, Ongar and Redbourn again, because of the cost of 
building adequate railway services; White Waltham would have put an 
1. Town and Country Planning, Spring 1946, G. McAllister. 
2. See First Interim Report of the New Towns Committee, 1946, p. 9; 
2nd Deb~te, New Towns Bill, Hansard, Vol. 422, cc. 1072-1186; 
also Debate in Committee Stage of the Bill. 
3. Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 1943-51, Cmd. 8204, p. 123. 
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airport out of action; and the last, Crowhurst, would not, it was claimed, 
1 have been able to have attracted sufficient industry. Many sites were 
later suggested and agreed upon, but two which were badly needed had 
finally to be rejected. The first in South Wales, near Pontypridd, was 
turned down because it would have necessitated sterilising a large amount 
of coal, and the second, in Cheshire, because there was a risk of subsidence 
due to the mining of salt underneath. 2 
The Ministry used six criteria by which it judged the suitability of 
sites: reasonably level and stable land, good road and railway access, 
services able to be provided at reasonable cost, suitable for purpose for 
which it was established, and absence from serious complications such as 
land subsidence.3 
Local authorities took the initiative in suggesting some of the New 
Town sites. Essex County Council and Billericay Urban District Council 
put forward the site for Basildon, Lancashire County Council had three 
New Towns in their preliminary plan, Leyland, Parbold and Garstang, and 
Easington Rural District Council proposed the site for Peterlee.4 
1. Ibid., 
2. Ibid., 
3. Ibid., 
4. Ibid., 
P• 
P• 
P• 
P• 
125. 
123. 
125. 
124. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GENESIS OF PETERLEE 
History of the Environs 
From the earliest years of the nineteenth century, the varying 
fortunes of the coal industry has conditioned the settlement pattern and 
the social history of the environs of the Easington Rural District;~ 
Nation-wide trends in housing and living conditions reached into the 
area, but by the time they had been tributaried into the mining villages 
of the north, their beneficial effects were diluted and often became 
further causes of squalor. Five distinct periods can be distinguished. 
The first covers the whole period before 1811, the others are 1811 to 
1870, 1870 to 1890, 1890 to 1914 and 1914 to 1939. 1 
The earliest settlement that can be dated was believed to be at 
Yoden, circa 950 A.D. Until the eighteenth century, the land was 
entirely under the control of the Bishops of Durham, and was administered 
from Easington; it remained poor and desolate. Then in 1758, Rowland 
Burdon, a Newcastle banker, bought the Castle Eden estate and started off 
a chain of development by private land owners. All settlement which 
grew up was purely agricultural, grouped around the village green. 2 
1. Except for those specifically given, all reference must be made to 
the first chapter of "Analysis of Planning Problems", 16th January, 1950. 
(Cyclostyled ~cript - Peterlee Development Corporation. Interesting 
annotated copy in Durham County Planning Department.) 
2. 'Green Villages of County Durham' - Geographica 1935 - Thorpe. 
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Burdon's son built a turnpike from Stockton to Sunderland, and introduced 
a corduroy factory at Castle Eden. There was some mining of coal along 
the waterways of the Tyne and the Wear, in the shallow outcrops, but there 
was none in the district; the eastern half of the Durham coalfield was 
disguised under a bed of magnesian limestone. 
In 1811, Dr. William Smith made a boring at Haswell and proved that 
coal lay beneath the limestone plateau. A railway line was laid from 
Hartlepool to Haswell in 1835, which opened up the coal to the southern 
markets. Railway, not road, became the early means of coal haulage. 
Pits were sunk first in the western half of the plateau - South Hetton 
was opened in 1831, then Haswell in 1833, Thornley in 1836, Murton in 
1838, Shotton and Hesledon in 1840, Trimdon in 1842 and Wingate in 1843. 
The villages grew up around the pit heads. 
Houses were often made of local stone. They were either low pitched 
one storey, or with the loft in the front converted into a bedroom. 1 
They were built by the coal owners and let 1 free' after the miners signed 
the yearly bond. 
"Front doors opened straight on to black dirty unmade 
streets with possibly a concrete footpath edged by an open 
stone channel communicating with a gulley at suitable 
distances. Back doors opened into a small, sometimes 
unmade and unenclosed yard, never more than 10 feet 
1. Unpublished thesis, 'The Derelict Villages of County Durham', 194o, 
Ada Temple. (Durham Colleges Library.) 
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across, and then again on to black filthy unmade streets. 
A stone channel, the sole mode of drainage, again ran the 
full length of the street, with water stand pipes at 
intervals of 60 yards or so. In the centre of the back 
street stood detached groups of outhouses, comprising 
ashpits and middens, later to be converted into W.O.'s 
Running usually on one side of this area was the main 
shopping street, comprising small combined shops or 
lock-up shops, together with frequent public houses. 111 
During this period of the history of the County, there was an influx 
of people. They came from the Pennine Dales where the lead mines were 
closing down, from Yorkshire where the linen industry was facing increased 
competition from cotton, from Ireland and from all parts of England 
affected by enclosure and poverty. 
The third period was an intermission in the history of the area with 
long lasting social consequences. There was, between 1870 and 1890, a 
recession in the northern mining industry due to competition from the 
Hidland pits, who were capturing the southern markets. The pits at 
Haswell, Hesleden and Hutton Henry closed, never to reopen. An inward-
looking community spirit grew out of the miners' bitterness and 
resentment. The declining villages experienced the first taste of a long 
continuing migration of the young and enterprising. Lower rents 
1. 'Farewell Squalor', c.w. Clarke, p. 63. 
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accompanied the decline in the life of the village, attracting a drifting 
1 population and adding to the atmosphere of general decay. 
·Between 1890 and 1914, there occurred the second great expansion in 
the coal trade, due to the economic nascence of the Dominions and South 
America. Some of the inland pits were revived and new deep sinkings 
were begun on the coastal shelf of the east Durham plateau. Easington 
was opened in 1900, Harden in 1901 and Blackball in 1907. These pits 
became dependent on the coastal railway, the Leeds Northern line, opened 
in 1904 (not until 1924 did the A.1086 connect the villages by road). 
Villages were larger and engulfed any agricultural settlements 
which happened to be near the site of a new pit. Houses were built 
for the colliery owners by speculative builders, limited only by the 
soulless bye-law health legislation of the 1870's. The colliery-companies 
erected houses only to last the term of their lease. After the lease 
was up, the property reverted to the landowner, so it was not good 
business for the colliery company to expend fresh capital on repairs and 
. t 2 ~mprovemen s. 
nouses were laid out in what is now known as the 'grid iron', 
30 to the acre density, no gardens and little open space nearby. They 
were monotonous rows of small brick houses, having no regard to arrange-
ment or amenity. The Hammonds, in their 'The Town Labourer' , called 
1. 'Derelict Villages of County Durham', Ada Temple, p. 4o. 
2. Ibid., p. 44. See also 'Report of the Coal Commission 1925', 
Vol. 1, P• 199. 
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them aptly 'the barracks of an industry'. This description could have 
applied to many of the industrial towns of Britain during the period, 
but the proximity of the pit, the waste heaps, the sulphur fumes, and the 
conditions of labour, made the mining villages 'singular' in character. 
The east coast pits continued to expand between 1918 and 1939 • 
., 
By 1939, Harden, with 14,000 miners, was the largest colliery in the 
country. The last years of the twenties and the early thirties provided 
an interval of, first, industrial strife, then degradation. The Durham 
miners held out nine months longer than the rest in the General Strike 
of 1926. Because of the depression in the east of the area, miners 
found their wages cut below subsistence, and in the west (about 5~~) were 
made redundant. The migration (6% of the population, 1931-1939) and the 
high level of unemployment, made plain to the public conscience the 
deplorable living conditions and the potential industrial weaknesses of 
the mining districts. Housing, but not industry, was a local government 
responsibility, so that whilst the problem of industry was being discussed 
in theory, that of housing was being tackled in practice. o 
During this period, the Rural District Council caught up with the 
private and speculative builders in the number of houses erected; the 
fraction of tied colliery houses was reduced to a quarter of the total. 
Between 1930 and 1932, also, the local council set about converting 
12,000 privies i~to water flushed closets. The total number of houses 
the council built over the period 1918 to 1939 was 4,700, 2,700 of which 
were in replacement of the first mining period. Improvement as these 
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houses were on the old, they left much to be desired. Little thought was 
gi vein to layout or architectural treatment. The only influence the series 
of Town Planning Acts had was to inspire lower densities, gardens, and roads 
back and front. The layout was a transition between grid iron and Garden 
City concepts. Thomas Sharp, the architect, did not mince his words in 
speaking about them: 
"At Horden and Ea.sington, a great sprawling town village is 
being run up by both the local authority and speculative builders. 
The standard of meanness and disorder shown here seems to me 
almost incredible in this fourth decade of the twentieth century. 
Here above all is the kind of activity which almost makes one believe 
that men have lost the ability not only to create what is good, but 
actually to recognise what is evil. 111 
Easington was the inherited administrative centre; Horden, the 
largest village, had no urban functions for the district as a whole. 
Recreational facilities, of the football field, billiard table, kind had 
been provided for the separate villages by the Miners Welfare Commission. 
Other than a well-organised lending library system, there was little 
provision for cultural entertainment. 
In 1939, there were still 1,000 slum houses. Of the rest, one half 
had no bathroom, and three-quarters had no indoor lavatory. The thirties 
had brought great improvements in the provision of services, recreation 
1. 'Britain and the Beast', Essay by Thomas Sharpe entitled 'The North-
East, Hills and Hells ' , 
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and better housing. These undertakings had a profound effect on the 
social well being of the community and. • • 11marked the beinginning of a 
new concept of modern living in a mining communi tyrr. 1 
Mr. Clarke and the Easington Rural District Council 
The inspiration for the idea of having a new town in Easington Rural 
District can, with all justice, be attributed to the mind of one person, 
Mr. C. W. Clarke, who was the Council's Engineer and Surveyor. It is the 
growth of that inspiration which will be the main theme of the rest of 
this chapter - from its initial stage of 'centralised development' into the 
full legal concept of a 1 New Town' • The story will be taken up to the 
stage where the Ministry of Town and Country Planning2 was brought into 
the project, and then an interim summary will be made of events so far. 
The chapter will continue with an assessment of the various roles of the 
Council and the Ministry in the development of the concept, and will carry 
the story forward through the statutory proceedings of the New Towns Act, 
up to the stage where the Final Designation Order was made on the 10th March, 
Mr. Clarke was the son of a colliery manager and had been brought up, 
and went to school, in the mining villages where his father worked. The 
squalor of conditions in the pit villages had been apparent to him as long 
1. 'Farewell Sq_ualor', C. W. Clarke, p. 12. 
2. Henceforward, wherever the word 'Ministry' is used on its own, it refers 
to the Ministry of Town and Country Plann:Lng. Reference will be made 
to various files during this chapter, which will be listed in a special 
appendix at the end of the thesis. 
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as he could remember. From school, he went to train as a design engineer. 
At no stage did he receive any formal training in Town Planning, and even 
his informal training consisted of personal observations, rather than book 
learning. The only book relevant to the subject that he can remember to 
• 
have influenced him, was F. J. Osborn's 'Green Belt Cities'. 
In the early 1930's, when an attempt was being made to remedy the most 
obvious of the area's housing and sanitary deficiencies, a great compet-
ition for new housing developed among the separate villages. The only 
answer made by the then archi teet was a policy of short term appeasement. 
Mr. Clarke was influenced by this in coming to his own conclusions. Also 
important in developing his ideas was a spate of 'jerry building' on 
Crimdon Dene. The first occurrence, the addition of new housing on to 
the fringes of villages whose original nucleus did not, in his opinion, 
merit such additions, led him directly to the policy of, what became 
known as, the 'centralisation of development'. This involved the building 
of all new housing on virgin sites away from the existing villages. 
The concept had greaten content than this, as can be seen later when the 
first report that Mr. Clarke produced is examined in detail. The second 
happening, with its long fight to gain powers of compulsory purchase, 
raised in Mr. Clarke a desire to create a recreation area which would 
serve the whole Rural District. 
In 1938, the post of Architect fell vacant and as the Council wanted 
one man to fill all three offices, Mr. Clarke was obliged to take on the 
extra responsibility. All the same, it was the opportunity he was 
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waiting for to improve the planning of housing in the District. He put 
out feelers among the Council Members to see how they reacted to the 
suggestion of centralising development on one site. The reaction was 
completely negative and the idea was "guillotined by a small group of 
senior councillors11 • 1 It has been surmised that Council Members at the 
time regarded such a proposal as politically unpopular; they would be 
risking their seats if they put it forward. Hr. Clarke had to postpone 
his ideas until a more favourable time. These tentative plans were then 
only at a very nebulous stage and did not take any definite shape until 
later. 2 
It was the necessity of submitting a post-war scheme for reconstruction 
which was the excuse and motive for Mr. Clarke to propose once more the 
centralisation of development. On the 4th March, 1943, the Ministry of 
Health issued a circular requesting the Easington Rural District to submit 
a post-war programme. It also allocated to the District two years' 
suppiy, 800 houses, 400 a year.3 The circular was discussed on the 18th March 
and methods of allocation were gone into. The Council first of all agreed 
upon a one year scheme, and it was, as it were, upon the basis of the 
second year's allocation of 400 houses that Mr. Clarke first tied his 
larger scheme of centralisation. 
1. Sunderland Echo- Suppiement, Wed. May 25th 1960. 
2. Interview with Mr. Clarke, 11th December, 1959. 
3. Telephone conversation Mr. Agar, January 1960 - from Minutes of 
Housing Committee E.R.D.C. 
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The idea at that stage was not to .have one large site. In Mr. Clarke' s 
eyes, previous experience had already proved that the Council would not be 
willing to approve a proposal of this nature. Instead he suggested, in 
order, as it were, to provoke discussion amongst members of the council, 
having perhaps as many as four or five sites. His ideas were placed before 
a meeting of a Sub-Committee of the Housing Committee on the 29th June, 1943. 
This consisted of the Surveyor, Mr. Clarke; the Clerk to the Council, 
Mr. Gray; and the Chairman of both the Council and the Housing Committee. 
The Housing Committee was to meet later the same day, and this Sub-Committee 
(an institution of flexible purpose, like a Committee of the whole House 
of Commons) was acting that day as a Working Party. To quote from the 
tersely worded minutes, what Mr. Clarke suggested was: 
"that apart from the first year's programme' and in view of the 
Council's general post-war programme, consideration should be 
given to the acquisition of suitable sites for the purpose of creating 
and developing central housing estates on a large scale to serve a 
number of villages in the vicinity of such estates, rather than 
continue the sporadic building of smaller numbers of houses in 
each and every village. 111 
The Sub-Committee agreed that the suggestion should be a matter for 
early consideration by representatives of the whole of the parishes in the 
District. The full meeting of the Housing Committee recommended that the 
proposal should be placed on the agenda at a future date, and that mean-
while, Mr. Clarke should prepare a report showing the number, location and 
size of the sites that he had in mind . 
1. E.R.D.C. Hinutes of the Housing Committee, 29th June, 1943. 
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While Mr. Clarke was preparing the details of his report, the reactions 
of some of the parishes were e~icited by members of the Sub-Committee who 
went around paying visits to certain representatives. Not every village 
was consulted. Those that t.oiere, included Easington, Blackhall, Station 
Town, Wingate, Thornley and Shotton. 1 \a1hen the outline report t.o1as ready 
it was presented to members of the Housing Committee at a meeting held on 
5th August, 1943. In order not to rush the proceedings, the Clerk and 
the Chairman suggested that no decision he arrived at then, but that 
members should have time to digest the report. Later it could be gone 
into from every angle and all objections given a full hearing. A visit 
to the proposed sites was also suggested so that the whole Council would 
have the opportunity of discussing their relative merits. 
The Five Site Plan 
The Report presented by Hr. Clarke showed five sites for housing, 
as well as an extra one to be used as an industrial site for a trading 
estate. The fifth area recommended was only a tentative suggestion by 
Mr. Clarke for development to take place at Crimdon, on land already 
acquired by the Council. The recommendation was not accompanied by 
concrete proposals. For all intents and purposes, there were only four 
sites, plus the one for industry, which 1;1ere taken seriously. Site No. 1, 
just north of South Hetton, was meant to cover the districts of Nurton, 
Cold Hesleden, Dalton-le-Dale, Hawthorn, Seaton and South Hetton. Site 
No. 2, in the area which is now the north part of Peterlee, was intended 
to cover Easington Village, Easington Colliery, Harden and part of 
1. E.R.D.C. ~tinutes of the Housing Committee, 5th August, 1943. 
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Shotton Colliery. Site No. 3, lying between Haswell Moor and Wheatley 
Hill, catered for Haswell, Thornley and parts of both Wheatley Hill and 
Shotton. Site No. 4 was to the north of Deaf Hill and was intended to 
cover the districts of Wingate, Station Town, Hutton Henry, Castle Eden, 
Deaf Hill and parts of Wheatley Hill. The single area selected for a 
trading estate lay to the north of Haswell. 
Each site was analysed from the point of view of road and rail access, 
drainage, and availability of amenity open space. With sites 2 and 4, 
the railway facilities were not good and "road transport would have to play 
a large part in long distance and services to local collieries". New roads 
were proposed for some of the sites. Drainage in all the areas was said 
to be good, and only site No. 3 needed more wooded land and open space. 
The average size of each site was just under 300 acres. 1 
The area selected for the trading estate was to be for light industry. 
With a new road joining Easington Lane to Haswell, good road access would 
have been available, and being on the Pesspool branch line, rail facilities 
would have been also adequate. It was also near the Sabulite Works at 
Tuthill Quarry. 
The Question of the provision of services had not been at that stage 
fully investigated. Certain broad planning ideas were mentioned. Each 
new district would be "self contained with its own amenities", which 
1. For a rough comparison, the Peterlee designated area was 2,350 (which 
included Castle Eden Dene). Mr. Clarke's plan in 'Farewell Squalor' 
was for 1,395 acres. 
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included schools, branch library, churches, cinema, shopping centre, 
communal laundry, public house, community hall, medical clinics, nursery, 
restaurant, and playing fields. These amenities would act as a central 
core of development around which would be built the housing, first of all 
a ring of houses at 10 to the acre, and then another ring at 6 to the acre. 
These belts of housing would be intersected by a series of green "wedges" 
radiating from the centre. There would then be a green belt around the 
second ring of houses, which itself would be followed by another ring of 
housing, at 3 houses to the acre. The outermost belt would be agricult-
ural land, with very scattered development, 1 house. per 7 acres. "All 
existing plantations, woods or natural green belts would be earmarked so 
as to retain for posterity the beautiful parts of this Rural District. n 
The whole scheme was to be a long term policy for development, 
covering up to 20 or 30 years. It was recognised that the idea was 
necessarily ambitious and would involve expenditure on a scale hitherto 
unknown in a Rural District. 1 
The visit to the various sites took place on the 12th August, 1943, 
when the Housing Committee, in effect the whole Council, was taken around 
the District in a 42 seater bus. 2 On the 19th August the Housing 
Committee met again and decided to recommend that the principle of the 
centralisation of housing development be adopted. The question of 
having made a hurried decision over the main principle did not appear to 
1. Mr. Clarke's Report, 4th August, 1943 (14.7) 
2. Interview Mr. Clarke, 11th December, 1959. 
- 43 -
be in dispute. The only point which members seemed to want time to 
consider more fully was the location and number of the sites. This then 
was deferred to a later date to give members more opportunity of examining 
the Surveyor's Report. 
In October, there was an attempt to set up a Sub-Committee which 
would consist of representatives from each parish and ward, in order·that 
a closer inspection could be made of the sites recommended in Mr. Clarke's 
report. On 18th November, 1943, some Council Members forced a special 
Sub-Committee meeting in order to voice objections. Most of these were 
levelled, not against the principle of centralisation, but the siting of 
the proposed new areas of development. The Chairman said he was at a loss 
to understand v1hy the meeting had been called at all. The principle had 
been agreed upon, and there was a period of time being allowed to pass 
before any further steps were to be taken, so that members would have time 
to inspect the district and come to a decision themselves. Nevertheless, 
the meeting continued and objections and observations were recorded. 
The principal source of these objections came from the respresentatives of 
Haswell, who disliked the site just south of Murton, between Murton and 
South Hetton. They felt that ho~ses should be planned to be built nearer 
Haswell. A Wheatley Hill representative wanted development associated 
with his village to be tied to site No. 3, rather than site 4. One 
important general warning was given by Councillor Stonehouse who said that 
in taking large tracts of land for central housing development, the 
possibility of the sterilisation of coal would need to be taken into 
account. The meeting adjourned with the intention of having a further 
look at the sites at a later date. 
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Councillor Barnes and the Proposal for a Single Site 
The next reference to centralisation that can be traced was at a 
meeting of the Housing Committee held on February 9th, 1944, which had 
very important results. Mr. Clarke was questioned by Councillor Barnes 
as to whether he thought tl1at a major project of centralisation on the 
No. 2 site would not be the best policy. This was entirely unexpected. 
During the period from August 1943 to February 1944, Mr. Clarke, in 
general conversations, had been advocating the benefits of the one town 
idea. Nevertheless, he had no knowledge that such a suggestion was 
going to be brought up at the meeting, but was pleased that his 1938 
1 
suggestion had at last taken root. He, of course, answered the question 
in the affirmative, and proceeded to give his reasons at length. Never-
theless, the Committee, willing as they were once more to accept the 
principle of the idea being put forward, were not vdlling to accept at 
that stage on what site centralisation should take place. At this 
meeting, where the whole Council :oL .. 4:1· was eligible for memberShip, only 
19 persons were present (at least, only 19 voted). The motion was formally 
moved by Mr. Barnes and seconded by ~1r. Edwards. A delaying amendment 
was moved but failed. On the vote to the main motion, there were 14 votes 
for and 5 against. It was duly recommended that the principle of 
centralisation of housing development on one suitable site be adopted, 
and that the particular site should be decided on at a later date. The 
J 
Surveyor, Mr. Clarke, was also asked to prepare a report. On 17th 
February, 1944, the principle of centralisation of development on one site 
1. Ibid., interview with Mr. Clarke. 
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was confirmed by the whole Council. Before the meeting, the Minutes of 
the Housing Committee of the 9th February, as was usual, had been 
circulated. 't Nevertheless, only 26 attended the Council Meeting," a clear 
indication of either apathy, agreement, or perhaps ignorance of the 
project's significance. A fourth alternative may also provide the 
answer. There is very little argument in a full meeting of the Council. 
The main deliberations are settled in Committee, and the main disputes in 
the meetings of the "Labour Group11 • These Labour Group Meetings are held 
before important decisions are taken in Council or Committee. Most 
members in Council Ivleetings abide by majority votes taken by "the Group". 
The divisions of opinion between the older inland 'west side' villages 
and the more 'modern' east coast villages, which seeped into the open in 
certain extraordinary meetings of the Housing Committee, were mainly 
hidden under the cloak provided by "the Group". 
The Effect of the New Towns Report 
Because the preparation of development on such a scale would take a 
long time, and in order that the worst deficiencies in the villages 
should be made good first, the one year plan for 4oo new houses had been 
changed into a two year plan for 800 houses. It was the administration 
and organisa~ion necessary for this two year scheme which prevented 
planning being continued on the long term project. The end of the war 
in 1945 meant that the two year plan for post-war reconstruction took 
effect immediately and further long term planning had to be postponed. 
1. Telephone conversation with Mr. Agar, January, 1960, from Minutes 
of the Council. 
- 46-
The staff in the Surveyor's office could not stand the strain of preparing 
the twa schemes at the same time; one was a matter of urgency, the other 
could wait. 1 
In March, 1946, the first Interim Report of the New Towns Committee 
was published. This was avidly read by Mr. Clarke, and carefully 
annotated. He was impressed by all those points which appeared relevant 
to Easington, and particularly noted the benefits of development by a 
New Towns' Corporation, compared with the lesser powers then available to 
local authorities. 2 By the end of April, too, the Surveyor's office was 
free to turn to long term planning because their two year scheme had got 
underway and was out of their hands. Mr. Clarke and his staff began to 
think about ways and means. On 6th May, 1946, they wrote to the Regional 
Office of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, requesting a copy of 
the 1920 South Wales Regional Survey in connection with their own scheme, 
agreed by the Council in 1943, to centralise development for the whole 
district. The letter was answered by a subordinate, and its significance 
was not realised. 3 A couple of days later, Mr. Silkin, the Minister of 
Town and Country Planning, opened the debate on the New Towns' Bill in 
1. This explanation is surmised from the letter 'Clarke to Gray', 14th May, 
1946, (14.3) and from det~ls of Housing Committee Minutes up to 1946. 
2. Interim Report of the New Towns Committee (14.8) - annotated by 
Mr. Clarke. 
3. Letter Clarke to Tetlow, 6th May, 1946 (14.1). 
Letter Robson to C~arke, 10th May, 1946, (14.2). 
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the HOuse of Commons. Mr. Clarke had already noticed that one of the 
purposes of 'New Towns', suggested by the Reith Committee (the New 
To~ Committee), was to: 
"regroup persons from areas of diminishing population and 
from small scattered communities, whose major industry is 
.declining, and to rehouse them, not merely with greater 
amenities, but in proper·relation to newly established 
industries11 • 1 
Then, in his speech on th~ 8th May, 1949, Hr. Silkin mentioned that he 
was contemplating New Town development in Durham. 2 This reference 
perturbed Mr. Clarke and he wrote on the 14th May to Mr. Gray, the 
Clerk of the Council, inviting him to write to the Minister. 
"Before carrying the work in my department too far, I think 
it might be advisable, in order·to avoid duplication of 
work or future hold-ups, to contact the Minister of Town 
and Country Planning on this matter, pointing out that in 
1943, the Council decided, on a report from me, that the 
practice of sporadic building in each and every village 
be discontinued, and that consideration be given to the 
1. first Interim Report of the New Towns Committee, P.3. The New Towns 
Committee did not have in mind specifically either Peterlee or Newton 
Aycliffe when writing this paragraph. "Members had much general 
knowledge of Great Britain and knew then of many areas of declining 
industry and scattered population where New Towns could be useful for 
creating better conditions and introducing new industries." (F.J. Osborn-
Letter to the author, 18th August 1960). 
2. 2nd Reading Debate on New Towns Bill, 8th May, 1946. 
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creating of a new self-contained centre of development 
complete with the necessary community facilities, employment 
being provided by new light industries. 111 
It appears then that at this time Mr. Clarke had not been informed of 
the intention of the government to establish a New Town near to the 
recently created Trading Estate at Newton Aycliffe. Also , one can 
assume from the foregoing that Mr. Silkin's reference to Durham in his 
speech on 8th May was not made with any knowledge of Easington's project~ 
Mr. Gray, the Clerk to the Council, responded to Mr. Clarke's 
letter by writing to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning at Newcastle. What may well have confused the Ministry 
was that Mr. Gray enclosed with the letter dated the 17th May a copy of 
Mr. Clarke's report of the 4th August, 1943 - the report which suggested 
five diffe~ent sites.2 Whether this enclosed report delayed a full and 
immediate appreciation of the Rural District's plans, cannot be 
ascertained for certain. No communication with a senior officer of the 
~linistry until December, 1946, can be traced. What appeared to be the 
result of Mr. Gray's letter in May was that a few research workers in 
the Ministry were allotted to basic fact finding and statistical work on 
the Rural District's behalf. 
1. Letter Clarke to Gray, 14th May, 1946, (14.3). 
2. Mr. Clarke's Report, dated 4th August, 1943, (14.?). 
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Initial Research of the Regional Offices of the 'Ministry' 
The first results of these research workers in the Ministry, of 
which there is a record, is a report by Mr. James, which was sent to the 
Rural District by the County Planning Officer, Mr. Bates. It is not 
kno~m whether the Rural District received a copy when it was first produced 
on the 30th August, 1946, or whether Mr. Clarke had to wait until 
October, 1946, when he received the communication from Mr. Bates, to 
realise that the research being carried out in the Ministry was 
mis-directed. Research in the report had been confined both in its 
assumptions and in the calculation of statistics to the one Labour 
Exchange area of Horden. It appears that it was not fully realised that 
the proposed new development was to be for the whole of Easington Rural 
District, and not just for the Exchange area, where the new building was 
going to take place .• Mr. Bates was misled by Mr. Gray having enclosed 
the 1943 report. It is noteworthy that it was not until October that the 
correct interpretation was put on the scale of the project, though it is 
not certain whether the Regional Controller of the Ministry was himself 
informed. 1 
Research was needed because Mr. Clarke was trying to draw up a 
comprehensive report on the Rural District. The Surveyor's office was 
attempting to gather in material as fast as it could. The Minis try was 
supplying some basic facts and figures. Most of the material, however, 
appeared to be gleaned in direct correspondence ~nth the relevant 
1. Report prepared by Mr. James, 30th August, 1946 (14.9) 
Letter, Bates to Clarke, 1st October, 1946 (14.10). 
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authorities concerned, and likewise it seems t~~t the co-ordination 
and arranging of the facts was done in the Surveyor's office at Easington, 
mostly by }tr. Lumsden. 
A first draft of the 'Report' was sent to Mr. Bates on the 8th 
November, 1946, and to Mr. Tetlow, the Regional Controller of the 
Ministry, ten days later. Both were asked for their early comment 
because copies had to be circulated for a meeting of the Council in 
1 December. 
Interim Summary 
T9is is a good stage to stop and take stock of the history to date. 
There is no hard line where the work of the Easington Rural District 
Council ceases and that of the Ministry begins. Nevertheless, it was, 
as we shall see, the publication of the 'Outline Survey by the Council 
in November, 1946, which brought home to the responsible officers in the 
Regional Offices of the Ministry the true significance of Easington's 
schemes. Easington did not leave off planning and research, but the 
emphasis moved from planning to consultation and compromise. To make the 
point of interim summary here, is also apt because it emphasises the 
responsibility of Mr. Clarke and his deputy for the development of the 
idea, and the research and planning which led up to the publication of 
their plan. 
1. Letter, Clarke to Bates, 8th November, 1946 (14.12) 
Letter, Clarke to Tetlow, 18th November, 1946 (14.13). 
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The project had indeed grown from the 1938 and 1943 concepts of 
'centralisation'. It is difficult to determine how much, because it is 
uncertain just how strong was the theoretical idea in Mr. Clarke's mind 
in the early days of 1938. The evidence goes to suggest that though 
there were many points latent in the concept, they were all in a very 
nebulous stage. Nothing had been worked out very fully. This is very 
natural as it is rare for someone to work out a scheme in detail unless 
he thinks that there is a good chance of it being implemented. The 1943 
plan for four or five separate sites was not simply a climb down. The 
readiness and ease with which Mr. Clarke switched in defence of the 
'one site project' at the meeting of the Housing Committee on 9th February, 
1944, suggests that he must have had his heart strongly on that idea. 
The separate sites solution was a compromise to his ideal. 
Even a project envisaging five new estates was recognisably 
ambitious. Mr. Clarke made no attempt to disguise "the magnitude of 
the scheme". 1,800 houses at an average of 4 persons per house, in each 
of five centres,. made a total of 36,000 people "which is equal to 50";6 of 
the population. The cost was placed at between 7 and 8 million pounds. 
He also clearly stated that new road works, bridges, sewers, water and 
electric services would be required. Anybody reading the report of 
1943 would be left in no doubt as to what he would be letting his Council 
in for if he voted for the project. The report was widely distributed, 
the members of the Council were shown the sites and they were given from 
the 5th August, 1943, to the 9th February, 1944, to consider the report 
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at their leisure. As with later objections, most at this stage were 
confined, not with attacking the principle of 'centralisation', as 
defined by Mr. Clarke, but against the particular location of intended 
sites. A foreboding of future discontent were the vociferous objections 
raised by Haswell. It appears that the plans for this village, which 
were in Mr. Clarke's mind from some unknown date, were for its complete 
replacement within 20 years. The site of the new industrial estate was 
scheduled to lie immediately to the north of Haswell, and it may well 
have been Mr. Clarke's intention to plan for expanded industrial building 
on the site of the demolished village. 1 
It is difficult also to determine the reasons why the principle of 
centralisation on 'one site' was apparently passed so easily through 
both the Housing Committee and the Council. During the narrative, 
three possibilities were mentioned, 'apathy', 'ignorance', and either 
'agreement', or the cloaking of 'dispute' in the 'Labour Group' meetings. 
What must be meant by 'ignorance' here cannot be lack of knowledge of 
the details of the plan, or even of many of the economic consequences 
in terms of cost or social upheaval. What can be meant is that the 
Councillors were ignorant of the long term effects on their constituents. 
It was probably imagined that the extraordinary wartime feelings would 
continue long after the war, if not indefinitely. The same spirit of 
revolutionary community rebuilding that was infusing the legislators and 
1. Letter, Clarke to James, 17th January, 1947 (15.5). 
Interview Mr. Lumsden, February, 1960. 
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planners in London and the big cities, had its counterpart at 
Easington. __ The 1938 attitude of the Councillors is an interesting one. 
Is i:t to be regarded as the norm, or a case of pre-war ignorance which 
could not happen today? The evidence of contemporary attitudes in 
Easington, compared with first the 1938, and then the extraordinary 
wartime years, leads one to suspect that a similar project proposed 
today would not stand anywhere near the same chance of being accepted -
notwithstanding the early unhappy episodes in Peterlee's history. 
There was most certainly dispute between the villages, but mainly over 
the question of where the town was to be sited. 
agreement over the principle of centralisation. 
There was considerable 
The villages on the 
west, which were older development, realised that a New Town sited away 
from them would mean the destruction of their 'identity' as villages. 
There would be comparatively little slum clearance in the newer pit 
villages, _with the double benefit that what clearance was found to be 
necessary could be rehoused immediately 'next door'. The newer east 
coast villages, by virtue of their larger populations, commanded a 
majority of representatives in the Easington Rural District Council, 
and likewise in the corresponding 'Labour Group'. It was most probably 
the loyalty of the villages in disagreement with the plan put forward by 
Mr. Clarke, to the majority decisions of the 'Labour Group', that 
allowed apparent: unanimity in full meetings of the Council. 
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The next point which is worth considering is the effect of the 
1946 New Towns Bill on the Easington project. Why was there such a 
delay between the 17th February, 1944, when the Council confirmed the 
idea of centralisation on one site, and May, 1946, when Mr. Gray wrote 
to the Ministry? The coincidence of this letter and the publicity 
surrounding the appointment of the New Towns Committee, and the impending 
New Towns Bill, is almost too suspicious to put down to chance. Surely 
one must conclude that the plan had been allowed to hang fire and had 
suddenly been revived by the appearance of the Bill. There must be 
some truth in this, but to weigh up how much is a task for which there 
is not sufficient evidence to provide any sure answer. What probably 
was a stumbling block were the immense legal and financial difficulties 
involved, which were beginning to be realised by the Surveyor's office 
tEa ••t 1 a sJ.D.g on. The centralisation project was first of all the second 
part - and more - of the two year postwar plan that the Ministry of 
Health in 1943 asked Easington to draw up. The next step was to make 
the two year plan complete in itself, after the Council had approved the 
long term plan. The 800 houses allocated for building during those 
two years were erected in the villages in proportion to their population. 
Whether the larger scheme would have been in the same fashion continually 
put off, cannot be determined. However, there is not much doubt that 
the Surveyor's office was kept busy between February, 1944, and May, 1946, 
1. Interview Mr. Lumsden, February, 1960. 
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drawing up plans for these Boo houses. An authentic note was struck 
in Mr. Clarke's letter to Mr. Gray when he said: 
"The working drawings for our two year permanent housing 
programme, with the exception of Harden 134, have now been 
approved by the Ministry of Health. As this two year 
period expires in August, 1947, I think it is essential, 
in order to avoid delays in building development, that 
preliminary survey and research work on the proposed 
Centralisation scheme be commenced at the earliest possible 
date. 111 
There was indeed a coincidence in the dates when the New Towns 
Bill made its appearance and the date when the Working Drawings for 
the two year plan had been passed by the Ministry of Health. Whatever 
was the case, the Interim Report of the New Towns Committee dispelled 
some doubts and made the case for speeding up planning of their own 
scheme. Mr. Clarke had noted well the benefits of having the New Town 
built under the aegis of the proposed Act. From a Memorandum sent to 
him by the Town and Country Planning Association,~ he had seen that 
neither Private nor Local Authority Associations would receive the same 
prerogatives as the 'Development Corporation'. If Private or Local 
1. Letter, Clarke to Gray, 14th May, 1946 (14.3). 
2. Memorandum of the Town and Country Planning Association, 22nd May, 
1946 (14.5) 
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Authority development had been directly turned down as a proposition 
by the Minister, then their own project, if they intended to go ahead 
and build it by themselves, would obviously not be very well received 
when it was placed before the Minister - unless, that is, it was 
submitted as a proposal under the Act. Such must have been Mr. Clarke's 
reasoning when he sent the note to Mr. Gray inviting him to contact the 
Ivlinistry. 
~~. Clarke was well aware of the need for new industry to be 
associated with any new development, as can be seen in his first report 
of 1943. The industrial area in that report was intended to serve all 
the five new communities. It is clear from this that Mr. Clarke had 
either faced up to the dilemma of at least limited travel to work and 
had, nevertheless, come down in favour of concentration, or had discounted 
the factor entirely. Whatever weight was given to it at this early 
stage was most certainly increased by contact with the Ministry. 
The important point was that from the very first, it had been decided 
that the industrial site used should be planned to be in an area which 
would "serve existing tO\mships as well as the New Town." 1 Even if 
the industrial site was not organically integrated into the New Town 
area, the housing arid community facilities would have been planned with 
a great deal of understanding of contemporary planning techniques. One 
gets the impression from reading through the files, that Mr. Clarke was 
1. Outline sketch of central development (File 14) 
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digesting new ideas as fast as they were explained to him. 
It can also be seen how much the 'Outline Survey' was the product 
of Easington, rather than the planning section of the Ministry, because 
of some of the indi vi dial ideas there expressed, which did not receive 
much support from the Ministry. Firstly, there was Mr. Clarke's 
views on the mining problem; he did not regard the danger of coal 
1 
subsidence to be very great. Secondly, all the 10,000 houses to be 
built were to rehouse miners from the villages, not the kind of balanced 
population that 'Planners' were then aiming for. 2 Thirdly, there was 
to be practically no new house building in the villages, the result of 
which was later to be the concern of both the Ministry and the County 
Authorities. 
growth.3 
Lastly, the target population took no account of natural 
The Easington Plan and Regional Influences 
Mr. Bates' (The County Planning Officer) views on the 'Outline 
Survey' were discussed with Mr. Clarke at a meeting, so there is no 
record of them, but Mr. Tetlow's (The Regional Controller of the 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning) were expressed in a personal 
1. Chapter 3 on Coal Problem, P. 2. 
2. See Silkin's speeches, Ch. 2, p. 20 and pp. 21 - 22. 
3. See letter James to Clarke, 6th March, 1947 (14.16a). 
Also Meeting, 26th March, 1947, p.4 (1?.5). 
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letter, which is very instructive. The letter opened with the guarded 
comments that none of the remarks made was to be taken as official by 
the Hinistry. All the same, Mr. Tetlow said that he was having the 
matter very thoroughly looked into so that his l1inistry \vould be in a 
position to develop its own views on the project without necessarily 
having to wait for the initiative to be taken by Easington. He there-
fore regarded the problem with some urgency, and thought that central 
government would take a hand if they agreed with the idea in principle. 
For himself, he had some doubts; these were mainly concerned with, not 
the idea of 'grouped development', but with the intention of having only 
one site for the grouping. Either a "white elephant" would be created, 
or the existing villages would have their life blood and initiative 
sapped. · Mr. Tetlow also stressed the importance of coal in the area, 
and though the introduction of other interests was necessary, it was 
vi tal that nothing was done to draw attention away from "this most 
important of all the country's minerals. 2 With regard to Mr. Clarke's 
views on the sterilisation of coal, he disagreed that .there would be 
little trouble, especially "if the damage factor is considered in relation 
to more or less total extraction of coal. 2 11Any new development in the 
Easington district, whether it be in a new community or an extension of 
existing communities, must necessarily be considered very carefully in 
relation to the coal position.2 Mr. Tetlow, though making the principal 
point that the subsidence problem was serious, admitted at the same time 
that it applied to new building of all kinds, whether centralised or not. 
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Such was the gist of this very important letter. The rest was mainly 
concerned with criticism of certain figures in the tables used by 
Mr. Clarke. The only important criticism was of the figure given in 
the report for employment needs, and for the density per acre in the 
1 industrial area. Mr. Tetlow thought that Mr. Clarke's employment 
figure of 8,000 was the absolute maximum, due to the reluctance of the 
Ministry of Labour to admit a higher figure of female labour availability, 
and he also thought the allowance for the industrial area of 100 acres 
was too large "and could be very appreciably reduced. 112 Mr. Clarke did 
alter one of the figures criticised. They had been worked out by 
Miss Elliott, herself in the Ministry, and sent to Easington on 4th 
October, 1946. The figure of 8,000 mentioned by her had been reduced 
to 6,000 because "the Ministry of Labour and ourselves think it unlikely 
that the percentage of female to make employment can be raised to the 
national average. 113 Mr. Clarke had just attempted to get away with the 
higher figure • He did not reduce the planned size of his industrial 
site. 
The "Outline Survey of the District with Development and Redevelop-
ment Proposals" was in fact submitted earlier than expected. A Special 
Meeting of the Housing Committee considered it on 19th December, 1946. 
1. The industry question played an important part in the early history of 
Peterlee. The relevance of these points will be discussed in a 
separate chapter devoted to the problem of industry. 
2. Letter, Tetlow to Clarke, 4th December, 1946 (14.14). 
3. Letter, Elliott to Clarke, 4th October, 1946 (14.11) 
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It was decided to recommend that powers be given to Mr. Clarke to 
implement the 'Report', and also that the Council's indebtedness to the 
1 Surveyor should be placed on record. 
Mr. Tetlow later made the point that he had known about the project 
for "a considerable time", 2 but that he had maintained a discreet 
silence until the Council had expressed their desire to go ahead. 
The Regional Controller's knowledge could not go back further than 
May, 1946, and it appears unlikely that his appreciation of the scope 
of the project went back further than the date when he received the 
draft report from Mr. Clarke. 3 The question is of some importance 
because it is not known how much encouragement was given behind the 
scenes, how much, that is, of 'Farewell Squalor' was written from 
Easington and how much from the Ministry. Also, by not taking too much 
of a hand in the early stages, before the Council had committed them-
selves, the Regional Controller saved himself a 'trump card' in any 
persuasion that might be necessary with the Minister. The question of 
dating his knowledge and appreciation of Easington's scheme then, if it 
could be answered, would perhaps give us a clearer idea of when he had it 
in mind to attempt to have the area designated under the New Towns Act. 
There is another reason why he did not interfere with the initiative of 
1. Minutes of the Housing Committee. 
2. Meeting, Tetlow and the Council, 12th,Harch, 1947 (15.7) 
3. The inclusion of the old report (14.7) with the letter to Tetlow 
from Gray (14.4), the statement by Tetlow in his letter to 
Clarke (14.14) that he agreed with the idea of grouped development 
but not necessarily on one site, and the initial confusions of the 
Hinistry Research workers, lead one to this conclusion. 
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the local authority. l·1r. Tetlow knew the strength of local democratic 
feeling and did not want a repetition of the public opposition and 
resentment which had resulted from some of the previous applications of 
the Act. 1 
The only kind of interference that the Regional Controller allowed 
himself was to dampen down the speed at which the Rural District wanted 
to move. The same day the Report was passed by the Council on the 
19th December, 1946, Mr. Clarke wrote to Mr. Bates and Mr. Tetlow 
asking them to "come and see me at a very early date". He also wrote 
to Colonel Methven of North East Trading Estates Ltd., asking him to 
attend the same conference. He mentioned in this letter that his 
proposed plans might cut across the policy that N.E.T.E. intended 
implementing. Mr. Clarke was obviously uncertain of the best site for 
the industrial estate and asked in the letter for some advice from 
2 Colonel Methven. 
Mr. Tetlow's reply was to arrange a meeting - which was virtually 
the newly instituted Regional Physical Planning Committee3 - for 
10th January, 1947. He also urged patience on the Council, which the 
day before the meeting, themselves confirmed the Housing Committee Minute 
1. See Tetlow's opening remarks at Heeting with the Council, 12th March, 
1947 (15.7). 
Also, H. Orlans "Stevenage; A Sociological Study of a New Town" 
(Routledge and Kegan-·Pool,. 1952). 
2. Letters, Clarke to Methven, Tetlow and Bates, 19th December, 1946 
(15.1) 
3. Meeting 10th January, 1947 (13.1). 
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of December. The wheels of negotiation were slow but necessary. 
All the Regional heads of Ministries were present on the 10th January. 
Mr. Clarke opened by explaining that he had already submitted his 
proposals to the Government Departments concerned. The site had been 
discussed with the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and was the most 
suitable one as far as they were concerned; it was near to the main 
collieries, and the agricultural land was no better and no worse than 
land in other parts of the district. The configuration of the land was 
suitable for sewerage, and a reservoir was adjoining. Road facilities 
were good; rail access was not good, but a line could be brought from 
the Wellfield track. 
There was a large degree of difference between various members' 
views as to the correct acreage for the industrial estate. Mr. Clarke 
adhered to the 100 acres of his report. Mr. Bulmer of the Board of 
Trade thought that 30 acres was sufficient. Colonel Methven, f~r the 
North East Trading Estates Limited, the Board of Trade's Agent, stated 
that a small estate is administratively difficult to run. Working on 
the assumption of 7% of the population needing diversified employment, 
he had come to the figure of 7,000 and therefore an estate of 70 acres. 
Mr. James, the Research Officer of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning, also came to a different result. Reducing the number of 
females available for employment, given by Miss Elliott and adopted by 
1 Mr. Clarke in his amended report· (Miss Elliott was Mr. James' assistant) 
1. December, 1946, Report Amended January 14th, 1947. (See errata sheet 
in File 14). 
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to 4,000, and adding 1,000 jobs for males, he had come to the conslusion 
that there was a need for an estate of 50 acres. He had reduced the 
number of jobs for females because the figure of 6,000 did not include the 
.. 
work which would be available in the service industries 
Two more points mentioned at this meeting are worth recording. 
The first w.a;s.;raised by Mr. Gibbs, from the Ministry of Labour. He was 
concerned at the increase in travelling distance for the miners from their 
homes to the collieries. Mr. Tetlow gave him the answer that figures 
from the Miners' Welfare Association showed that miners already travelled 
long distances, criss-crossing from home to pits which were not necessarily 
the nearest to them. Secondly, Mr. Bates raised the question again of 
the mining problem. He said that he had gone into it unofficially, and 
was satisfied that provided they kept south of an important seam to the 
north of the site, they would be all right. Mr. Coates, the Ministry of 
~uel and Power representative, said nothing on this which has been 
recorded. But when a conclusion was arrived at of "general agreement in 
principle", two points were stated to need further consideration. One was 
agriculture and the other coal. 
The Ministry of Agriculture objected to the site chosen by the 
Surveyor for Easington on the grounds that it was valuable agricultural 
land. They put forward an alternative, which was an area more to the 
west, around Shotton Collier,i. ('The coal problem' has been dealt with 
in a chapter by itself and the changes in the Coal Board's attitude can 
be located there.) 1 The Northern Region Physical Planning Committee had 
1. Meeting 10th January, 1947 (13.1) 
- 64 -
had one earlier formal meeting, but at its first working meeting held 
on 28th January, 1947, the proposed 'New Town at Easington' was the third 
item on the agenda. The Ministry of Agriculture there reiterated its 
attitude. The representative of the Ministry of Labour also maintained 
his position as regards the objection to increased travel to work, which 
he claimed the alternative site proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
would not help alleviate. The committee were willing to agree in 
principle to the proposal for a New Town, in fact unanimously, but they 
deferred to a future date any decision as to size and location. 1 
The discussion on the deferred subjects was held in February. 
The Ministry of Labour, having accepted the project in principle, 
attacked the proposed size of the New Town. Mr. Gibbs, their represent-
ative, claimed that "if the town went ahead as planned with about 
9,000 houses, it meant a vast expansion of men in service industries 
right in the heart of a coal extraction area, where the paramount need, 
as laid down in the White Paper, was to expand the coal mining labour 
force". No discussion was held on the location of the site and it was 
decided to refer the question of size to a sub-committee of interested 
members.2 
The Regional Office of the Ministry, at least from January, 1947, 
must have had it in their minds that the Easington project would make an 
ideal subject for the New Towns Act. The County Planning Department, 
1. Meeting 28th January, 1947 (17.3) 
2. Meeting 25th February, 1947 (17.4) 
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under Mr. Bates, most certainly did. On the 28th January, Mr. Bates 
made a report to his County Planning Committee that the proposal could 
best be realised through a government sponsored New Town under a New Town 
Corporation. 1 Whether Mr. Tetlow approached the Ninister before or 
after attempting to convince the Rural District Council, is just not 
known. If it was the former, then the consent of the Minister to proceed 
must have been received by }tarch because the Regional Controller arranged 
for a meeting with the Council for the 12th March. Mr. Tetlow opened 
with a long and very frank speech which succeeded in its object, to 
persuade the Council to accept a New Town Corporation instead of themselves 
as the operative agency. One of the decisive influences in disarming 
possible opposition was the emphasis placed on the fact that the Government 
would finance the project. All his comments in the light of what 
happened are very interesting. Here is a selection of the most important: 
"The proposal that you have put forward is one which, to some 
extent,surprised me, but very much pleased me. Normally, one 
findS that it is the Government officials in an area who are 
pressing the elected representatives to concentrate development." 
"You have the richest coal and modern mining, but on the other 
hand, mere coal getting is not in itself a full and complete 
life for a community.. • the Government should help you set up 
a society which has, as its primary basis, getting coal, but has 
also other industry to help coal out in a difficult period." 
1. Report of the County Planning Officer, 28th January, 1947 (16.1) 
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"If we are going to get permanent industry in the area which 
will be reliable, it seems to me that we should get the 
industries that are tied here, which depend on the use of 
rivers, coal •••• 11 
11You have a New Towns Act; so far, it has not been used, it 
is starting to be used, but it is having a rough passage in 
some places, largely because the Government has been trying to 
use it ••• In Durham we have tried to go about things differently; 
we do not want the Government to say to an authority 11Do this" 
or "Do that". Up here we want it to be a case of finding out 
what the authorities want and then giving them all the assistance 
possible in helping them to carry it out.'" 
"If this is to be carried out with the greatest of expedition, 
the Government feels it can be done best if a body of developers 
responsible for the whole is set up, a body which need not worry 
itself about the financial background. A New Towns Corporation 
would be a body of perhaps a dozen persons who would be selected 
as far as possible locally, but with possibly a few outsiders in 
it in order to bring in points of interest which the local 
people might not have." 
The Regional Controller added that they were yet uncertain on two 
points: the size, and location of the proposed New Town. They were 
not certain whether Mr. Clarke's recommendation for a town of 50,000 
was too large or whether 30,000 would not be better in the circumstances. 
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The principal point about the location, he said, was that differing 
from other New Towns, it was not going to be industrially self-contained, 
therefore the travelling time between home and work becomes an added 
factor to be considered. 
After his speech, Mr. Tetlow answered questions. One Councillor 
asked whether, considering that Hartlepools and Sunderland were 
developing industrial estates, did he think they would have much chance 
of getting new industry? Mr. Tetlow replied that industry was going to 
those places to take up the slack in employment, just as they intended 
to do with Easington. They did not want people to have to travel up 
to 40 miles to work. The New Town trading estate may not only cater 
for people not engaged in coal getting inside the area, but also perhaps 
draw on people outside the boundaries of Easington. He added that due 
to the proposed New Town estate, the one agreed upon in 1946 for Wingate 
would be reduced to not more than two or three factories. 
In answer to a question of how long it would take to build the Town, 
Mr. Tetlow said that he thought it could be done faster than the 
15-20 years proposed by the Council. The main factors controlling the 
speed of development would be the availability of labour and materials 
There was no question as to the success of the Regional Controller's 
appeal to the Council. On the 24tht Harch, by a unanimous vote, it was 
decided to put the project in the hands of the Minister, and to have the 
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Town built by means of a Development Corporation, under the New 
Towns Act. 1 
Meanwhile, the Surveyor went ahead tidying up his own 'Outline 
Survey', and preparing it for the printers. The meeting of December, 
1946, had also empowered him to have his report published "in order that 
the proposals in the scheme be known to all in the District". 2 
There was also much interchange of information between the Rural 
District and the staff of the North Eastern Development Area Plan. 
This professional team of Planners were doing, at the time, a 
comprehensive survey of the North ~st. The principal authors were 
George Pepler and P.W. Macfarline. They were in favour of the idea on 
the whole, but they had their reservations. They considered that the 
stretch of coast from Sunderland to the Hartlepools, including the 
scattered mining villages, was already sufficiently urbanised. The 
proposal was in order only if it was regarded essentially for 'population 
regrouping', and not for expansion by means of an attraction of the 
coming lab~ur surplus from west Durham. 3 More comments on the Pep~er and 
Macfarline Plan can be found in the chapter on 'Industry'. 
1. Meeting, Tetlow and the Council, 12th March, 1947 (15.7). 
Letter, Clarke to Tetlow, 24th March, 1947 (in unheaded file -
Clerk to the Council's Office, Easington R.D.C.). 
2. Extract of Minutes of Housing Committee (15.3). 
3. North Eastern Area Development Plan P. 152. (Copy in Durham County 
Library). 
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The Regional Physical Planning Committee met again in March to 
consider the report of their sub-committee set up to consider the 
question of the proposed size of the New Town. The sub-committee did 
in fact consider the subject of location as well as size. They made 
some interesting comments on the site suggested by Mr. Clarke. The 
area, they said, was a very rolling one; the gradient of the principal 
access from Harden was abnormally difficult and unsuitable. The location 
most suitable for a civic centre was too close to the northern boundary, 
and the whole site was generally very exposed. The committee also 
elaborated on the reasons why the suggested site of the Ninistry of 
Agriculture was unsuitable. The location of a drab derelict village 
on the site was unsatisfactory. The area was also most exposed. 
The committee put forward a third alternative. Their recommended site 
was to the north of Mr. Clarke's, embracing Easington Village and 
Easington Colliery. The benefits attributed to their choice were, 
first, that the contours, and suitability for drainage, aided normal 
development, and, secondly, the proximity to existing habitation would 
prevent unsatisfactory detachment and would solve many difficulties in 
the early stages of development. Nost of the recent building has been 
in that area • Lastly, the site adjoined a main railway and offered 
good facilities for the location of industry. The committee recommended 
that the site proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture be withdrawn and 
that consideration be given further to Mr. Clarke's and their own 
al terna ti ve. 1 
1. Report of the Sub-committee (1?.6). 
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The March meeting of the full Regional Planning Committee considered 
the report. The Ministry of Agriculture still refused to give its 
assent to the second ten-year programme, and had shifted their ground 
from claiming that a New Town site would eat up more land than scattered 
development, which was their original position, to asserting that the 
acquisition of land a long time prior to development would result in the 
product of the land falling, as a consequence of decreasing agricultural 
land values. The Ministry of Labour had not altered its views but agreed 
to abide by the majority decision. The Committee were unanimous in 
agreeing to acquire land for the first ten-year programme of 3,904 houses, 
and in the decision to also buy enough land for the second ten years, 
of 5,416 houses, the Ministry of Agriculture dissented. Also agreed was 
that the overall density should be 6.5 nouses to the acre. Consideration 
of the site proposals was deferred again for further consultations. 1 
No decision on the site had been reached by the time of the next 
meeting the following month. Mr. Tetlow agreed the situation was 
growing urgent because the Rural District's housing programme was rapidly 
nearing completion, and they hoped to put all their future development 
into the New Town. But negotiations were still continuing with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and had just been opened with the N.C.B., so 
they would have to wait until the outcome of these were known. 2 
1. Meeting, 25th March, 1947 (17.6). 
2. Meeting, 22nd April, 1947 (17.7). 
- 71 -
The Committee again met in May. The Chairman stated that agreement 
had been reached with the N.C.B. The question of the site was more or 
less assumed as settled, without further discussion being recorded. 
Mr. Dixon, for the Coal Board, said there would be difficulties in 
building anywhere in Easington, and wherever development took place strongly 
reinforced foundations would have to be used. The Ministry of Agriculture 
maintained its position, which none of the suggested alternative sites 
had managed to satisfy. 1 
It is clear that the choice of site was conditioned by the fact 
that, other things being more or less equal, the National Coal Board 
had at least been able to clear 146 acres for immediate development on 
the land abutting on Harden Colliery. When the Minister was given the 
choice of sites, this land agreed with the N.C.B. would have been in 
the north-east corner of Mr. Clarke's site, and in the south-east corner 
of the site put forward by the Regional Physical Planning Sub-committee. 
The first communication that the Rural District had with the N.C.B. 
over the New Town was on the 18th March, 1947, first of all on the 
telephone and then by letter. Mr. Clarke made a request to the 
Divisional Production Director for permission to use certain figures in 
his published edition of 'Farewell Squalor'. The N.C.B. were quite 
upset that they had not been informed of the project before and had not 
received a copy of the 'Outline Survey' along with the other Ministries 
and Government Departments. Mr. Clarke tendered his apologies. 2 
1. Meeting, 28th May, 1947 (1?.8). 
2. Letter, Clarke to Barratt, 18th March, 1947 (14.17). 
- 72 -
A meeting was arranged with Mr. Dixon, the Divisional Estates 
Manager. As well as. Mr. Dixon, there were present, Mr. Clarke, the 
County Planning Officer Mr. Bates, and Mr. Tetlow. After the meeting, 
Mr. Clarke posted to Mr. Dixon a copy of the drawing showing the general 
layout of the proposed New Town. A few more such meetings must have 
been held between the Regional Controller and Mr. Dixon, culminating in 
agreement in June of that year. 1 In his report to the County Planning 
Committee of July 11th, 1947, Mr. Bates wrote: 
"Following upon discussions with the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning and the National Coal Board, agreement has now 
been reached with the latter that where necessary to secure 
stability, coal will be sterilised so as to develop the first 
section of the Easington New Town and steps will be taken to 
co-relate the mining and surface development in the two 
future units. 112 
The Acceptance of the Plan by Mr. Silkin, The Minister. 
The next important event which carried the project forward another 
step took place in July, 1947, when the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning, Mr. Silkin, paid a visit to Easington. The visit had a 
joint purpose; Mr. Silkin was also spending a day at Aycliffe. The 
Minister, when he arrived in Easington on the evening of the 7th, made 
a short tour of the area. The next day, he met members of the Council 
at the Council Offices. 
1. Letter, Clarke to Dixon, 16th April, 1947. 
2. Report of Meeting of County Planning Committee, 11th July, 1947 (16.2). 
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Mr. Silkin put the question to the Council of why did they not 
build the Town themselves. Most of the answers given were not 
relevant and only stated why a Town was needed in that locality. However, 
Mr. O'Neil said that coal was a national asset and if the State wanted 
foal, it could pay to make the area more attractive. 
60,000 was the figure mentioned by Mr. Silkin as the right size for 
a New Town and he hoped that they would review the figure of 30,000 that 
had been suggested to him. Mr. Silkin also said that they should aim 
at having a balanced community consisting of all classes. In reply, 
Councillor Roseby said that the site of the New Town chosen was such a 
beauty spot that he feared that too many 'other classes' would be 
attracted. 
After the meeting, Mr. Silkin again paid a visit to some more of 
the villages. The whole thing had, he said later, been mainly 
exploratory. The answers he had received to the questions he had 
raised "had very deeply impressed him it. 'l 
The Regional Controller, Mr. Tetlow, had been with the Minister on 
his tour and had pointed out the various sites, other than the one 
recommended by Mr. Clarke. All the complications had been explained to 
Mr. Silkin, but as a result of his visit he nevertheless immediately 
2 
chose the one put forward in 'Farewell Squalor'. 
1. See Files in Clerk to Council's Office, Easington. 
of visit of Minister, 8th July, 1947, also Meeting 
Local Authorities, August 27th, 1947. 
2. Interview J.R. J~es, 8th January, 1960. 
Unheaded report 
of Minister and 
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The Counqil next heard from the Ministry in London on 16th August, 
Referring to the recent visit, the letter daid that the Minister 
"had in mind the expediency of establishing a town with a population of 
the order of 30,000 people. The town would be a balanced community, 
its citizens being drawn in the main from persons now living in unsatis-
factory conditions in the Rural District. The existing opportunities 
of local employment would be supplemented by the introduction of suitable 
additional industries". 1 
During the early part of August, the Ministry of Health had allocated 
another 400 houses to Easington to be built in, and only in, 1947. 
The Regional Controller, Mr. Tetlow, recommended to the Council that they 
build these on the New Town site. They could use the normal procedure 
under the Housing Acts to acquire the site and raise the necessary loans. 
Mr. Clarke said that he was anticipating a favourable decision from 
Mr. Silkin and had commenced surveys on the New Town site. 2 
Under Section 1 (1) of the New Towns Act, the Minister, before he 
could make a Designation Order, had to first consult with all the Local 
Authorities concerned. A meeting with the Local Authorities was 
arranged for August 27th, 1947. The intention was to speed up the 
statutory proceedings as much as possible in order that the building 
programme could be got under way. 3 The Minister was responsive to this 
1. Letter, Ministry to Clerk of Council, 16th August, 1947 (15.8) 
2. Surveyor's Report, 21st August, 1947 (15.9). 
3. The reason for this was the necessity to build the allocation of 
houses quickly. See note 3, page 23. 
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and agreed to the early meeting. When he arrived, he said that he had 
not expected, when he was in Easington last, that he would be back so 
soon. The Local Authorities represented at the meeting were the 
Easington Rural District Council, the Durham County Council, the East 
Durham Joint Planning Committee, the Newcastle Corporation, the West 
Hartlepool County Borough, and the Hartlepool Borough Council. 
Mr. Pepler, for the North Eastern Development Area Plan, was also present. 
Both the Hartlepools Authorities were only invited after protests had 
been sent to the Ministry. 1 The meeting mainly consisted of an address 
by the Minister, with a few questions at the end. 
Councillor McNann of the Easington Rural District Council took the 
chair. His opening remarks mentioned two reasons for speed. There 
was, he said, an immediate need for new industry in the area, and the 
rate of progress in setting up such new concerns did not have to be 
linked with therate of construction of the New Town. Secondly, the 
Direct Labour Staff employed by the District Council was rapidly nearing 
the end of the post-war two-year building programme. 
Mr. Silkin then spoke at length. He first of all explained the 
purposes of the New Town, and what had influenced him in agreeing to 
the project: 
"··· in the next twenty years, there is an established need 
of some 10,000 new houses providing for a population of about 
30,000, and the question the Easington Rural District Council 
1. Letter, Waddell to Clerk of Council, 22nd August, 1947 (15.10). 
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had to ask was where were they going to build those 10,000 
houses, and it was a question they had to answer straight 
away." 
"The only thing was to build them on a new site away from the 
conditions he had described without the handicap of any 
existing buildings, and where it would be possible to build 
up a township of some thirty-odd thousand with the amusements 
and other essential conditions which were necessary to maintain 
the good life." 
A second reason was: 
"··· that it was definitely anti-social that they should have 
people of one income group and one type of occupation all 
segregated together, merely able to discuss the events of the 
pit and the life around the pit, and nothing else." 
There was another factor which impressed him: 
"that in an area such as this, where practically the only 
industry was mining, there was no scope for people who 
wanted to take up any other occupation, or were not suited 
or fit to take part in mining. 11 
The Minister then stated why he thought the town should be built by a 
public corporation and not by the Local Authority: 
"The building of a New Town would mean capital outlay which 
is irrecoverable, in the first years at least; but in the 
very early years it means a heavy loss, which, having regard 
- 77 -
to the finances of the Rural District and the County Council, 
it would be unfair and unreasonable to expect them to bear." 
As to the size of the town, Mr. Silkin estimated that because of 
the short life of the pits, 20-40 years, the figure of 30,000 target 
population would be too small. He favoured the larger figure of 
60,000, which could support a larger number of amenities. 
He then went on to describe the statutory machinery for creating 
the town, the draft Designation Order, the local public inquiry, and the 
setting up of the Corporation. The Minister defined at length the 
qualities he was looking for in members that he would appoint to the 
Corporation. It would not be a re~ard for service. The Corporation 
would need a variety of talents, people who were not too old, who were 
really keen on the idea of a new town, and who could act independently 
from the pulls of Local Authorities who recommended them. 
The first comment to be made after the Minister's speech was from 
the Town Clerk of West Hartlepool, who voiced fears that the creation of 
another trading estate in the New Town north of the Hartlepools would 
simply mean increased competition for a limited labour supply. The 
Minister answered this with these words: 
"It would be absurd to build new towns at the expense of the 
old, and it might do more harm than good if we did not consider 
the effect on the old town. This new town was not being erected 
for the purpose he had explained when introducing the New Towns 
Bill, it was for a different type of purpose, and it had to be 
perfectly clear that they were not attracting population from 
old towns that should not be attracted - that was not the 
purpose of the plan which was being organised by Mr. Pepler and 
his organisation. One of the purposes was to ensure not only 
that the development area got the amount of industry necessary, 
but that it was properly distributed. 111 
The Easington Rural District Council were now being overtaken by 
the mechanism of central government. The letters from the London 
offices of the I1inistry were couched in a most formal manner, and 
requests were made to them to do small tasks as if they had had no 
close interest with the project at all. However, they still thought 
of it, or Mr. Clarke did anyway, as 'our' New Town. It was made quite 
clear at the meeting with the Local Authorities in August that a 
Consultant Planner would be engaged on the planning of the town. 
Mr. Clarke, in his correspondence, made no reference to suggest that 
2 he would be offered the post. Nevertheless, negotiations had been 
taking place with electricity and water companies, and sewage disposal 
was being planned, all on the basis of the 'three neighbourhood plan' 
that had been printed in 'Farewell Squalor•. 3 Also the prospects of 
the industrial area recommended in Mr. Clarke's pamphlet were being 
1. Meeting of Hinister and Local Authorities, 27th August, 1947 (3.2). 
See Summary at end of Chapter. 
2. Letter, Clarke to Hunting Aero Surrey Ltd., 25th November, 1947. 
(15.19a). 
3. See File 15 for evidence, August- October, 1947. 
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seriously looked into by Mr. Tetlow, Colonel Methven and representatives 
of the Board of Trade. The only serious disadvantage was the proximity 
of the area to the I.C.I. sabulite works, and the consequent enforcement 
of Home Office regulations concerning buildings adjacent to expiliosives 
works. }tr. Bates and Colonel Methven were satisfied and obviously 
thought the above difficulty could be overcome. 1 
The Regional Physical Planning Committee discussed the question 
of the industrial estate at its meeting on the 26th August, 1947. 
They could not come to any agreement over its exact location before 
receiving figures of estimated labour availability from the Ministry of 
Labour. But all the same, they were all in agreement that the estate 
2 
should not be included in the Declaratory Order. 
Mr. Tetlow called a meeting himself on the 24th September, 1947, 
which was virtually the above Committee, but included other interested 
parties (similar to the meeting on 10th January, 1947). The same 
question was discussed and a similar conclusion arrived at as the 
Physical Planning Committee before them. However, many points of 
interest arose in the course of these two meetings which will be 
discussed in a separate chapter devoted to the 'Industrial Problem' •3 
Work in the Regional office of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning and the Council Offices, Easington, continued through November 
and December, 1947, planning for the public services, the re-routing of 
1. Letter, Bates~ to Clarke, 10th September, 1947 (15.13). 
2. Heeting, 26th August, 1947 (17.9). 
3. Meeting, 24th September, 1947 (16.3). 
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the A.19, and the contouring of the North-east corner of the site, 
the No.1 unit in Mr. Clarke's plan. 
May, 1948, was the date when the Easington house building programme 
was scheduled to be completed, and both the Regional offices of the 
Ministries of Health and Town and Country Planning considered it 
unthinkable that there should be a cessation of the Council's building 
programme. The planning and surveying for development in the North-
east corner of the intended designated area was the direct outcome of 
the two Ministries' consultations on the impending housing needs of the 
Rural District. 1 
Just before the Draft Designation Order was published on the 
10th October, 1947, the Council received another formal letter requesting 
recommendations for members of the informal Committee, which would later 
become the Corporation, 'if the need arises•. 2 
Most of the formal documents contain little information, except a 
reference to a particular map and stating where this may be viewed. 
The Draft Order was accompanied by a Statement from the Minister as to 
the size and general character of the proposed New Town: 
"A town on this site would provide accommodation for some 
30,000 people, drawn in the main from other parts of the Rural 
District where families are at present living in badly-serviced 
1. Report of the Surveyor, 11th December, 1947 (15.20). 
2. Letter, Waddell to Clerk of the Council, 6th October, 1947 (15.18). 
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and congested settlements too close to the pit heads. In 
addition, the new settlement would provide for the first time 
the recreational and shopping centre which is needed to give 
the district as a whole a greater degree of cohesion and self 
sufficiency. While facilities would, as far as possible, be 
made available for all the community activities normally 
associated 1:rith a town of substantial size, special care would. 
be taken to preserve and enhance the natural amenities of the 
neighbourhood, in particular the existing open space at 
Castle Eden Dene. 
In order that the new town might be enabled to develop as a 
balanced community, sui table provision would be made for 
industrial employment to absorb the female labour available 
in the district and any male labour not employed in the 
coal mining industry. 111 
'The Easington Advisory Committee 
The first and informal meeting of the New Town Advisory Committee 
was held on the 16th December, 1947. Not all the members who were 
tJ 
later to be asked to sit on it were present. The names recorded were 
Mrs. M. Felton, the Chairman, Councillor O'Neil, Mr. C.A. Mackay, 
Alderman E. Robinson, Councillor H. Lee, and Mrs. J. W. Gray. 
1. Draft Order, Statement by the Minister as to size and final 
character, 29th October, 1947 (15.19). 
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The full list included two more names, Mr. E. Allen and Lt. Col. 
Sir M. Wayman. In the letter asking for the Rural District Council's 
comments on the appointments, some brief notes were given on each 
member. In brackets by the names of Councillor O'Neil and 
Alderman Robinson were, respectively, "Easington Rural District 
Council", "Durham County Council" - "by whom his name was suggested". 
All the members, except the Chairman, were people resident in the 
North-east. 1 
The opening meeting was arranged by Mrs. Felton in order, as she 
said, to make a start, and to have some suggestions to put before the 
Minister when he came up again in January. 
Mrs. Felton said that she had come across some uncertainty as to 
who was going to manage the industrial estate, and she approached the 
Minister, who had agreed to the new Corporation assuming the 
responsibility. 
Mr. Mackay asked if there was any objection to the appointment of 
Mr. Clarke as Planner. Mr. Robinson replied that some tribute should 
be paid to Mr. Clarke, but he thought, however, that it would be better 
to have someone who had much wider experience of town planning for the 
post of Planner. 
suitable person.2 
It was decided that the Committee should look for a 
1. Letter, Waddell to the Clerk of the Council, 6th March, 1948 (15.24). 
2. Informal Meeting of the 16th December, 1947 (1.2). 
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There was no other meeting until the one in January, which the 
Minister attended. On this day also, the new Architect-Planner, 
Mr. Lubetkin, put in his first appearance. The Minister told of how 
he had been chosen. Mrs. Felton had first tried to find someone who 
knew the area, but no-one was available who seemed capable of under-
taking the task. By process of elimination, they had finally come to 
the conclusion that the firm of Tecton, and in particular Mr. Lubetkin, 
was the most suitable. The Hinister said of Mr. Lubetkin that he was 
a naturalised Englishman, having been Russian by birth, and had 
practised in England for many years. He was regarded as one of the 
most enterprising and eminent of architects in the country. He was 
both archi teet and engineer and had undertaken a number of important 
schemes, which included works in the Soviet Union, France, Germany and 
in this country. The most notable London work that he had done was in 
finsbury and Paddington. 
Some other members of the Committee had come with other names 
in mind, but it was generally agreed to be guided by the Hinister, and 
Mr. Lubetkin was duly appointed. It was thought that if Mr. Clarke 
wanted a post, he could be asked to apply when the advertisements 
appeared in the press. 
marked one for him) • 1 
(It is believed that they had actually ear-
1. Interview, C.W. Clarke, 11th December, 1959. 
The position offered by Mrs. Felton was Works Manager, to be 
responsible for building the town by direct labour, of which 
Mr. Clarke had gained considerable experience whilst working 
for Easington Council. 
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The Minister made a short address to the new Committee, stressing 
the missionary aspects of their work. He begged them to understand 
the special responsibilities of the Ministry, and hoped they would 
co-operate with it, even if there was resentment at what was misread as 
interference. Mr. Silkin again in this speech made a reference to the 
speed at which the New Town could be built. 1 'Speed should not be the 
determining fac~or; they should build on a firm foundation and see 
what they built could stand the test of time'. 
The next step in the statutory proceedings was the Public Local 
Inquiry. This was to be instituted if, after the publication of the 
Draft Designation Order, there were any obje9tions lodged with the 
Ministry. There were, and an Inquiry was scheduled to be held on the 
27th January, 1948. 
The'Explanatory Memorandum' 
Before the Inquiry an 'Explanatory Memorandum', printed by the 
Ministry, was circulated. This gave in some detail "the reasons which 
led the Minister of Town and Country Planning to propose that an area of 
approximately 2,350 acres in Easington Rural District, County Durham, 
should be developed under the New Towns Act, 1946". 
1. The Minister also mentioned the question of time to be taken in 
building the town, in the meeting with the Local Authorities (3.2). 
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The Memorandum gave a brief history of the proposal, and then 
went on to give the case for a New Town. It was pointed out that even 
though the merits of the project may not have been doubted, it could 
0 
have been held that as good, if not better, cases could have been made 
out for similar development in other parts of the country. "It seemed 
clear that the District did have a special claim in that it is situated 
on the richest part of the Durham coalfield and must in any case receive 
a high priority in housing, and also that it offered an outstanding 
opportUnity for breaking with the unhappy tradition" of the squalor and 
isolation of mining villages. 
Three reasons were given why the population was limited to thirty 
thousand. First, they decided not to eliminate existing settlement in 
the Rural District. Second, they did not want to attract population 
from outside, and third, they did not wish to unjustifiably encroach 
on coal or agricultural interests. 
The most interesting paragraph was that on 'Industry'. Though it 
was said that sooner or later new industry would be needed in Easington -
and it did not state the exact reasons why this would be so - there was 
nevertheless substantial provision for the employment of female labour 
and any male labour not employed at the pits at the Hartlepools Trading 
Estate, and apart from that, coal mining would remain the dominant 
industry in the district. The only clearly stated reason given for 
new industry was that it would create a more balanced community. 
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The Memorandum ended by a statement of reasons why that 
particular site was chosen. It was conveniently placed in relation 
to road communications and essential services; it lay amongst pleasant 
surroundings and offered every opportunity for a satisfactory lay-out 
and the effective arrangement of neighbourhood units. The two altern-
ative sites had to be ruled out because of, in one, existing development, 
1 
and, in the other, the presence of a spoil heap. 
The Public Local Inquiry 
The Local Public Inquiry was conducted by Mr. Fitzgibbon. The 
objectors who sent representatives were the North-Eastern Electricity 
Supply Company, the County Borough of West Hartlepool, the National 
Farmers Union, the three landowners, Mr. Hannon, The Ecclesiastical 
Commission, Haswell Parish Council, Thornley Parish Council, and Hutton 
Henry Parish Council. 
In a letter accompanying the eventual Designation Order, the 
Minister's answers to the various objections were published. For 
convenience, where a reply was made, it will be given immediately after 
the particular objection, in this narration. 2 
Mr. Morpeth gave evidence on behalf of the North-Eastern Electricity 
Supply Company, who did not want to object to the scheme as such but 
wanted certain facts to be placed in front of the Minister so that he 
1. Draft Easington New Town Designation Order 1947, 'Explanatory 
Memorandum' (3. 1) • 
2. Letter, Waddell to the Council, 5th March 1948 (15.24). 
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could decide in the light of them. These were that if the New Town 
was built in that area, it might mean the loss of certain substations, 
and the cost of placing underground two sets of overhead cables which 
cross the area. The cost of this was estimated at £61,000. In his 
letter to the Council, the :Hinister said that "nor can it be assumed 
that an electricity substation or other undertaking lying within the 
area affected by the Order will be subject to any form of control that 
would not be entirely acceptable to the statutory undertaker". 
The West Hartlepool Borough Corporation objected on the grounds 
that the proposed designated area had a section which was. included in 
an application made by the Borough Council to the Boundary Commission. 
An answer was given to this in the Minister's letter. The Ivlinister 
said that he was concerned with the most effective planning of the area 
as a whole and he would not be justified in allowing applications to the 
Boundary Commission for extension of local authority boundaries to 
influence his decision either for or against the development proposals. 
It was the Durham City Branch of the National Farmers Union that 
raised an objection on behalf of the tenant farmers who farmed on the 
site. The lawyer who spoke for them raised several specific points, 
most of which were attacks on statements in 'Farewell Squalor'. The 
first was that when Mr. Clarke said that the land was of typical 
fertility, he was underestimating it. The second point was to question 
why the alternative site at Wheatley Hill had been turned down; the 
life of the pit was over-estimated, it was second rate agricultural 
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land, and the unsightly pit heap could be bull-dozed. Thirdly, the 
three farms on the site co-ordinated their milk production, whose end 
product was 200 gallons of what they said to be irreplaceable milk. 
Lastly, they objected to the lack of individual freedom that there 
would be in the New Town and implied that the Local Authority might well 
prove a tyranous landlord. In the Minister's letter to the Council, 
the only one of the above points answered was that concerning the loss 
of agricultural land, which it was claimed would be no more than under 
equivalent scattered development. 
The solicitor acting on behalf of the three landowners also raised 
. 
the question of luss of agricultural land. The Minister's letter was 
an answer to them too. Mr. Angus, their solicitor, said that more 
agricultural land was being lost than was necessary, because Mr. Clarke's 
planned densities were too low, and he made no mention of the possible 
use of 'flats'. Mr.cTetlow's reply to this was that the planned 
densities were no less than normal suburban development. Mr. Angus's 
second objection was that the woodlands acquired by the Corporation 
would not be utilised commercially. The Minister replied that the land 
would be administered in accordance with the soundest principles of 
estate management. 
Mr. Hannon then attempted to make an objection and was very 
roughly handled, and rudely treated, by the presiding Inspector, 
Mr. Fitzgibbon. After some hard cross-questioning, he was at last 
allowed to make a short statement - which was pretty incoherent. 
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The gist of it was, on the other hand, quite clear, and that was that 
Mr. Hannon thought that building should be confined to the villages, 
and that the New Town was a waste of the taxpayers' money, that of 
ex-servicemen in particular. The two points that Mr. Fitzgibbon picked 
on that are worthy to be noted were first, that no-one could object 
unless he had some interest which he represented other than the national 
interest, _and, secondly, Mr. Fitzgibbon said that objections on that level 
had been and should be dealt with by Parliament. As a short comment 
here, it can be said that the Inspector's views must have been mistaken, 
otherwise Parliament would not have given the Minister discretion to 
name each New Town under the Act, and it would not have written into the 
Act the statutory safeguard of a Public Local Inquiry. 
The Durham County Planning Office was also represented at the 
Inquiry, but they made it quite clear that they were not there as 
objectors. In fact, the proposal rrhas been considered more than once· 
by the County Planning Committee and has been approved by them on each 
occasion". 
A representative of the Ecclesiastical Commission put in an objection 
because his client feared that a small farm near Shotton would be 
destroyed and they would lose control over the land use. The Minister 
replied to this by saying that, just because buildings lay within the 
designated area did not mean they would necessarily be destroyed. 
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Haswell Parish Council complained that there had been very little 
contact made with them by the Rural District Council over the proposal; 
not in fact until August, 1947, when they were sent a co~y of 
'Farewell Squalor', did they receive any official notification. A similar 
complaint was made by Hutton Henry Parish Council. Both Haswell and 
Thornley Parish representatives stressed the lengthened 'travel to work' 
entailed by the New Town. Miners, it was said, had impossible schedules 
of work hours, which no bus service would be able to keep up with. 
Thornley Miners Lodge sent a letter to their Parish Council asking to be 
associated with their complaint. The Miners Lodge's principal point 
was that the whole working of the Lodge system depended upon the fact 
that the officials and the men lived.on top of the pit. All three 
villages stressed their strong community feeling, and the need and desire 
for development in their villages, which they felt would be sapped by 
the growth of the New Town. Both Thornley and Hutton Henry desired to 
have Trading Estates built in their areas. Thornley also expressed a 
fear that Peterlee would become but a mere appendage of Horden. 
The ~linister, in answering the criticisms of the separate Parish 
Councils, based his reasoning on the support given to the project by 
the County, and Rural District Councils, which made him conclude that the 
proposal would benefit the district as a whole. Few of the individual 
objections were dealt with; the only one answered at length being 
Thornley's point about Peterlee becoming an appendage of Borden. It was 
more likely, the Minister said, that a town of 30,000 would swamp a town 
of 14,000. 1 
1. Hinutes of Local Enquiry (12.4). 
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Final Meetings .of the 'Advisory Committee' 
There were meetings of the 'Advisory Committee' on the 22nd January, 
when an Administration Officer was chosen, and on the 3rd 11th and 25th 
February, 1948. The meeting on the 3rd was mainly devoted to discussing 
which authority should run the licensed premises in the New Town. (The 
description of the meetings of this Committee may not be an accurate 
account of the discussions which took place, as they were taken from the 
~~nutes, whose content was to be a subject for dispute later). On the 
11th, Mr. Lubetkin reported on his meeting with the Coal Board on the 5th. 1 
Co-operation between the Board and the new Corporation would not be easy. 
Mr. Lubetkin, who had first visited Easington on the 21st January, 1948, 
had, by the time of the meeting with the N.C.B., formulated his views on 
how the town should be built, firm views which allowed him to report that 
no matter what arrangements had been made with the Board, or by the 
Ministry, no easy path could be found. A full description of his ideas 
will be made later. At the moment, it can be noted that whatever 
research was done during his tenure of office, Mr. Lubetkin had neverthe-
less drawn his principal conclusions long before any primary research 
had been made. What is more, they directly conflicted with the network 
of negotiations that had been built up on the basis of the skeleton 
framework provided by the neighbourhood plan in 'Farewell Squalor'. 
This was probably explained to him in a meeting with Mr. Tetlow and the 
Regional Controllers of the Ministries of Labour and Health just before 
1 • Heeting on the 11th February, 1948 ( 1 • 5) • 
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the one with the N.C.B. 1 This is the last reference there is of 
Mr. Tetlow in connection with this project. He was soon after moved to 
another appointment. The sympathies of the 'Advisory Committee' were 
clearly with the Architect-Planner and there seemed to be no debate on 
the question of adhering to the arrangements made by Mr. Clarke and 
Mr. Tetlow, or of overturning them in favour of those of Mr. Lubetkin. 
It was even realised by them that these plans had been formulated because 
there was an urgent need to start building right away as soon as the 
Final Designation Order was made. At the meeting on the 11th February, 
it was stated that the new plans would take a long time to make, and that 
they would not be able to use Easington's Direct Labour force. 
On the 25th February, the 'Advisory Committee' expressed its 
dislike of the plans made by the Regional Controller, and suggested 
that better liason was going to be needed between the new Corporation 
and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Mr. J .R. James was lent 
by the Ministry, ostensibly to help with the work on the 'Social Survey', 
but mainly to act as liason. 2 
By the 5th March, the 'Advisory Committee' had engaged its own 
mining consultant, Mr. Potts, then Mining Reader at King's College, 
Newcastle, and had begun to make its own investigations into the mining 
problem. At the meeting on that day, the Committee took steps to 
publicise the New Town.3 
1. Letter, Tetlow to Clarke, 4th February, 1948 (15.23). 
2. Meeting of 25th February, 1948 (1.6). 
Interview J.R. James, 8th January, 1960. 
3. Meeting of 5th March, 1948 (1.7). 
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Shotton Hall was chosen by Mr. Lubetkin for the new residence of 
the Corporation, and the Direct Labour force at Easington were engaged 
to do the necessary repai-r work and to erect the temporary structures 
to provide office space. 
Mr. Clarke was not able to take up the offered employment with the 
new Corporation. The strain of the preparatory work had worn him out 
and, on Doctor's orders, he was obliged to take up other and less 
d t . 1 ar uous occupa 1on. 
The Final Designation Order was made on the 10th March, and the 
2 Corporation were duly constituted on the 12th. 
Conclusion 
This summary will attempt to trace the leading threads of the 
history, some of which stand out in their own right, others of course 
being much conditioned in their priority of placing, by the events which 
have taken place since. Where the interim summary ceased, was the point 
where Mr. Tetlow, the Regional Controller of the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning definitely decided that the Easington New Town project 
needed to be very carefully inspected. The narration continued up to 
the time of the Final Designation Order in March, 1948. The broad and 
1. Interview, C.W. Clarke, 11th December, 1959. 
2. Designation Order, 10th March, 1948 (15.25). 
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general history of the New Town will end at that point in this thesis, 
principally because there, the main aim of the thesis has been achieved 
to trace how it was that a New Town of Peterlee came into being. 
Whether the New Towns Act was invoked or not, the various Government 
Departments still could have killed the project more or less at birth if. 
they had wanted to. The most influential member of the group of 
Regional Officers was Mr. Tetlow. As The Regional Con troller of the 
Ministry, who had no building functions or specific responsibilities 
limited to one field, as had the others, Mr. Tetlow became the Chairman 
of the Regional Physical Planning Committee. The Regional Controller 
had been a very important man to convince. How had it been done? 
Mr. Tetlow had betrayed many misgivings in his letter to Mr. Clarke 
on first receiving a copy of the 'Outline Survey' in December, 1946. 
He had rightly foretold the later feelings of other Government Departments, 
when he said that the idea had the potential danger of either being a 
"White Elephant" (his own phrase) or it would be so effective as to drain 
the existing villages of their "life blood and initiative". At the time 
of receiving the report he was already convinced of grouped development 
as being the right answer, he was just not sure that there should be 
obly one site. What appeared to convince him was that there were not 
sufficient existing settlements which warranted being further developed. 
Mr. Clarke's enthusiasm and many of the ideas expressed in his report 
must have taken a toll on Mr. Tetlow's opposition. He agreed that the 
social structure needed broadening and that the area was due for new 
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industry. But he well recognised the priority of coal getting in the 
neighbourhood, which was a limiting factor on his enthusiasm for new 
industry, but was also a motive force for agreeing to the housing part 
of the New Town. This, the newest part of the Durham Coalfield, was 
going to need extensive development anyway. 1 Miss Elliott, one of the 
Research Assistants at the Ministry, was against the scheme2 , but the 
senior Research Officer of the Ministry was Mr. James, who threw his 
weight down on the side which advocated the New Town. This is all the 
evidence there is. All else is conjecture. Whatever was the final 
persuasive influence on the Regional Controller is not known, but he 
certainly became its strongest advocate, and it was his influence on 
Mr. Silkin which, as the Minister admitted, proved decisive. 3 
It was a chain of persuasion from Mr. Clarke, through the 
Regional Controller, to the Minister. The arguments that had convinced 
one had a similar effect on the others, but all the same, certain 
individual preferences stand out with the main personalities. With 
Mr. Silkin, one can deduce that he had been very impressed by his tour 
around the villages in July, 1947. What people had said to him then 
and what he had seen appeared to do a lot to convince him. Two points 
stand out. The first was the desire to create an example for the 
building of mining villages, for the future, and for other localities -
1. Letter, Tetlow to Clarke, 4th December 1946 (14.14). 
2. Letter to the Author, 18th January, 1960 and 6th April, 1960. 
3. Meeting, 21st January, 1948 (1.1). 
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to make a break with the tradition of squalor which had domina ted 
their past. The second was the impulse to widen the social structure 
of the area by introducing different income groups - an argument which 
needed the building of new industry, if for no other reason. As with 
Mr. Tetlow, it is difficult to tell what was the most decisive influence. 
The argument explained in the interim summary would have had a powerful 
effect on the Vunister. It would have proved most embarrassing for the 
Minister in the long and much disputed arguments in the House of Commons 
if the Local Authority had managed to push the measure through the 
Regional Physical Planning Committee, but the Hinister had then not 
agreed to place it on the list of Government-built New Towns. The 
arguments were against the amendments to the Bill which desired to allow 
other authorities than 'Development Corporations' the privileges of the 
Act. Mr. Silkin did not, though, have to succumb to further pressure 
from the North-East for another New Town. Newton Aycliffe preceded 
Peterlee and sufficed to placate the desire of the North-East, as with 
other areas, to be 'in the swim'. 
The next problem that is worthy of being investigated further is 
that of the choice of location and size of the New Town. Mr. Clarke 1 s 
choice was objected to, principally by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and right through the negotiations they were never really satisfied. 
They were willing to accept that their objections had received a fair 
hearing and after the final decisions had been made, they just gently 
smouldered in silence. There was a general assumption by everybody 
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that the site, wherever it was finally located, must be near the new 
coastal pits, so that the area was limited in which a choice could 
be made. The objections of the Ministry of Agriculture were partly 
admitted by the Sub-Committee of the Regional Planning Committee which 
investigated the problem, when they themselves made an alternative 
recommendation. The Sub-Committee, as with the Regional Controller 
and the }~nister, could not accept the Ministry of Agriculture's 
alternative because of the delapidated existing development and the 
siting of a coal slag heap. It was suggested at the Local Inquiry that 
the pit heap could be bull-dozed. As with, though, the Sub-Committee's 
alternative, the main argument against either appeared, from the planning 
point of view anyway, to be the presence of existing development. The 
Sub-Committee's choice had indeed been conditioned by this factor and 
they had picked their area partly because most of the new development 
since slum clearing started had been concentrated in that part of the 
district. The village green at Easington was put forward as a good 
focal centre. As this site was also rejected on the grounds of 
'existing development', it can be seen how much the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning desired to build on virgin land. The actual site 
chosen was unique among the New Towns in that it had fewer people living 
on it than any of the others. 
There were also other factors which influenced the decisions, of 
a more political nature. The Regional Physical Planning Committee 
stressed that if Easington Rural District put forward a site, then it 
should be given priority, in order not needlessly to thwart their wishes. 
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Mr. Tetlow was obviously very worried about the coal position. There 
was little recorded discussion in the Regional Physical Planning 
Committee, in which a representative of the Ninistry of Fuel and Power 
took part. It was, it seemed, an understood thing that the Board's 
consent had to be obtained. The negotiations that opened in April 
were attended by Mr. Clarke, and it can therefore be assumed that his 
site received priority investigation from the Board. Mr. Dixon and the 
local }ti.neral Valuer had said that the magnitude of the problems would 
be similar on most sites in the district. The fact therefore that the 
Coal Board had accepted the neighbourhood plan of Mr. Clarke must have 
so pleased the Regional Controller that he did not think it was worth 
pursuing any of the other sites. All the same, the various recommend-
ations were all placed before the Minister when he came for his visit to 
Easington in July, 1947, and it was Mr. Silkin who made the final 
decision. 
Before taking a look at the controversy about the correct size for 
the New Town, there are a couple of interesting points about size 
relative to population. A query on intended densities was raised at 
the Local Inquiry by the solicitor representing the landowners. The 
'all in' density of 6.5, it will be remembered, was confirmed by the 
Regional Physical Planning Committee, and indeed Mr. Tetlow defended the 
point on the spot at the Local Inquiry. His answer - that the figure 
was usual for 'suburban' development - showed very clearly the way 
Mr. Clarke intended building the town, with which idea everybody seemed 
to concur. Size relative to population is the subject also of 
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comparisons made between the various suggested sites, as to the acreage 
they would have used. Mr. Clarke's original report in 1943 suggested 
five sites,·at an average of 300 acres each- 1,500 acres. For the 
single site of 'Peterlee' in 'Farewell Squalor', there would have been 
used 100 acres less, excluding the industrial estate, that is 1,400 acres. 
The rest that was included to make up the 2,350 acres of the designated 
area, was Castle Eden Dene, which was neither going to be built on, which 
might have disturbed the Coal Board, nor was it land lost to the Ministry 
·of Agriculture. 
The size of the town was calculated by Mr. Clarke by multiplying 
the average population per house by the number of houses to be built 
in the Council's twenty-year programme. The result was the target 
population of 30,000 This left out of account the natural increase 
which would be expected, especially in the second ten-year period. 
It also ignored the numbers necessary to make up the 'balanced population', 
which was not a motivating factor of Mr. Clarke or the Council, but would 
have inevitably resulted from the introduction of new industry. A further 
point which is debatable was whether Mr. Clarke over-estimated the number 
of houses that were 'substandard' and were scheduled to be pulled down 
in the second ten-year period. A complimentary point to this is 
Mr. Clarke's calculations of where all the new houses should be built. 
Would there be no new building in the villages? Though he made no 
allowance in his assumptions for new building in the villages, he had 
intended to have a 'rounding off process' which would not only see the 
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1 
erection of community buildings, but also houses as well. 
points would have altered the target population somewhat. 
All these 
The North Eastern Area Development Plan pressed the point that 
the area was sufficiently urbanised and that therefore the New Town 
should not attempt to attract population from outside, notably from 
West Durham. A town of 30,000 was all right but it must not be any 
larger. The Ministry of Labour and National Service must have 
echoed the Coal Board's feelings when they complained that a town of 
30,000 would need a quantity of service industry which would be 
incompatible with the desire not to have too great a rival pull on the 
local miners. They desired to cut down the target population to 
20,000 in order to reduce the quantity of service industry necessary. 
On the other hand, the Minister, Mr. Silkin, wanted a town of 60,000 
which, he said, would be more balanced and would support a greater 
number of amenities. But he was obviously obliged to be swayed by 
his advisers and agree to the lower figure. He did add in one speech, 
though, that it was likely that the planners had underestimated the 
length of life of some of the surrounding pits, which would mean the 
provision of more jobs and homes than had been calculated for. 
1. Letter from Lumsden, l1arch 1948 (File 15). 
In a letter to a local vicar inquiring about the likely population 
of his parish at the end of the twenty years, Mr. Lumsden replied 
that the vicar should allow for a figure 5% above the calculated 
decrease in the population, because of the new houses which would 
be built in the village. 
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The full story of the 'Industry Problem' will be told in a 
separate chapter, but for the sake of completeness, a few points about 
this early period can be made here. Without new industry attached, 
the whole conception would indeed have been a glorified housing estate. 
This would have gone against the tenor of long term development and 
New Towns area policy. So then, what we are looking at when the 
arguments are surveyed is the effect of short term policies limited to 
the peak periods of high demand, especially for coal. The conflicting 
thoughts on this are even reflected in some of the official and 
publically issued policy documents. For instance, the tenor of the 
Statement accompanying the Draft Designation Order is very different 
from the 'Explanatory Memorandum' issued before the Local Inquiry. 
The various waves of political pressure took their toll on official 
thought. There was complete agreement on one point. Lack of rail 
facility, and the need to centre industry for the district, meant that 
the estate should lie in the North-west of the area - outside the 
designated New Town boundary. 
The two-year post-war housing scheme of the Rural District was due 
to end by :f.'lay, 1948 • There was a certain air of urgency in the Council 
Offices at Easington and in the Ministry, at ·the thought that this 
should happen before building for the New Town had commenced. This 
became intensified by the extra allotment of 4oo houses by the Ministry 
of Health in August, 1947. The urgency was responsible for the 
pre-designation planning carried out by the Surveyor's Office at 
Easington, all on the basis of the neighbourhood plan, printed in 
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'Farewell Squalor'. A considerable amount of planning was done. 
Negotiations were entered into with all the organisations who 'IIOUld 
be supplying the town with services, again on the basis of the No. 1 
unit of the plan, in order to facilitate building as soon as the 
Designation Order was passed. In fact, if V~. Clarke and Mr. Tetlow 
had not believed that the Ivlinister was pushing the Order through as 
fast as he could, they were prepared to acquire the land and raise 
the necessary loans by means of the Housing Acts. Quite a situation 
would have arisen if they had acquired the land and built on it, and 
then the Development Corporation had been forced to re-purchase it 
for other purposes. In point of fact, events did not go to these 
extremes because the 1'-1inister, surprisingly soon after r.d.s July visit, 
responded to the urgency of the situation by coming back in August to 
hold the Statutory 'Local Authorities Meeting'. 
It is not necessary to go into the agreement that Mr. Tetlow made 
with the N.C.B. at any length here, as the salient points of it will 
be discussed in the next chapter especially devoted to the problem of 
'Coal'. In brief, agreement was reached in May that building could 
start on the No. 1 unit in Mr. Clarke's plan, building on the remaining 
units being agreed from time to time. There was probably a Cabinet 
meeting in June or July to discuss the whole question of Peterlee, 
where the agreement with the N.C.B. was confirmed. It is uncertain 
whether a point, 'IJhich later gave the Corporation some heart-ache, was 
confirmed by the Cabinet. This was the question of how·long should be 
spent in building the town. In his speech. to the Council in March, 1947, 
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l'1r. Tetlow made reference to the fact that Mr. Clarke had probably 
overestimated the time necessary to build the town. Mr. Clarke was 
working on his twenty-year plan, Mr. Tetlow was thinking in terms of 
under fifteen years, but this was before· discussions had been opened 
with the N.C.B. In the speeches he made to the Local Authorities and 
then to the first formal meeting of the Easington Advisory Committee, 
Mr. Silkin mentioned that "speed should not be the determining factor." 
The Minister did not elaborate the statements on either occasion, so 
that any conclusion is purely conjectural. 
Both the agreement with the N.C.B. and the preliminary planning 
and negotiations with service agencies were conducted on the basis of 
Mr. Clarke's plan. The Regional Controller and the Minister must have 
been content that this plan should form the ideas on which the town 
should be built. The Regional Controller and Mr. Clarke knew that a 
senior Consultant Planner would be engaged by the Corporation. Either 
they thought that Mr. Clarke would be that person, which is unlikely, 
or they thought that the person called in would agree to follow the 
basic principles at least that Mr. Clarke had laid down. As we shall 
see, the kind of person who would make a plan like Mr. Lubetkin was 
rare. He was not of the school of planners who adhered to the 'suburban' 
densities that Mr. Tetlow defended at the Local Inquiry. 
Mr. Lubetkin arrived in Easington on the 21st January, 1948, and 
he probably learnt at the various meetings on 5th February the extent 
of the negotiations made with the Government Departments and other 
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authorities. But between those dates, he had formed the ideas on 
which he thought the town should be built, ideas which conflicted with 
the agreement made with the N.C.B. and with the urgent housing situation 
in the Rural District. The newly formed Corporation was dominated by 
the personality of its Chairman, Mrs. Monica Felton. 1 Whether or not 
she was conversant with the whole situation is not certain. It is most 
probable that the Minister briefed her quite thoroughly. What is 
certain is that the other members of the Corporation were for some time 
kept in the dark and did not see the papers of the Regional Physical 
Planning Committee, nor were they thoroughly briefed on the negotiations 
that had preceded their formation as a Corporation. TPis made for a 
position where the Corporation were enthused with Mr. Lubetkin's 
inspiring ideas without clearly realising the conflicts they must 
engender if carried through. 2 
Peterlee is there because of the phenomenal coincidence between 
Easington's unusual scheme and the early idealistic years of the New 
Towns Act. It is pure conjecture whether anything less powerful than 
a Development Corporation, with all its statutory powers, could have 
established the New Town. Could Easington have done it on their own? 
It is the opinion of this author that the answer must be no, mainly 
because the very motive force which would have needed to have been 
1. Interview, Mr. E. Allen- February, 1960. 
2. Interview, Mr. E. Allen, February, 1960. 
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perpetually renewed in the Council Chamber itself, would have been an 
increasingly diminishing one. All over the country, the end of the 
war idealisms have vanished. The counter pressures would have grown too 
great and the scheme would either have collapsed altogether, or its 
scale would have been gently pared away into insignificance. 
It is a very difficult question to answer, whether Peterlee should 
be there at all. For the answer to the question why it is there, one 
need only analyse the political situation and the strength of relative 
pressures - who, in fact, had the ear of the Minister at the crucial 
moment? This is not the whole story, as the rational, social and 
economic imperatives played a distinct role, but to what extent is 
difficult to determine. The Regional Physical Planning Committee 
seemed to concentrate on specific items which were placed on the agenda 
by one of its members. The County was only in 1947 set up as an overall 
planning authority in place of the separate Districts. Durham County 
were only just beginning preliminary planning for their Development 
Plan which was not due·to be ready until 1951. The rational analysis 
could have only been done in the offices of the Regional Controller for 
the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, or by the North Eastern 
Development Plan. To the author's knowledge, the Ministry did not have 
any plans for New Towns in the region, which were formed as a deliberate 
part of Development Area policy or for a region with poor housing and 
villages. It is not known whether any judgement was made at all 
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whether expanding or contracting areas should be given New Towns. The 
main policy of the Pepler and Macfarline Plan was, as was the County after 
them, one of re-groupment. They did recommend other New Towns, but the 
significant point was that their recommendations came after both Newton 
Aycliffe and Peterlee had been designated. New Towns were at the time a 
popular item and many areas were clamouring for them. Durham had received 
more than its quota. The West of Durham may have deserved priority but 
at the time when the New Towns were being allocated out, no comprehensive 
Plan had been issued upon which Regional decisions could be based. 
Neither of the Durham New Towns was created as part of rational 
joint housing and industry policy for a depressed area. The New Towns Act 
was put on the Statute Book principally to facilitate the Barlow Commission 
recommendation of decentralisation for congested areas. Neither the 
Tyne nor the Tees area was regarded in the same light as London, and the 
New Towns in the North were not meant to solve that kind of problem. 
Peterlee, in fact, was limited in its designation responsibilities to not 
drawing on population from outside the Rural District. But as can be 
seen when the 'Industry Problem' is looked at more closely, there are 
suggestions of the idea of New To~ms as a solution to some of the problems 
of depressed areas, in some of the comments made by the Minister and other 
responsible people. The principal difficulty to fuller understanding was 
created by the inflationary situation of the economy which was neverthe-
less combined with a policy of high investment. 
must be saved for a later chapter. 
But this discussion 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEM OF COAL SUBSIDENCE 
Introduction 
The problems of subsidence dominated the minds and time of all those 
engaged in the early years on the planning of a new town at Peterlee. 
The long drawn out negotiations held up the building operations for 
two and a half years. They developed into an uncompromising struggle 
between the Peterlee Development Corporation and the National Coal Board. 
The watershed, which divides the narration of the history into two, an 
understanding of which will aid the reader, is the interim between two 
decisions. The first was the high point for the Corporation, the award 
of the Lord President's Committee of the Cabinet, in July 1949, and the 
second, a Cabinet meeting of February or March 1950, which completely 
reversed the first decision and left the power of dictating terms to 
0 
the N.C.B. The account of the various negotiations will be set out 
1 below and a critical summary at the end. 
The subject of subsidence contains problems of great technical 
intricacy. A brief description of the geology of the Peterlee site 
1. References will be made to various articles, memoranda and letters 
during the course of this chapter, most of which, but not all, were 
found in the files of the Peterlee Development Corporation. These 
files and their contents have been listed in a special Appendix, 
and notes in the thesis will also state,where applicable, a reference 
to the relevant file (L.e. as note 4 below (4.11)). 
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will be made here and any further explanations that are necess~y will 
be interspersed with the general narrative. 
The profile of the land in the area consists of sandy clay deposits 
overlying a strata of magnesian limestone, beneath which are first, 
yellow sands and marl clays, and then the various layers of coal deposits. 
The limestone outcrops in the North-east of the site. It is of 
varying thickness, but generally about 500 feet. In this area it is 
weak and powdery, containing fissures and cavities enlarged by the 
pumping of water. Instability due to the partial collapse of the lime-
stone bed, apart from the mining of coal, is counted as a possible 
(though not probable) danger, due to any long continued pumping out of 
the water. 1 
There are five workable seams of coal measures, at depths of 
900- 1,300 feet below the surface; the highest being 300 feet below 
the yellow sands. The seams are of a general thickness of 3 - 5 feet, 
and only partly worked out. In 1948, it was assumed that the whole of 
2 the coal would not be extracted until circa 2,000 A.D. The weak 
plateau of limestone will provide little protection against the dangers 
of subsidence. The final degree of sinking that will result has been 
1. Analysis of Planning Problems- 16th January 1950, p.49. 
2. This assumption was one of the points of the N.C.B.'s mining 
programme challenged by the Corporation. See p.12~.Ch. III. 
- 109 -
estimated, and generally agreed upon for the area, to be some 60% of 
the total thickness of extracted seams. 1 
Coal under the area is worked from Shotton and Harden collieries. 
A royalty barrier, which under nationalisation has been still maintained, 
divides the two sets of working. The barrier acts as a safeguard 
against flooding. 
The area in which the coal was most worked out was in the north-
east of the site, growing least extensively mined progressing towards 
the south-west of the site. The coal programme as it stooQ after the 
war was not of concentrated, but piecemeal extraction, in plots scattered 
over the whole area. 
The ideas of the Rural District Council on the subject were those 
of its engineer and arc hi teet, Hr. C. \iJ. Clarke. He was not particularly 
perturbed by the prospect of possible subsidence. The main reasons why 
2 this was so were given in a small paragraph in 'Farewell Squalor'. 
"Another disadvantage, the effect of which can be minimised 
by suitable precautions, is the liability of the surface to 
subsidence due to Mine Workings. Subsidence in this area, 
however, is not such a serious disadvantage as is sometimes 
quoted, since the depth of the colliery workings, coupled 
1. Professor Potts, Peterlee Development Corporation's ID1Dlng 
consultant, verified that this figure was correct. (4.11). 
2. C. W. Clarke- 'Farewell Squalor', p.62. 
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with some peculiar quality of the overlying strata, renders 
subsidence almost unnoticeable over most of the area. rr 
From March, 1947, the Regional Office of the Ninistry of Tovm and 
Country Planning assume increasingly greater responsibilities for the 
project. By that date, the Regional Physical Planning Committee had 
agreed that the New Town should go ahead, and the Easington Rural 
District had allowed the idea to be placed before the Minister under the 
New Towns Act. At that date also, the Regional Controller, Nr. Max 
Tetlow, had come to certain conclusions about the suitability of 
1 
available sites, especially from the angle of the coal problem. 
From that point of view, he thought that the Peterlee site was as good 
2 
as any other. Realising that the N.C.B. had objections to the project, 
Mr. Tetlow decided to open negotiations with them. 
The Coal Board's first reaction when they heard of the New Town 
was decidedly one of unqualified opposition. They felt that the miners 
living in the New Town would have further to travel than they did then. 
Also, no matter where the town was sited, they believed that there would 
be a need by the builders for serious sterilisation of coal deposits. 
1. See p. ?1• Ch. II. 
2. See letter from Mineral Valuer to Regional Controller (marked 
confidential), 28th February, 194?. (B.2). 
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The Pre-designation Agreement 
Second thoughts, however, coincided with the opening of negotiations 
by the Regional Controller. It became apparent to the Board that a 
New Town would have a good psychological effect on the area and would help 
stabilise the mining population on a particularly important section of 
the Durham Coalfield. 1 
Mr. Tetlow managed to pacify the N.C.B. completely. A letter dated 
24th June, 1947, from the Mining Estates ~~ager of the N.C.B., Northern 
Region, to the Regional Controller "puts very plainly on record the price 
of the National Coal Board's acquiescence in the project11 • 2 
11 Easington New Town 
I refer to our recent discussion regarding the site of the 
proposed New Town and now write to confirm that the Divisional 
Board will raise no objection to the selected site as shown on 
the plan enclosed here<dth. 
The Board are of the opinion that the area shown scored in red 
on the plan will not seriously interfere with the present coal 
production and should be regarded as the first stage of 
development for immediate building, provided structural 
1. From Minutes of Regional Physical Planning Committee, 28th l{ay 
1947 (13.4). 
2. Letter from Mr. Dobbie of Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 
July, 1949 (4.5). 
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precautions are adopted by building houses in pairs on 
strongly reinforced concrete foundations. 1 
It is understood that the next development stage of the New 
Town will be in the western portion of No.1 Unit followed by 
Nos. 2 and 3 and that you will give an early indication to 
the Board of the approximate date when these further 
developments may be expected, so that a suitable programme 
of underground operations can be planned to secure the maximum 
extraction of the valuable coal resources in each area in 
advance of building requirements. 2 
In agreeing in principle to the location of the New Town, the 
Board understands that all future major housing schemes 
contemplated by the Easington R.D.C. will be concentrated in 
this area and that the programme of surface development will 
be agreed from time to time to the underground mining 
operations of the Board. 
(signed) F. Dixon.~ 11 
It has also been ascertained that, not long after, these negotiations 
travelled up the administrative hierarchy as far as the Cabinet, and that 
1. The area scored in red on the map mentioned, refers to the North-east 
corner. 
2. The 'units' mentioned in this paragraph, refer to the neighbourhood 
units as shown in C. W. Clarke 1 s 'Farewell Squalor' • 
3. Op. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations' (6.1) p.2. 
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some sort of undertaking was given at that level. 1 At this stage of 
the proceedings then, it can be assumed that the Minister of Town and 
Country Planning gave his consent to these opening preliminaries on the 
part of his Regional adviser. 
There was no reference to the likely effects of subsidence by the 
~linister at either of two important meetings he attended, the first at 
Easington in August, 1947, and the second with the Advisory Committee 
in January, 1948. 2 
It is clear that either }tr. Tetlow believed that Mr. Clarke would 
be the Planner, or more probable, that another Planner would be chosen 
who would nevertheless adhere to the bare outline drawn up by Mr. Clarke. 
The plans for the No.1 unit to the North-east of the site were very well 
advanced and negotiations had been opened with the statutary agents for 
public services to be provided.3 
At the first informal meeting of the Advisory Committee on 16th 
December, 1947, it was decided to have someone else other than }tr. Clarke 
to do the planning. 4 By the Meeting on the 21st January, someone had 
been found, after some amount of searching. Hrs. Felton, the Chairman 
1. Letter on the 23rd July, 1948, from Mr. Williams to Mr. Dobbie (~.5). 
2. Meetings, 27th August 1947 and 21st January 1948 (3.2) and (1.1). 
3. See pp. 80 and 103 Ch. II. 
4. Meeting of Easington New Town Advisory Committee, 16th December 1947, 
(1.2). 
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designate had eventually chosen Mr. Lubetkin, and Mr. Silkin, the 
Minister, had interviewed him a few days before that meeting. 1 
not known whether Mr. Lubetkin accepted the appointment with full 
It is 
knowledge of the agreement already made with the N.C.B., or exactly 
when it was explained to him, if it ever was, before the 5th February. 
The Local Public Enquiry was held on the 27th January. The N.C.B. 
did not put in an appearance at all and it was certainly this original 
agreement which kept them from placing any objections. 2 The only 
reference to the problem of coal subsidence was made by Mr. Tetlow, who 
stated the Minister's preference for centralised development which could 
be better related to problems of subsidence than could any scattered 
development.3 
Mr. Lubetkin quickly formulated his general views on how the New 
Town should be built. He was ready to put them forward at the supposed 
routine meeting with the N.C.B. arranged for February. At that meeting, 
Mr. Lubetkin expressed surprise when told of the agreement made with the 
N.C.B. by Mr. Tetlow. The Regional Controller was also present at this 
t . 4 mee ~ng. (It is-the last reference of him in connection with Peterlee 
1. Ibid., 21st January, 1947 (1.1) 
See also p.104, Ch.II, note 2. 
2. ~unutes of Meeting with the N.C.B., 5th February 1948 (4.2). 
3. ~unutes of the Public Local Enquiry (12.4). 
4. Preliminary Report on Relations with the National Coal Board, 
7th February, 1948 (4.2). 
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that can be traced; soon after he was moved to another appointment.) 
The new Architect-Planner put forward his general ideas, the basis, he 
thought, from which the Corporation would want to formulate their Master 
Plan for a New Town. The N.C.B. in turn stoutly adhered to certain 
fixed principles, most of which could be deduced from the pre-designation 
agreement. These were:-
" 1. That the development of the town should proceed in detached 
and semi-detached houses on reinforced foundations. 
2. That such development to take place on areas of the site 
where one or two seams only remained to be extracted. 
3. The development to start in the extreme North-east corner, 
and for the sake of an early start, the National Coal 
Board agrees to sterilise some coal in this area. 
4. The total time necessary for the construction of the town 
to be in the neighbourhood of thirty to forty years so as 
to allow the Coal Board sufficient time to extract the 
coal in accordance with their existing plans. 111 
The objections of the Architect-Planner were threefold: 
11 1 • The overall building period for the town \vas too long 
(this would be about three times as long as the period 
envisaged in the Reith Report). 
2. The fact that only the North-east corner of the site was 
ready for immediate building, and that no other portion 
1. Op. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations', (6.1), p.6. 
- 116 -
would be available for some time, pre-determined to 
a large extent the character of the master plan, 
irrespective of planning considerations related to the 
New Town as a whole. 
3. It was clearly undesirable on planning grounds to proceed 
with the development of the North-east corner. Neverthe-
less, if parts of it had to be utilised, this could not be 
done without simultaneously providing an appropriate 
proportion of urban amenities, which should be more 
1 
centrally located." 
The Corporation henceforward took the attitude to the pre-
designation agreement with the N.C.B. with the full consent of the 
Minister, 2 that what had been negotiated before they had been instituted 
as a legal body under the 1946 Act, was not binding upon them. 3 At the 
meeting on 19th May, 1948, the N.C.B. partially accepted this argument 
by agreeing that the technical officers of each side could meet to 
examine each other's plans in detail. Neither side referred the matter 
back to the Cabinet, which had some time before concurred with the 
pre-designation agreement. Henceforward, this agreement receives no 
further mention. In this way, Mr. Lubetkin' s plan was laid open for 
1. Ibid.-, (6.1), p.4. 
2. Interview with Lord Silkin, 29th January, 1900. 
3. ~dnutes of the meeting of the 19th May, 1948 (4.4). 
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inspection on its merits. The negotiations which followed gave it a 
very thorough hearing. It was also established at the meeting on 
May 19th that the Coal Board were thicl~ing of their legal liability for 
compensation to property owners if subsidence took place. Mr. Williams 
had suggested that this might be so as a guess, and had hit on to 
something which was one of the prime motivating factors in the N.C.B.'s 
h l b h . thr h t th l d t• ~· 1 w o e e aVlour oug ou e pro onge nego 1av1ons. 
The Ideas of Mr. Lubetkin 
To give a resume of Mr. Lubetkin's ideas: he saw the area of the 
site as a large 'saucer', within whose rim the whole town should be 
built. 2 In the centre would be the dense development, growing less 
dense towards the periphery, merging eventually into the open spaces, 
parks and playing fields on the outer boundaries. The phasing of the 
building programme, he wanted so arranged that as each portion of housing 
was completed, it should be accompanied by corresponding communal 
amenities. ~~. Lubetkin believed that building lightly (that is mainly 
semi-detached houses) was inacceptable on sociological, aesthetic and 
economic grounds. Subsidence would mean that structural precautions 
would be needed over the whole site. Building heavily, utilising many 
1. Ibid., 19th May, 1948 (4.4). 
2. The building of the town within the rim of the 'saucer' was. often 
referred to in the negotiations as- "Horizon-lining'. 
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flats, would occupy a lesser ground area, but the sites would need to 
be entirely stable when building took place. 1 
The next step was taken at a meeting in July 1948. The N.C.B. 
here recognised that the Corporation felt that the North-east corner 
was unacceptable, and since an early start on building was essential, 
they said they were willing to suggest some alternative sites on which 
work could begin. 2 A few days earlier, the Minister visited the 
Corporation and intimated his intention to take steps to ascertain what 
would be involved in building on land liable to subsidence and what 
would be the costs of insuring against such risks. Early in August, 
1948, the Minister notified the Corporation that he had appointed 
Professor Webster, the Chief Development Officer of the :tviinistry of 
Works, to investigate. 
Meanwhile, of the four choices of alternative sites offered by 
the N.C.B. on which work could begin immediately, the Corporation chose 
one in the South-east corner adjoining existing settlement at Harden. 
The N.C.B. had acted very promptly in acceding to the Corporation's 
request for such a site. 
At the request of the hinister, no meeting was held for further 
discussions between the N.C.B. and the Corporation until the Webster 
1. See unheaded note by Hr. Lubetkin (4.15). 
2. Minutes of Neeting, July 23rd, 1948 (4.6). 
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Committee had reported. 1 The Committee gave a progress report to the 
Corporation in November, clearly shovang the way it was heading in its 
intended recommendations. 2 The Committee's final report was not available 
until January, 1949. 
The Corporation went ahead with the preparation of a master ple.n, 
even after the progress report of the Webster Committee had been received, 
and were bold enough not only to do much needed preliminary work, but 
to turn out a fairly complete plan. This was submitted to the National 
Coal Board for inspection. The final receipt of the Webster Report, 
even after the warning of November, still came as a 'sharp interruption' 
to the Corporation's activity.3 
The Webster Report 
The Webster Report is a very important document in the history of 
these coal negotiations. The words used in the Report itself were for 
the most part guarded and well qualified. In the hands of some of the 
authorities, certain precepts hardened though into firm rules which 
bedevilled much future discussion. 
The Report concluded that the danger from subsidence varied in 
different parts of the site. The land was divided into three 
categories of relative danger, green, amber and red. 
1. Op. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations' (6.1), p.5. 
2. Conference with Ninister's team, 26th November 1948 (4.9). 
3. Op. cit. Analysis of Planning Problems, p.56 
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"The amber denotes areas where surface movements can be 
expected to be seYere, and green areas where the surface 
movements can be expected to be average or less." 
11The red zones consisted of land which from any aspect 
building should not be permitted." 
Development should be mainly confined to green zones, where these 
progressively became available, and also should be restricted to 
detached and semi-detached houses, except where local sterilisation of 
coal was conceded to allow buildings of special importance to be 
constructed. 
"It was assumed that, as far as possible, there should be 
no interference with coal working, and no extensive 
sterilisation of coal or alteration in the programme of 
mining. 111 
The Corporation felt that if the Report was accepted, then it 
would be restrictive on all its major activities, layout and 
construction, the areas to be developed, and the timing of the building 
operations. Layout proposals restricting building to two storied 
detached and semi-detached houses, as well as the prohibition of 
building on 'red' zones, would both limit the number of inhabitants 
which could be accommodated. They also objected to the fact that the 
1. Report on Peterlee Development by the Chief Development Engineer's 
Division of the Ministry of Works. (Webster Committee Report). 
(6.2). 
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growth of the town would be a reflection of the· gradual expansion of 
1 
'green' zones from 'amber'. 
In stating their objections to the implied conclusions of the 
Report, the Corporation attacked certain of the underlying working 
hypotheses of the Committee. 
From the point of view of building on the surface, 
"There is not a great deal to choose between the 'green' and 
the 'amber' zones proposed, and that there seems to be no 
sound evidence for regarding the 'red' zones as permanent 
obstacles to building. 112 
The \-Jebster Committee did not say that there should be no building on 
'amber' land. There could be if they were not important buildings 
and certain structural precautions were taken, but they advised building 
only on the 'green' land. Their criterion, which the Corporation 
thought was not sufficient, was the number of principal seams remaining 
to be extracted. It worked out that land under which less than two 
principal seams remained to be extracted was denoted as 'green' and 
therefore safe. Where there were two and a half or three seams, the 
land, broadly speaking, was denoted as 'amber'. 3 
1. Op. cit. Report on the Negotiations with the N.C.B., p. 6. 
2. Ibid., 'Report on the Negotiations' p.6. (6.1.). 
). Zoning proposed in the Webster Report, 11th March, 1949, pp. 2 and 5 
(4.12). 
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In addition, the Corporation, though they agreed that there ought 
to be no extensive sterilisation of coal, on the other hand thought 
there ought to be some positive alteration in the mining programme of 
the National Coal Board. J.vlr. Potts, Hining Reader at King's College, 
Newcastle, had been appointed Hining Consultant to the Corporation, and 
had formulated a case for the reorganisation of the mining programme 
under the Peterlee site, on the basis of the surveys of workings prepared 
by himself. 1 No meetings had been arranged with the technical officers 
of the National Coal Board and the Corporation, and the information as to 
the National Coal Board's plans were not easily forthcoming. 2 
The Phased Development Plan 
The Master Plan being prepared while the Webster Committee were 
sitting depended for its relation with the 'coal problem' on the plan 
thought out by Mr. Potts. This plan proposed that the area be divided 
into zones and the coal under each zone extracted in quick succession, 
leaving five years for subsidence to take place before building. Then 
an area for initial development would need to be agreed upon since 
there were no stable sites for the first five years' building. Some 
sterilisation would be involved in this initial development area, but 
not more, it we~ hoped, than the one and a quarter million tons allowed 
1. See 'Report on rti.ning Subsidence'- Mr. Potts, February 1949 (4.11). 
2. Op. cit.'Report on the Negotiations', p.7 (6.1). The Webster 
Report, p.6 (6.2) stated that the N.C.B. had not made detailed 
plans beyond 1960. 
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for in the 'early agreement', where a start was to be made in the North-
east corner. This whole scheme was called by the Corporation the 'Phased 
1 Development Plan'. 
Meanwhile, the Corporation wished to go ahead with the building of 
100 houses on the site in the South-east corner adjacent to Harden, 
agreed upon in July, 1948, with the National Coal Board. 2 They 
submitted a proposal under Section 3(1) of the 1946 Act early in 
This was to obtain permission from the Treasury for the 
construction of roads and sewers for the 100 houses scheme. In repJ_y, 
the Treasury expressed apprehension regarding the subsidence question in 
relation to the development of the town. They withheld their permission 
to continue, and suggested to the Minister that he should report back to 
the Lord President's Committee. 4 
The Lord President's Committee 
The Lord President's Committee of the Cabinet did consider.the 
question on the 25th March, 1949. They agreed that it would be necessary 
to proceed with the proposed construction of a New Town at Peterlee, but 
that the size and other details of the project could not be decided until 
1. See (a) Ibid., 'Report on the Negotiations', p.7 (6.1). 
(b) 'Analysis of Planning Problems 1 , p .58. 
2. See p.118 (this chapter). 
3· Op. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations', p.5 (6.1). 
4. Details found in Report of a meeting of Corporation with Mr. Dobbie 
of the Ministry, 31st Harch, 1949 (4.14). 
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the position had been further examined. The Hinistry of Fuel and Power 
and the National Coal Board would have to examine the Webster Report and 
discuss the problem further with the Corporation. The Committee invited 
the Minister of Town and Country Planning to arrange for a detailed 
examination of the plans for Peterlee by his Department, in consultation 
with the Treasury, Ministries of Health and Fuel and Power and the 
National Coal Board, and to report further whether an agreed scheme of 
1 development could be secured. 
The detailed examination and consultation with the other Departments 
was arranged in an Interdepartmental Committee under the Chairmanship of 
Sir Thomas Sheepshanks, Permanent Secretary to the I1inistry of Town and 
Country Planning. Also invited to sit on the Committee were Professor 
Webster and Mr. Hill, the Senior Structural Engineer of the Y.linistry of 
Works. This Committee met in April, 1949, and decided that the 
Corporation and local representatives of the National Coal Board should 
at once open negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreed solution 
of the problem of relating surface and underground development. They 
should report the results of their negotiations to the Interdepartmental 
'Working Party' as soon as possible. The report should be a joint 
document and should show an agreed phasing of the New Town and a Master 
Plan in accordance with that phasing. 2 The National Coal Board did not 
1. ~linute headed 'Regional Working Party for Preparation of Peterlee 
New Town Development Plan' (7.1). 
2. Report of Interdepartmental Working Party, 13th April 1949. (8.3). 
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wish to meet the Corporation before the 1st June, so that was scheduled 
as. the day for the first local level meeting of what became kno~m as the 
'Regional Working Party•. 1 
The Informal Meetings 
Because the first meeting was not until 1st June, the Corporation 
decided informally to sound the National Coal Board on its 'Phased 
Development Plan'. Mr. Williams, the General Hanager of the Corporation, 
met, in turn, Mr. Dixon, the Estates Manager of Northern Division, N.C.B., 
and then Mr. Barratt, the Production ~~ager. At the first meeting, 
Mr. Dixon led the General Manager to believe that the National Coal Board 
were not only prepared to consider initial development, other than in 
the North-east, but that they would examine the idea of sterilisation for 
residential purposes, especially on the East side. Mr. Williams also 
deduced that the Estates Hanager did not look ~dth any disfavour on the 
idea of a development periphery or 'horizon line•.2 'rhe second meeting 
on the 19th May, 1949, was also felt bytliejGeneral ~~ager not to be 
discouraging, though Mr. Barratt did say that he was not prepared either 
to go into details then, or to commit the Board to any of the Corporation's 
proposals.3 
I 
1. Notes for the General ~mn~er (4.15). 
2. Meeting of the 15th March (4.16). 
3. Heeting on the 19th May, 1949 (4.17). 
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The Regional Working P?Xty 
By 1st June, 1949, the Board's attitude had hardened. The 
Webster Committee had pre-supposed that "generally speaking, there are 
about 2~ seams of coal to be worked under the Peterlee site." The 
Board claimed there were five workable seams; the others had not been 
planned for detailed extraction until 1965. The addition of these 
seams made the waiting time before the land became stable longer than 
the Corporation had calculated. 
It was conceded in principle that some sterilisation of land may 
be necessary, if only for the town centre. On the other hand, the 
Board withdrew its previous offer in the 'early agreement' to sterilise 
one and a quarter million tons in the North-east corner. The National 
Coal Board was also very doubtful as to the possibility of sterilising 
land in the East for initial development, or of speeding up its mining 
programme in the West. 1 
A second meeting took place on 16th June, 1949. As the session 
on 1st June had been unclear whether the target population figure could 
be treated as a variable, a directive was obtained from the Minister 
of Town and Country Planning. 
remain 30,000. 
The Chairman announced that it was to 
The Corporation had prepared entirely new plans, which it thought 
were a concession to the National Coal Board's existent mining plans. 
1.0p. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations', p.8 (6.1). 
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First the Corporation w~ted 60 acres set aside for the town centre, of 
which only the East side should be made available immediately, and the 
rest in ten years' time. Second, the general acceptance elsewhere of 
unstable areas for residential development, restricting this in the first 
place to detached and semi-detached houses, but with gaps left for 
terraces, flats, schools and similar large buildings, to be built as and 
when stable sites became available. Third, a small measure of sterilis-
ation to be accepted, and every effort made to speed extraction. 
It was to this third and last stipulation that the National Coal 
Board directed their main objections. They were not prepared to sterilise 
the coal under the Eastern part of the central area, in the lower seams, 
only in the upper, not giving required stability until 1957. They were 
also not able to expedite extraction in the North-east area as requested 
by the Corporation. The only concession made was a small stable area 
of some 27 acres to the East of the town centre to be made available by 
1958-59- 1 
The Two Seam Rule 
During the course of the meeting, the 'two seam rule' became 
established. This said that only that land under which two or less 
seams remained to be extracted could be considered stable for the 
building of detached and semi-detached houses. The Webster Report did 
:t .• Ibid., 'Report on the Negotiations', p.9 (6.1). Meeting of 16th 
June, 1949. 
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not state this in any way categorically but the Senior Structural 
Engineer of the Ministry of Works, Mr. Hill, who was principally 
responsible for writing the Report,was also present at these meetings 
of the Regional Working Party. The Webster Report had stated certain 
buildings and precautions for building on 'three seam land 1 , 1 but when 
questioned by Mr. Williams, ~tt. Hill answered that 11 he did not think they 
knew sufficient about ground movement to estimate the difference between 
2 two 'pulls' and three 'pulls'. This idea became firmly fixed, not 
only in the minds of the National Coal Board, but also the Treasury, who 
judged their consent to expenditure by it.3 The strong adherence of 
the National Coal Board to the rule was motivated by their fear of having 
to pay out large sums in compensation. 
The Corporation were forced to do their calculations upon the basis 
of the 'two seam rule'. Given the 600 acres that Mr. Lubetkin calculated 
were available, then under the above stipulations, the Corporation would 
only have been able to build sufficiently for a population of 18,000 
- 8 4 in 3 years. 
There are no written reports or minutes of the third meeting of 
the Regional Working Party held.on 11th July, 1949. We can deduce 
that it must have been pretty stormy. The lines the Corporation were 
1. Ibid., 'Report on the Negotiations' (6.1), p.11. See also (6.2). 
2. Meeting of 16th June, 1949 (?.3). 
3. See p.123 (this chapter), note 4. (Ref. (4.14)). 
4. Op. cit. 'Report on the Negotiations' p.10 (6.1). 
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working on before the meeting were firstly to attack the 'two seam rule' 
for low density housing, and secondly to press for 300 stable acres for 
1 the higher density development, either by re-organisation of the mining 
programme or by sterilisation. It appears then, from the outcome of 
this meeting, that nei~her the position of the Board or the Corporation 
fun dam en tally changed. 
Re Submission to the Lord President's Committee 
After the third meeting of the Regional Working Party, the Chairman 
submitted a report .to the Interdepartmental Working Party, which met 
on the 14th July, 1949. The result of this meeting was that a 
recommendation was passed to the Lord President's Committee of the 
i Cabinet, that land for the town centre should be sterilised, plus 
300 acres which should be made available 'over varying periods'. The 
300 acres was made up of 100 within the visual horizon on the North-
east, and 50 outside it, 50 in the South-east abutting upon the East 
side of Blunts Dene, and 100 West of the town centre. On the last 
100 acres, the Committee were willing to discuss whether they were to 
be on the South-west or the North-west. 2 
The Lord President's Committee met on the 19th July, 1949, and 
decided in favour of the Peterlee Development Corporation. A town was 
to be built of 30,000 population within 15 years. The National Coal 
1. Op. cit. pp.11-12 (6.1). Meeting 16th September, 1949 (?.4). 
2. Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party (5.2). 
- 130 -
Board had to agree to make available 'for immediate development' the 
area asked for by the Corporation for the town centre, and 200 acres on 
the East side of Blunts Dene. Al1other 100 acres, the exact location of 
which to be agreed later by the Board and the Corporation, was to be 
made available on the West side of the designated area. 
The only difference between the Interdepartmental Committee's 
recommendation and the Cabinet award was one of time. Should the land 
be surrendered by the National Coal Board 'over varying periods' or 
'for immediate development•. 1 
Another meeting of the Regional Working Party, the fourth, was 
held in September, 1949. What was discussed was the land East of Blunts 
Dene awarded by the Cabinet. Before the end of August, the National 
Coal Board, through the Minister of Fuel and Power, had objected to the 
100 acres on the West. While discussion continued on the Eastern 
sites, the l1inister of Town and Country Planning investigated the 
problem of sites on the West.2 The National Coal Board had, during all 
the previous negotiations, stated the difficulties they would have in 
speeding up their programme of working in the West, and now they were 
very worried that the Cabinet award would have the effect of making their 
proposed re-organisation of Shotton Colliery uneconomic. 3 
1. Note by the General Hanager, P.D.C., July 1949 (5.4). See also (8.8). 
2. Heeting of the 16th September, 1959 (?.6). Also ibid. (5.4). 
3. Ibid. (5.4). 
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The Miners Unions 
Whether or not the National Coal Board knew the repercussions that 
would result by raising the question of 'redundancy' and introducing the 
Miners Union into the already complex negotiations, is not known. 
Either way, the Unions were brought in and their influence was, one can 
surmise, almost decisive. 
Both Shotton Miners Lodge and Harden Miners Lodge were called in 
by the Area General Manager and had explained to them the National Coal 
Board's interpretation of the likely effects of the Cabinet's award of 
sterilised land. Much to the Corporation's dismay, the National Coal 
Board used a literal reading of the Cabinet's phrase 'for immediate 
development', not only in the case of the Harden miners, where it was 
perhaps justified, but also with the Shotton miners, where it was 
doubtful. With the fear of unemployment in their minds, the two Miners 
Lodges wrote to the Corporation for a meeting of explanation. 
The first was held with the Harden Miners Lodge late in September, 
1949. The miners expressed fears that 4oo-500 men would be laid off, 
and that four and a quarter million tons of coal would be sterilised. 
The Corporation were surprised at the size of the figures mentioned and 
they put their case in full to the Lodge. After the meeting, !>1r. Vvilliams, 
on the instructions of the Corporation, contacted the Area General Manager 
to see where he had estimated his figures of redundancy from, and why he 
had called the Unions in. The answer given was that the figures were a 
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conservative estimate, and that they were produced on request and not 
with a view to exacerbate relations or to make the continuation of 
relations with Peterlee difficult. The Area General Manager added that 
if he were approached again, he would say that the picture of redundancy 
would not be so depressing when the final analysis had been reached -
though he would not go so far as to issue a joint statement with the 
1 Corporation to this effect. 
It is surmised that internal affairs were so occupying the Corpor-
ation in October that they had to put off seeing the Shotton ~liners 
until the following month. 2 The meeting was held on 19th November. 
As with the Harden miners, great apprehension was expressed, as to the 
amount of sterilisation, and they mentioned a figure of seven and a half 
million tons of coal (an increase of three and a quarter over the 
Harden Lodge~) 3 
Before that meeting, however, the fifth meeting of the Regional 
Working Party was held. Against their will, the National Coal Board 
were forced, because of the July Cabinet decision, to come to some 
agreement over the stahle area to be made available in the West. The 
Corporation estimated that they would have developed the 50 acres of 
sterilised land in the South-east by 1956-57. If five years had to 
1. Report of the General Manager, September 1949 (8.3). 
2. Dr. Felton resigned as Chairman of the Corporation. 
was appointed in her place on 13th October, 1949. 
Lord Beveridge 
3. Meeting with Shotton ~ners Lodge, 19th November, 1949 (8.6). 
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pass to let the effects of subsidence work themselves out, then the 
National Coal Board would have to stop working in two years, that is 
1951. In that year the Corporation would want at least 50 of their 
100 acres. 1 
Internal Divisions in the Corporation 
While forced acceptance was the working hypothesis at Regional 
level for the National Coal Board, at Headquarters pressure was beginning 
to rise. This must have been sensed by the Corporation because by the 
middle of November they were not only reviewing their plans, but 
divisions were appearing in the openly expressed views of the 
administrative heads. The General Manager issued a report to the 
Corporation which disagreed with some of the assumptions of the Architect-
Planner, while agreeing with certain others. Mr. Williams pointed out 
that he was now convinced that the National Coal Board did not over-
stress the difficulties of speeding up their mining programme. He felt 
that Mr. Lubetkin's plan to house first one third, and, in a later plan, 
one fifth, of the population in flats was something which, in the 
circumstances, should be altered. He agreed that the 'two seam rule' 
not only increased the amount of land to be sterilised, but also reduced 
the total land available, even for low density building, making some 
1. Meeting of the 7th November, 1949 (8.4) and (8.7). 
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high density development inevitable. Mr. Williams therefore recommended 
that the size of the town centre and the target population should be 
1 
reduced. 
The Breakdown of the Regional Working Party 
The Corporation had been right in their judgement that pressure 
was indeed being built up at a high level against the decision of the 
Cabinet made in their favour. On the 5th or 6th of December, 1949, 
news filtered through to the Corporation that the Regional Offices of 
the National Coal Board had been instructed by the Board in London to 
discontinue attendance and co-operation with the Regional Working 
2 Party. This was confirmed by the Regional Offices to the Chairman of 
the Working Party on the 7th December, when it was explained that the 
Board in London were raising certain points of principle with the 
Vunister of Fuel and Power, and asked them to postpone any further 
meeting of the Regional Working Party for the time being.3 At a 
meeting later (13th January, 1950) between the Corporation and 
representatives of the ~unistry of Town and Country Planning, the reason 
for the breaking off of negotiations was given that the terms of 
reference for the Working Party relating to the construction of a town 
for 30,000 population in fifteen years were unacceptable to them. This 
1. Report of the General ~~ger on the Coal position, 17th November 
1949 (8.8). 
2. Letter, }tr. Dobbie to~~. Peyer, 8th December, 1949 (7.10). 
3. Letter, }~. Nimmo to Mr. Sydenham, 17th December, 1949 (7.11). 
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was oecause the period of fifteen years would mean the stabilisation 
of such a large amount of coal as to render the proposed reorganisation 
of Shotton Colliery uneconomic and would considerably reduce the life 
of the pit. 1 Lord Beveridge, the Chairman of the Corporation, was 
most perturbed by the National Coal Board's action in breaking off 
negotiations; so much so that he took the view that there would really 
be no alternative to asking the Minister to issue a direction under the 
1947 Act, refusing permission for coal working in the areas referred to 
at the July meeting of the Lord President's Committee. 
Corporation Concessions 
Some time in early October, the Corporation brought over a Dutch 
mining expert, Dr. Van Iterson, to act as 'Subsidence Consultant. 2 
At a meeting arranged for January, 1950, Dr. Van Iterson argued out with 
Mr. Hill of the Ministry of Works the question of the 'two seam rule'. 
Mr. Hill did not entirely agree with the Doctor's views, but did admit 
that there was no hard and fast 'rule' •3 On the basis of this meeting 
and the various arguments expressed against the 1 two seam rule' , the 
Corporation met the Minister of Town and Country Planning's representatives 
again on the 17th January, 1950. Mr. Lubetkin suggested resuming 
negotiations with the National Coal Board with an increased time target -
1. Meeting of 13th January, 1950 (10.2). 
2. Betters, 14th and 26th October, 1949, from Mr. Niven (8.5). 
3. Heeting of 6th January, 1950 (10.1). 
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twenty years, a relaxation of the 'two seam rule', and only a small 
stable area on the West. It was Mr. Dobbie of the Ministry who insisted 
on adherence to the 'rule', hard as Mr. Lubetkin pressed for its 
relaxation. The reason given by Mr. Dobbie was that the introduction 
of the question at this stage would confuse the Ministers. 1 
The ~unister reacted to the proposals of this last meeting by 
drafting a letter to the Minister of Fuel and Power, dated 17th January, 
1950, asking for resumption of negotiations. He stated that the 
Corporation's requirements entailed that the West side should be avail-
able with two seams to be worked out in 1960-63, the remaining seam to 
be sterilised. The 'immediate' clause in the July Cabinet minute would 
have been foregone and the main objections of the National Coal Board 
to the Corporation's planning on the West side have been met. This 
letter was ignored by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and the National 
2 Coal Board, if the latter ever received it from the former. 
The Second Cabinet Meeting 
The next event of importance was the second Cabinet meeting forced 
by the Minister of Fuel and Power, on behalf of the National Coal Board 
and, it is believed, by l1r. E. Shinwell, M.P. for Easington, whose 
constituents were the Horden and Shotton miners. This Cabinet meeting 
1. Meeting of 17th January, 1950 (10.3). 
2. Summary of the Coal Problem (8.10). Letter, Lord Beveridge to 
Lord Hyndley, 5th April, 1950 (8.13). 
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took place after the General Election on the 23rd February, 1950. 1 
It was probably one of the first meetings of the new Cabinet, with 
Mr. Dalton replacing Mr. Silkin as Iviinister of Town and Country Planning. 
From evidence of later meetings, it can be deduced that the July 
decision was reversed and the original mining programme re-asserted. 
Decisions as to the future of the Peterlee New Town were left over to 
the discretion of a meeting of relevant parties. 
This was finally held on 4th April, 1950, at the House of Commons, 
and the importance of it for the whole existence of the New Town can be 
seen by the Coal Board's opening moves. At the meeting, Lord Hyndley 
attended for the Coal Board, Dr. Sam Watson for the Durham Miners Union, 
Lord Beveridge for the Corporation and Mr. Dalton on behalf of the 
Government and the Hinistry of Town and Country Planning. Lord Hyndley 
began by a frontal attack on the idea of having a New Town at Peterlee. 
Hr. Dalton took the kind of line which brought the National Coal Board 
into a position where instead of arguing that question, they argued the 
question, if the project was going to be carried through, what would need 
to be done. The National Coal Board were in the same way moved from 
their second attacking position of attempting to shift the site for the 
town several miles to the South, and were asked, as a first step, to 
consider the possibilities of the present site. 2 
1. Interview with Lord Silkin, 29th January, 1960. 
2. Letter, Lord Beveridge to Mr. Dalton, 5th April, 1950 (8.11). 
Letter, Lord Beveridge to Mr. Williams, 5th April, 1950 (8.12). 
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The Resignation of Mr. Lubetkin 
The departure of the Architect-Planner, Mr. Lubetkin, occurred in 
February, 1950. He resigned because, _after the reversal of the July 
Cabinet decision, it became impossible for his plans to be implemented 
even in a revised form. His resignation made a material difference 
to the Corporation's needs for stable land. They were now willing to 
forego high density development entirely outside the town centre and 
were willing also to build outside the 'horizon line'. If sufficient 
land in the North-east quadrant was made available then, and land also 
for the East town centre, they were prepared to consider any change or 
mode of building that avoided sterilisation of coal. All the same, 
Lord Beveridge still had his mind on the land in the West, and later, 
in a letter to Lord Hyndley, he reminded the Coal Board of the offer 
made by Mr. Silkin to the Minister of Fuel and Power, which had received 
1 
no answer. The same letter of LOrd Beveridge contained a plea that the 
Coal Board should not be as rigid as they appeared to be in the past, 
about making minor concessions underground to meet the Corporation's 
2 
needs above ground. 
It was finally decided at the Rouse of Commons meeting, that a 
Working Party should prepare an immediate programme of action, including 
in particular the delimitation of one or more areas within the present 
1. See page 136, and 'Summary of the Coal Problem' (8.10). 
2. Letter of Lord Beveridge to Lord Hyndley, 5th April, 1950 (8.13). 
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designated area of the New Town, on which house building could begin in 
the very near future. The Working Party, it was also concluded, need 
not be wedded to either 30,000 as a target population figure or 15 years 
as a time target. They were to be governed by the programme of the 
National Coal Board for underground working. 1 
Resumption of Meetings of the Regional Working Party 
Six months after the National Coal Board walk-out of the Regional 
Working Party in November, 1949, meetings were once more resumed. 
The date was May, 1950. There was a distinct change in the atmosphere 
as compared to the minutes of previous meetings. 
The Coal Board agreed without argument to the sterilisation of 
coal under the Eastern half of the town centre, and to allow building 
immediately to begin in the North-east corner. The Corporation still 
pressed for accelerated extraction East of the town centre, and the 
Coal Board replied by accepting the need to look at the problem again. 
In particular, they would investigate the possibility of not only 
speeding up working, but also the idea of leaving pillars as underground 
supports in the Horden main seam. 2 
The Grenfell Baines Group had taken over from Mr. Lubetkin and 
his team the task of planning the town. For the benefit of the 
Grenfell Baines Group, a map was given them at this meeting by the 
1. Letter of Lord Beveridge to Mr. Williams, 5th April 1950 (8.12). 
2. Meeting of 2nd May, 1950 (7.12). 
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National Coal Board showing the amount of two seam land that was at 
their disposal for building purposes. The amount shown was Boo acres, 
which later study proved the Corporation capable of building a town of 
20,000 in 15 years. 
Dr. Sam Watson was also at this meeting on behalf of his Union. 
He must have gained the necessary assurances about the possible numbers 
who might be made redundant, because he did not attend any further 
meetings of the Working Party. 
Next month, the Regional Working Party met again. Only the 
East side was the subject of discussion again as the Coal Board were 
still in the process of planning for their reorganisation of Shotton 
Colliery. 
The Board had considered the question of speeding up the working 
in the East and their findings were that they could make available to 
the Corporation a group of stable sites, during the period 1957-1960. 
Calculation by the Corporation on this basis allowed for a planned rate 
of building of 450 houses a year. 1 
While the Grenfell Baines Group were in the process of drawing up 
their Master Plan, Mr. Potts for the Corporation, and Mr. Fry for the 
National Coal Board, were on their own initiative investigating in 
detail the implications for building of the mining plans as they stood 
then. Their conclusions, based on the assumption of 5 years for 
1. Meeting of 1st June, 1950 (?.14). 
- 141 -
settlement, and an angle of draw of one third the depth of seams, were 
that a planned rate of 450 houses could not be nearly maintained. 1 
The Re-organisation of Shotton Colliery 
On top of this blow, the Corporation learnt of the completed plans 
of the National Coal Board for the re-organisation of Shotton Colliery. 
Added to the above, the result was a major upset to the calculations of 
land availability upon which the Grenfell Baines Group had been working. 
The Chairman of the Regional Working Party was angry that such a drastic 
revision of plans had not been notified to him directly, and for a 
time he contemplated rejecting them. 2 As an outcome of the disturbance 
caused, the National Coal Board were persuaded not to revise their plans 
again under the designated area.3 
The reduction in the amount of two seam land available forced the 
Corporation once more to consider attacking the 'two seam rule', in 
order to bring into use some of the land the Webster Committee denoted 
'amber', with three seams of coal on the average underneath. 4 
An attempt was made to find Mr. Hill of the Ministry of Works; 
Mr. Hill had said that a decision could be made as to the use of 'three 
seam land' if there was definite information as to its location and 
geological formation. This information had been collected, but Mr. Hill 
1. Meeting of 9th l1arch, 1951 (5.6) and 9.6). 
2. Meeting of 8th May, 1951, (10.5) and 8.14). 
3. Letter,}~. Williams to Mr. Sydenham, 3rd July, 1951, (8.16). 
4. Op. cit., 8th May, 1951 (10.5). 
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could not be traced. He had by then left Government service. 
of Mr. Hill, the Ministry obtained the services of Mr. Whitaker, 
1 Superintending Structural Engineer of the Ninistry of Works. 
The Technical Working Party 
In lieu 
A Technical Working Party was established by the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning, and Mr. Whitaker was asked to expound to it on the 
choice of criterion as to the liability of certain land to subsidence 
and its suitability for building. His answer was that the number of 
seams was not a sufficient criterion. Concentration should instead be 
laid on measuring surface differential. This would be greatest where 
there were faults or barriers in the strata below the surface, and where 
coal workings abruptly ceased. Additional factors w~re also relevant, 
making it certain that each piece of land would have to be judged on its 
merits. The broad generalisations of the Webster criterion were 
al . t• 2 unre lS lC. 
In a report made after this first meeting of the Technical Working 
Party, Professor Potts wrote on the possibilities which the new criteria 
had for the Corporation. It opened up freedom of movement on the East 
side of the area, other than in the South-west, where four seams still 
remained for extraction. Also available were the North-west area 
between the two barriers, and the south-east and South-west corners. 
These conclusions were worked out in conjunction with the National 
1. Letter, ~tt. Williams to Mr. Dobbie, 9th May, 1951 (?.15). 
Letter, Mr. Sydenham to Mr. Williams, 21st June, 1951 (8.14). 
2. Meeting of 27th July, 1951 (8.17). 
1 Coal Board. 
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Grenfell Baines altered their plans so that as little three seam 
land was incorporated as was consistent with the production of 500 
houses,a year. Three seam land was to be regarded as a bonus and not 
a key factor in planning, in order to keep to a minimum the possible 
2 
objections which could be made by the Treasury. 
The final report of the Technical Working Party agreed upon in 
October, 1951, even allowed for the construction of some large buildings 
on three seam land, provided that certain structural precautions were 
taken. The 'Availability of Land' map agreed upon at the same time, 
allowed for the construction of a town of 20,000, 5,800 houses, by 1961, 
at the rate of 500 houses a year. 3 
The Joint Memorandum 
For the first time, a Joint Memorandum was prepared by the Corpor-
ation and the Coal Board, which was put before the eighth and last 
meeting of the Regional Working Party on the 23rd January, 1952. It is 
noteworthy that the only dissenting note in the report concerned the 
availability of land in the West. The Corporation desired that further 
consideration should be given to the Coal Board's proposed programme of 
working to the West of the town centre, where, owing to the proposal to 
extract the Hutton seam, an area of 17 acres necessary for the cohesive 
1. Report of Jvleeting on the 2nd July, 1951, by Professor Potts ( 8 .18). 
2. Meeting, 3rd August, 1951 (11.2). 
3. Report of the Technical Working Party, 25th October, 1951 (11.4). and 
Jvleeting, 21st October (11.5). 
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build up around the town centre, would not be available to the Corporation 
until 1963-64. The Board agreed during discussion at the meeting to 
examine the possibility of making the land on the West mentioned, 
available earlier. The National Coal Board also agreed to have regular 
meetings in the future of a special Technical Sub-Committee in place of 
full meetings of the Regional Working Party. 1 
The Chairman concluded that the Report of the Technical Working 
Party and the Joint Memorandum provided a basis for the development of 
Peterlee on lines acceptable to the Coal Board, and opened the way for 
the Master Plan. The only difficulty that was likely to arise was 
over timing rather than layout. 2 
In his report to the Corporation, the General Manager, Mr. Williams, 
wrote: 
"As a result of this work, we have been able, for the first time, 
to arrive at a concordance between underground extraction, 
Master Plan and phasing of the Plan, which enables the building 
of some 500 houses per annum, resulting in a population of over 
21,000 by 1962. By this agreement, we have been able to increase 
our densities on the site, and continue building operations with 
a greater architectural flexibility than we have hitherto enjoyed.3 
1. Joint Memorandum (?.16). 
2. Meeting of 23rd January, 1952 (?.17). 
3.Report of the General V~ager, 6th February, 1952 (8.19). 
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From here on, the history of the Coal Negotiations can be traced 
in the meetings and reports of the Technical Sub-Committee. The basis 
of operations, however, has not changed since this convenient terminal 
point in the negotiations. Relations with the National Coal Board 
continued to improve from that date on. Professor Potts has later 
written of the "tremendous co-operation11 that has been achieved in the 
Technical Sub-Committee, "irrespective of the earlier disagreements". 
He went on to say that:-
''Peterlee stands out as a remarkable example of co-operation 
between developers under conditions which have never been 
attempted anywhere else in this country, and, probably in 
the whole world. 111 
It would have. been clearly wrong to finish off this chapter and 
the summary below without mentioning these later changes. 
Conclusion 
It is not correct to imply that the reason for the delays and 
obstacles \-lhich impeded the progress of the New Town '\orere simply due to 
the normal processes of the national democratic system. Though once 
certain unpleasant facts have been digested, we can question just how 
much truth there is in this idea. 
The unpleasant facts must be examined closely. What were they? 
First of all, of course, was the fact that coal was under the site, and 
1. Letter, Professor Potts to the Author, 30th March, 1960. 
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that, at the time, fuel shortage made the industry very powerful in 
terms of the pressure it could exert in high places. How short-
sighted the Government was in choosing between so many million tons of 
coal and the value of a town ·which may be the pride of a nation for 
centuries, must be left to the reader. Put baldly like that, without 
examining the various influences that Government might succumb to, even 
taken in a vacuum, the decision could not have been an easy one. 
Also important for the understanding of the problem was 
Mr. Lubetkin's conception of how the town should be built. Though he 
claimed shortage of land for building forced him to consider a central 
area of flats and high buildings, nevertheless Mr. Lubetkin, as he 
admitted, wanted density oi'· the kind that he was contemplating for its 
own sake - or rather for "sociological, aesthetic and economic" reasons. 
To build high, it is absolutely necessary to have stable land on which 
to build. 
of coal. 
Stability was only possible at the price of sterilised seams 
Thirdly, there was a certain amount of ill feeling engendered in 
the Coal Board because of the unwillingness of the Corporation to adhere 
to the pre-designation agreement made by Mr. Tetlow, the Regional 
Controller of the Ministry at the time. The idea that they had been 
misled in some way clouded the negotiations from the time that Mr. 
Lubetkin first put forward his ideas, to the date when the Board 
finally walked out of the Regional Working Party. 
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This·· agreement, it could be argued, should not have been made in 
the first place. Mr. Tetlow, who was himself not the planner, had 
made by these negotiations definite limitations for anybody who was 
going to take on the task. Not only though, did he think when he was 
engaged on them that whoever was going to plan the town would most 
certainly adhere to the skeleton framework suggested by Mr. Clarke, but 
also, it can be said in mitigation, that the kind of person who was 
likely to turn out a plan like Mr. Lubetkin was very rare. This can 
be readily seen by the criticisms levelled at most of the London New 
Towns that they are not sufficiently dense, or are 'prairie' like. 1 
However, given the agreement as a 'fait accompli', it is, if only 
for reasons of political expedience, wise not to ignore some obligations 
which arise because of it. Also there is a moral obligation to keep 
to a 'gentleman's agreement'. By recognising these obligations and 
adopting a different method of approach, the Corporation might have .. 
succeeded in gaining the co-operation of the Board in introducing 
Hr. Lubetkin's plan in a modified form, in exchange for the outline 
desired by the Board. By strict adherence to their legal rights under 
the New Towns Act and by refusing to accept that the Coal Board had 
sufficient 'locus standi' in law, the Corporation had antagonised the 
Board's local representatives. The Board themselves proved very 
1. Lewis Mumford, in a visit to some of the New 
"Prairie towns 11 and the name stuck. He was 
sparse, detached nature of the development. 
attacks in "Architectural Review". 
Towns, called them 
referring to the 
See also the frequent 
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difficult from the beginning; they were loathe to admit the Corporations 
standing in the locality, under the New Towns Act. They were aggrieved 
that what had been agreed upon before the Act had designated the New 
Town officially, was so arbitrarily overthrown once the Act had been so 
applied. The Corporation claimed, probably with reason, that the 
'time target' of 30-40 years would create impossible planning and 
economic difficulties. This does not excuse them however from 
attempting to honour the agreement - if only in order to change it. 
There was more content to the agreement anyway than just the 'time target' 
clause. The "method of approach" counted in this case a great deal as, 
of course, it does in most administrative negotiations. 
~~. Lubetkin's position was a difficult one. If he knew of the 
agreement before accepting his appointment as Architect-Planner, then 
if its implications were clear, he should not have taken on the post. 
An architect or a planner, being ideally an artist on a vast scale, 
should know at once the limitations under which he would have to work, 
preferably before accepting his commission. Ultimately, the 
responsibility, and the word here is not used in its politically 
technical meaning, lies with the Ninister, Mr. Silkin. He knew about 
both the agreement when it was first made and the plans, when they were 
first formulated, of Mr. Lubetkin. Taking a d~partmental line, 
Mr. Silkin stood by his legal rights under the Planning Acts, and 
accepted the advice of the Corporation to ignore the pre-designation 
agreement. 
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It appears as if the first fear of the Board was not that there 
would necessarily be large amounts of coal sterilised, with all the 
consequent effects on employment and production, but that building would 
take place on unstable ground, and they would be liable to pay compensation 
for damages. Secondly, they did not like tli!e~idea of having the extra 
outlay of themselves insuring against the effects of subsidence. In this 
they found an ally in the Treasury, who under a section in the New Towns 
Act sanctioned specific items of capital expenditure. But, as Mr. 
Tetlow tried to make clear in the Local Public Enquiry, and as Lord 
1 Beveridge wrote to Lord Hyndley, the Board did not realise that the 
alternative to the New Town was to allow Easington to go ahead with a 
large housing programme, which itself would raise the same problems. 
It was just that the Corporation attempted to come to grips with the 
problem firmly. The same answer could have been equally well addressed 
to the Treasury. 
The unfortunate fact \'las that when the problem arose to be discussed, 
there was not sufficient known about the technical issues of subsidence, 
especially as regards the peculiar nature of the potential earth movements 
under the designated area. When indeed a teclmical enquiry was ordered, 
it was equally unfortunate that their findings, which were in a sense 
only provisional, were treated as final. Some of the criteria and 
conclusions were misleading or one-sided. For instance, the conclusion 
that there should be no alteration in the mining programme was in the 
1. Seep. (this chapter) and Letter from Lord Beveridge to Lord 
Hyndley, 5th April, 1950 (8.13). 
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circumstances unreasonable. The criterion by which the site was 
divided into arbitrary categories was found later to be misleading. 
Please nc 
and 151 1 
The 'two seam rule' which grew up in the Regional Working Party, and 
was adhered to strongly by not only the Board and the Treasury, but 
also the officers of the ~linistry, was only provisional until, in the 
words of Mr. Hill, they knew more about the difference between 'two 
pulls' and 'three pulls'. This provisional ruling was not questioned 
at a high level until May, 1951, when the plans for the re-organisation 
of Shotton Colliery reduced the amount of 'two seam land' that the 
Corporation had at their disposal. It had to wait until then, even 
though Mr. Lubetkin had been trying to obtain a revision of the 'rule' 
from the time the Webster Report was published until when he resigned. 
It is not easy to work out now how well the extra available three 
seam land would have aided Mr. Lubetkin's plan. Some of it would have 
been outside the horizon line within which he wished to concentrate all 
building. The necessity for concentrated development would have been 
reduced, but, as has already been noted, Mr. Lubetkin wanted 'building 
heavily' for other reasons. He would still have wanted some sterilised 
land, and the second Cabinet meeting took back all it had awarded in the 
first place. However, it was partially the large amount of land granted 
at the first Cabinet meeting in July, 1949, to be available 'immediately', 
that precipitated the crisis and the second Cabinet meeting. 
The last contextural circumstance which complicated this already 
complicated problem was the situation created by the Coal Board's 
- 151 -
plans to re-organise the workings under Shotton Colliery. Combined 
with this was the potential reaction which lay in wait for any project 
which looked as if it may have led to 'unemployment'. The power of the 
Miners Unions at the end of the War was at its peak, and their influence 
was probably greater than the National Coal Board's itself. A difficult 
question to answer, but one that should be asked, is whether such a 
re-organisation under the designated area of a New Town was justified? 
Being an old pit, extensive modernisation was necessary, but should the 
plans have been formulated without reference to the intention of also 
building a New Town? It may have been that the re-organisation itself 
involved some redundancy, and that any sterilisation concessions to the 
Corporation made the margin of difference to the Unions and the Board. 
The figures of redundancy were, in the Board's views, underestimated, but 
their calculations were based on the 'immediate' sterilisation of the 
land. If their financial conclusions about Shotton Colliery had been 
instead based upon the letter of the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning to the Minister of Fuel and Power, of the 17th January, 1950, 
would the life of the pit have been so much shortened and its 
re-organisation still uneconomic? 
It is a curious fact that even after Mr. Lubetkin's resignation, 
and there was a different team of planners on the task, it was still 
necessary to seek stable land on the West, above the Shotton seams. 
The closing words of the Joint Memorandum presented to the Regional 
Working Party meeting of January, 1952, were a request by the 
Corporation for 17 acres on the West. 
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To conclude with an answer to the question posed at the beginning 
of this critical surr~ary, one could say that the ebb and flow of 
'interests' and 'pressures', which provides the key to an understanding 
of the political side of the problem, were part of the democratic 
working of the country's system of government. Peterlee was not 'a 
jewel in the palm of the hand', a phrase of Mr. Lubetkin's, to the 
National Coal Board, but was to an increasing extent, from the date of 
its final designation, a 'thorn' in their mining programme for the area. 
As a generalisation, their attitude can be said to be one of self 
protection, using the Cabinet as an arbiter in the national interest. 
The pressure they could exert depended on a number of factors, the 
personality of the Ministers, the counter pressure of their rivals, 
and the number of forces, other than themselves, that could be lined up 
alongside. When, for one reason and another, the Corporation was weak 
in its pushing power at the end of 1949, and the National Coal Board had 
correspondingly powerful allies supporting its campaign against the 
Corporation, then the Cabinet decisions went in favour of the Board. 
This conclusion takes no account of the rational weight of the issues, 
which of course are intricately involved. All the same, the issues 
did not radically change between the Cabinet decision of July and that 
after the General Election. This example provides an intriguing 
commentary on 'Cabinet Government', and is food for thought whether 
this process should be dignified by the name of democracy. 
CHAPTER IV 
INDUSTRY AND PETERLEE 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDUSTRY AND PETERLEE 
Plan of the Cha;pter 
The assumption that runs through this chapter and indeed through 
the whole thesis, is that the concept of a 'New Town' connotes the 
co-ordinated development of housing and industry, and that this kind 
of solution is possible for a whole range of planning problems. Peterlee 
1 is a "depressed" area New Town, lying in the hinterland between two 
conurbations, placed amongst small scattered outworn mining villages. 
In theory, the range of social and industrial 'diseases' that it can 
cure is wide. The chapter will therefore begin by a statement of the 
main regional industrial problems in order to clarify the potential 
significance of Peterlee. 
The rest of the chapter will take the following pattern. First 
the different views of the important personages and interest groups will 
be discussed in historical order. A more detailed history can be found 
in Appendix 2. (References will be given to this Appendix in the notes to 
this chapter. ) The second approach will be to take the main specific 
issues individually under the headings of "Employment" and "Si ting11 • 
Finally, the regional and particular problems of Peterlee will be 
related to National economic trends in Development Area Policy. 
1. The use of the word 11 depressed11 is not to suggest that the level of 
unemployment today bears comparison with that which persisted through 
the "Great Depression11 • 
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The Regional Perspective 
The introductory chapter has shown how with Owen and Buckingham 
'New Towns' had a joint significance for the many problems associated 
with both housing and industry, and how, after them, when the idea 
became synonymous with first 'Garden Cities' and then 'Garden Suburbs', 
much of the industrial significance was lost. The economic thinking 
of Owen and Buckingham was idealist and pre-classical, that of Ebenezer 
Howard, orthodox! So even if the idea of a 'Garden City' had not 
itself been perverted, the significance of 'New Towns' from an employment 
angle would still have had to wait for a revival of 'Public Works 
Economics' before travelling the long distance from literature to 
legislation. The relation between the 'New Town' concept and the 
depressed areas was 'one way only'. By 'one way' is meant that 'New 
Towns' were thought of as solutions primarily to the problem of southern 
congestion, especially the spread of London. The problem of the 
depressed areas was largely relevant to, for instance, the 1939 Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population only in so 
far as one of the prime reasons for the congestion in the south was 
that new industry was setting up there, instead of the north where it 
was recognised to be needed. Government policy for the North-east, 
with ~rich this thesis is most concerned, did not theoretically 
co-ordinate the new industry, which was steered there by legislation, 
with the settlement pattern on the same or even comparable scale as was 
worked out for London. This is not to say that many other areas did 
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not have similar complaints, especially the 'Development Areas'. 
In various regions there are conurbations in depressed areas, and 
therefore there is a double problem, that of obtaining new industry, 
and then secondly, co-ordinating it with the settlement pattern. 
This will need more explanation, which the next few paragraphs will 
attempt to provide. 
The pre-1939 situation in the North-east was still, in terms of 
known economic theory, a difficult problem. But with the assertion of 
Keynesean type solutions, a simple answer was provided which, to 
unsophisticated policy makers, needed little elaboration. Social 
problems can be ignored if the basic economic difficulties are solved. 
Another way of putting this could be that short run economic problems 
assert themselves far more easily on the attention of politicians than 
do long run ones. The placing of trading estates wherever the 
unemployment percentage was high, was just such a solution. It was 
the concrete expression of the much bandied policy of "taking the work 
to the workers'. Firstly, population is most concentrated in the big 
towns around the Tyne and Tees conurbations. In fact, the index of 
the 1936 National Overcrowding Survey showed that overcrowding was worse 
in the packed industrial towns of the North-east than in any other 
industrial centre in Great Britain. 1 The 1951 Census revealed that 
1. The first six on the list of County Boroughs with the highest degree 
of 11overcrowding" were, in order - Sunderland, Gateshead, South 
Shields, Tynemouth, West Hartlepool and Newcastle-upon-Tyne. (National 
Overcrowding Survey 1936). 
MAP 7. 
I. Newcastle OQ ]1"• C. B. 24. Darhant M.B. 
2. ~athC .. 25. Ha.rtlepool M.B. 
8. yth M.B. 28. Stockton on Teet M.B. 
"· 
W&naend M.B. 27. ~nu.D. 
a. M~thM.B. 28. ckham U.D. 
e. New lggln by the Sea 29. Blaydon U.D. 
U.D. so. Tanlield U.D. 
7. Aahlngton U.D. 31. ADDIIeld Plaln 
8. Bedllngtoa~U.D. 32. Stanley U.D. 
9. Seaton Valle~ U.D. S3. Leadpte U.D. 
10. Longbenton .D. a.. Corl8ett U.D. 
ll. Whltlek and 35. Bentields!de U.D. 
oa.._ton U.D. 36. Felling U.D . 
l2. N,bum U.D. 37. Hebbncn U.tl. 
13. Prudhoe U.D. 38. Washington U.D. 
14. Goeforth U.D. 39. Chestec le Street tJ .D. 
15. C..tle Ward R.D. 40. Houghton le SprlngtJ.D. 
18. M~R.D. 41. Hetton U.D. 
17. Hfl m R.D. 42. Seaham Hubour U.D. 
18. So11tb Sblelda C. B. 43. Bcandou and 
19. Gateshead C.B. Bbahott1et U.t>. 
20. Sunderland C.B. 44. Crook tJ . . 
21. Welt Hartl~! C.B. 45. TowLawU.D. 
22. Darllngtoa .B. 46. WUiington U.D. 
23. )arrow M.B, 47. Spennymoor U.D. 
48. Blahop Aacltl&nd U.f'. 
49. Shlldon U.D. 1-IU &0. Billingham u.O. 
··-·· 
51. Lancheattr R.D. 1-• 11 52. Chester le Street R.D. ·h-·~ 53. Boldon U.D. 
•-h. 54. Sunderland R.D. ,_,.,. 55. Houghton le Sprin\ 
.D. 
56. Durham R.D. 
57. Easiarcon R.D. 
59. Sedge eld R ,D, 
GO. Hartlepool R.D. 
61. Stockton R.D. 
62. Darlington R.D. 
63. Barnard Cutle R.D. 
64. Weardale R.D. 
65. Ml<ldleaborougb C.B. 
66. Thomaby on Tees B. 
87. l::1ton B. 
68. Richmond R.D. 
69. Croft R.D. 
70. Startforth R.D, 
71. Stoketley R.D. 
MAP SHOWING THE INCIDENCE OF OVERCROWDING IN AN AREA IN THE NORTH E~T 
National Overcrowding Survey 1936 
- 156 -
Tyneside had still the highest degree of overcrowding amongst all the 
other conurbations - 0.88 persons per room, compared to the average 
for England and Wales of 0. 74. Taking the work to the workers 
necessitated bringing industry into the big towns. Team Valley is 
an example of this. 
Team Valley was attached to a conurbation. There are two possible 
siting zones for such industrial estates in big towns, and these are 
on cleared land in the centre, or on new land at the periphery. It is 
claimed that the second has been the most popular policy, not only 
because clearing land is itself expensive, but because land values in 
the centre of big towns are prohibitively high. Such peripheral 
growth is the means by which conurbations add to their size even 
-further, as housing estates bulge outwards and 'in-fill' the unprotected 
open areas. Apart from its location, the big town industrial estate 
in a depressed area tends to prolong the life of outworn social capital, 
some of which, but for the presence of the estate, might have been long 
since replaced in a more pleasant and habitable situation. Thirdly, 
as has been found at Team Valley and a number of other estates, during 
a prolonged 'twilight inflation', labour tends to be drawn from many 
miles away. There is a long 'travel to work' which is regarded by many 
as itself a social evil; and also continual travel in leads to a 
further incentive to the town's growth. Another related employment 
problem is created by the fact that big towns have large service 
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industry requirements which satisfactorily absorb much of the available 
urban female labour. Trading estates need also much female labour and 
therefore must look further afield to find it. 
The next aspect of the policy of bringing the 'work to the workers', 
which the author asserts has not been sufficiently related to the 
settlement pattern and consequent long run economic and social problems, 
is the way in which the scattered hinterland has been dealt with. 
The post war policy for the distribution of industry for these 
hinterland areas has been as diffuse as the original and natural growth 
of the mining settlement pattern. The questions here can be raised in 
two halves. Firstly,. if the pits themselves were not, and the coal 
industry with them, going into decline, would New Towns on balance be 
still the most satisfactory policy? Secondly, taken as axiomatic the 
long term exhaustion of the pits, either because of high comparative 
cost or because of sheer physical exhaustion, where then is the best 
location for new industry? These can be seen as regional planning 
questions necessitating the co-o~dination of housing and industry 
policy together. One can only see the results of policy making here, 
and compare them with the theory and practice of Peterlee, but it 
undoubtedly raises the question of the efficacy of existing regional 
controls, such as the division of responsibility between the Board of 
Trade, which has regional offices, and the Ministry of Housing and Local 
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Government, which has not. In a similar way the Regional Physical 
Planning Committee is also brought into the limelight. 
Both the questions raised intimately concern the problem of 
Peterlee. The West of Durham was mined before the East and the pits 
there are fast declining. Blackball, Easington, and Harden on the 
East coast were regarded, at the time of the designation of Peterlee, 
as having a very long mining life. The main reason for designation 
was to provide a centralised area of new planned housing and community 
facilities, instead of adding on new development to the outworn social 
capital in the old villages. New industry would, if provided at all, 
be wanted only to create a 'balanced community', to give jobs to the 
women of the district who wanted to work, and for the menfolk who were 
unsuited to mining, such as the disabled. 
The significance of Peterlee is enlarged if a kindred New Town 
was also regarded as the most satisfactory form of development for an 
area where the pits are in decline. In that case, the west of Durham 
and any other declining region becomes a candidate for designation. 
It is clear that the line between building up existing development, 
such as that envisaged under the 'Town Development Act', and the creation 
of a 'New Tovm' is a marginal one. Too much existing development, and 
the planning difficulties are multiplied; the merits of the social 
capital must be weighed up. There is then only a like marginal, but 
important difference between the policy of 'grouped development', which 
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is the present policy of the Durham County Plan, and that entailed in 
the building of Peterlee and Newton Aycliffe. The difference lies in 
the size of the groupings, the location of industry, and the scale of 
the operations. 
The size of the grouping depends on the relation between the intended 
site and the nearest medium size town, and the facilities that the town 
provides. There are also certain social and planning considerations 
which favour 'town' grouping rather than 'village' grouping. Here the 
main consideration is industrial, and from that side it can be put 
forward that industrialists are attracted to, and their firms, once 
established, are more economic in, 'New Towns' than in 'New' or enlarged 
villages. 1 There are also social and economic reasons for having the 
new industry close to and related with a specific town, instead of being 
isolated and at some distance from the town. Lastly, the co-ordination 
of all development and its timing is a point of importance. 
Where there is a major declining industry in the locality, such as 
coal, in an area which has been historically depressed, there can still 
be economic difficulties even though the rest of the country is 
1. Some of the content of this hypothesis is not untested. The Inquiry 
on "Development Area Policy in the North East of England", (E. Allen, 
A.J. Odber, and P.J. Bowden), published by the North East: ·:Industrial 
and Development Association in 1957, has some bearing on this question. 
(pp.65 -74). The authors found that the big industrial towns were 
more favourable for the success of enterprises than areas of scattered 
settlement, where especially communications were poor. They could of 
course say little about the relative merits of 'New Towns' as against 
'New Villages' because there were no examples of the latter. On the 
other hand, Newton Aycliffe was found to be a relatively favourable 
spot, taking into account that mainly small, therefore comparitively 
high cost firms had been located there. 
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inflating happily. In assessing the effect of Peterlee, one must not 
only take into account the employment given by the new industries 
imported into the area, but also the multiplier effect of incomes spent 
by employees, as well as the incomes earned and spent and orders placed, 
in the course of actually building the town. The more incomes that are 
spent locally, the less harmful the result of building in a period of 
inflation. Ideally the best time to build would be on the downturn, 
but the most favourable time to attract industry is in an expansion. 
If creeping inflation is the rule, as it appears from the postwar 
economy to be, then the problem is how far one can invest locally in a 
depressed area ~uthout straining the national economy. 
The industrial history of Peterlee can only be understood within 
the framework of national economic trends. To grasp the special 
problems of the New Town regionally, one will need to abstract them. 
Those developments with priority would stand out in relief in the region 
when national trends demanded economies. Was the New Town going to 
receive priority or was it instead to queue up with everybody else for 
new industry? In short, was Peterlee going to be just a New Town 'in' 
a depressed area and not 'for' a depressed area? 
This section will first attempt to piece together some of the 
threads of the history to date and, where possible, to draw some 
conclusions about past and therefore future policy. The important 
problems then revealed will be treated individually. They are broadly 
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divided between those connected with 'employment' and 'siting'. This 
division is one of convenience, and the method might in some cases hide 
the interrelations which are present in most of the situations discussed. 
Trends in Peterlee Industrial Policy 
The memories of local councils are naturally longer than national 
parliaments on events which affected mainly a few, and their own, 
localities rather than all. With the 1930's well in mind, the plans for 
the New Tovm brought out by the Rural District Council of Easington 
contained provision for new industry, and sites where it could be 
1 located. The rationale of this was well investigated by Mr. Clarke 
and the Research Team in his own offices and those of the Hinistry of 
Town and Country Planning in Newcastle. To a large extent then - at 
this time- the New Town was to be 'for' the depressed area of Easington. 
It was recognised that it would start by being a 'miners' town', with 
many of the inhabitants travelling out to their pits to work, but ..•• 
11The extent of this travelling will be a maximum at the 
outset of the Scheme, gradually reducing as collieries become 
2 
redundant and New Industries develop." 
The Easington New Town project came to the attention of the main 
regional authorities at the end of thewar. The post war boom had 
started, continuing the pressure on scarce resources and prolonging 
1. Mr. Clarke's Report, 4th August 
Central Development" (File 14). 
Appendix II, PP• 1- 4· 
2. 'Farewell Squalor', p.66. 
1943 (14.7). "Outline Sketch of 
For further detail see 
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war-time controls. Existing local interests were protected by the 
blanket of full employment, and potential structural weaknesses were 
hidden by the common cry for more labour. The New Town, which during 
the war was seen as a long term project for replacing not only outworn 
social capital, but also industrial capital, after the w~, turned into 
a threat to established local interests. Short term policies prevailed 
at the expense of the future. The main fear was centered about the 
competition for labour. The view was expressed most forcibly by those 
who represented the Hartlepools Trading Estate. The other interest was 
more powerful and therefore less voluble. I have called them here the 
'mining interests' as they are represented by the Coal Board as well as 
the miners' unions. The relative merits of each of their claims are 
discussed later on in this chapter. Here it is sufficient to say that 
the change in attitude brought about by these interests can be personified 
in the role of the Regional Controller of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning, Mr. Tetlow. His early views were expressed when he spoke to 
the Rural District Council in March, 1947, about the New Town. 
11The Government should help; you set up a society which has, 
as its primary basis, getting coal, but has also other industry 
to help coal out in a difficult period.rr 
11If we are going to get permanent industry in the area which 
will be reliable, it seems to me that we should get the 
industries that are tied here, which depend on the use of 
. al tl1 rJ. vers, co ••• 
1. Neeting, Tetlow and the Council, 12th March, 1947 ( 15.7). 
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Mr. Tetlow's attitude changed in the Regional Physical Planning Committee, 
where all the major industrial interests were represented. After 
hearing the views of members of the Committee at preceding meetings, 1 
Mr. Tetlow, on the 17th November 1947, concluded that, 
"No allowance had been made on the plan for the New Town for 
such an estate, and it was unlikely that there would be such 
development on the site. 112 
The Minister, Mr. Silkin, was introduced to the subject through 
Mr. Tetlow, after agreements had been made •dth the other local 
interests. Despite this, Mr. Silkin was favourable to the idea of 
new industry for the New Town. The Minister also rejected the 
"Hartlepools argument 111 on the grounds that the purpose of planning ••. 
"was to ensure not only that the development area got the 
amount of industry necessary, but that it was properly 
distributed11 • 3 
His refusal of the claims of opposing interests, though, was of little 
importance, since by 1950, when the industry question became a live 
issue at Peterlee, he had been replaced in office, and secondly, it was 
the Board of Trade which was by statute responsible for the location of 
industry. Unfortunately, the terms in which the official designation 
1. See especially, lVieeting 24th September 1947 (16.3). 
2. Ivleeting, 18th November 1947 (17.10). 
3. Letter, Silkin to Ridley, 23rd March 1949 (18.1). 
Further detail is given in the Appendix II, p. 5. 
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literature was written were highly ambiguous. For instance, in the 
Draft Designation Order, dispute centred on the motivation behfund the 
intention to create a 'balanced community', and on the more subtle point 
as to whether "labour not employed in the coal mining industry" was 
meant to embrace only 'present unemployment' or to include also 
'anticipated future increases'. A quotation from the Order follows to 
illustrate this ambiguity. 
"In order that the New Town might be able to develop as a 
balanced community suitable provision would be made for 
industrial employment to absorb the female labour available 
in the district and any male labour not employed in the coal 
mining industry. 111 
Likewise the "Explanatory Memorandum" issued with the Draft Designation 
Order must be scrutinised for its significant meaning. The use of the 
phrase "labour not employed in the pits" has a different meaning in both 
documents. In the Draft Order it is suggested that the phrase refers 
to immediate needs. In the Explanatory Hemorandum (quoted below) the 
same words are linked with the Hartlepools Trading Estate which here 
covers also immediate needs. If immediate needs were covered by the 
Hartlepools Estate, as was suggested in the Explanatory Memorandum, then 
why mention it at all in the Draft Order that industry was needed for 
'labour not employed in the pits'? 
1. Draft Designation Order (3.3). 
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In the Explanatory Nemorandum there was mention of the 'impending' 
industrial needs of the district, and a clear statement of the desir-
ability of associating this with Peterlee. 
"Not the least of the advantages of the New Town would be the 
opportunity it would afford of creating a more balanced community 
than any which exists in the area at pr~sent. Coal mining 
would clearly remain for some time the dominant industry in the 
district. There was substantial provision already in the 
Hartlepools Trading Estate for the emploJ~ent of female labour 
and any male labour not employed in the pits. The need will 
sooner or later arise for industry at Easington itself, and this 
would be most effectively met by associating industry with the 
New Town. 111 
Important a statement as this was, no clue was provided, however, as to 
the timing intended. 'Sooner or later' is an expression which allows 
much latitude, and the ground between became the field of battle for a 
great deal of later argument. The phrase also suggested to the Board 
of Trade only two points of time. 2 It is clear, though, that industry 
would not be needed in "separate parcels" in the future, especially if 
1. Explanatory J:-1emorandum (3. 1). 
2. Letter, Sillar to Williams, 22nd February 1951. (19.?). 
Discussion on this subject is in the Appendix II p.25. 
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a long term view point was being taken. There would be a gradual 
build-up of unemployed from the pits. A short term depression might 
cause a panic need for a large number of jobs, but this should not have 
been a governing factor in policy making. The only time when a large 
number of jobs should have been provided all at one point of time was 
at the beginning, when the backlog was being made up. Otherwise, 
industry should have been built up gradually over time to anticipate 
the trend of future needs. These ambiguous statements may have been 
written that way on purpose, to allow flexibility, or they may have been 
unintentional. In either case, the Board of Trade was given leeway 
to take a less positive line. 
The onlY other view that industry would be needed in Easington 
to offset the impending redundancy in the local pits was the North 
1 Eastern Area Development Plan, but once written, there was no 'interest 
group' who would take up the recommendations and by 1950, the Plan had 
more or less been dropped as a basis for calculation. 
None of the authorities suggested that redundancy would not occur 
in the long run. It has been found that the Board of Trade and the 
County Planning Office, for instance, in a meeting in August 1950, did 
moot the long term prospects, but they were concerned at the lack of rail 
1. The North Eastern Area Development Plan- Pepler and Macfarlane, 
p.152. Hare details of the recommendations made in this Plan 
in Appendix II, p.9. 
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facility and the instability of the site. 1 Even with these points in 
mind one can conclude that the Board were unwilling to come to grips 
firmly with the long term problem. Mr. Sillar, the Controller, insisted 
that industry in Peterlee must not draw on labour working in neighbouring 
localities, 2 that the New Town would be treated like any other trading 
estate in the North East, and specifically that the 'long term' was 
only when 11 the coal was completely worked outn.3 
To the extent that the long term was brought into the calculations 
at any time, the Board, at the most, envisaged the total maximum capacity 
4 
of the Peterlee site to be about 3,000 persons, most of whom would be 
female employing. From the very first and right through all the trace-
able correspondence, the Board was assuming that all male employing 
industry needed rail facility, especially that employing unskilled males.5 
A second assumption was that male employing industry was 'heavy industry' 
which would need absolutely stable land. 6 For these reasons it was 
1. Meeting of Corporation with County Planning Officer, 30th May 1951 
(19.11), also (22.2). 
See Appendix II, p. 29. 
2. Interview West with Sillar, 29th November 1949 (Research Files - Industry). 
See Appendix II, p. 23. 
3. Letter, Williams to Sillar, 20th February 1951 (19.6) 
See Appendix II, P· 25. 
4. Paper written by Dymond of Board of Trade, in file 5P/25 of Durham 
County Planning Department. 
5. Interview West vd th Sillar, 29th November 1949 (Research Files- Industry). 
6. Interview Tindall with Sillar, Sullivan and Dymond, 27th January 1950 
(Research Files - Industry) and General Managers Report to the 
Industrial Sub-Committee, 30th October 1950 (18.26). 
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conveyed to the County Planning Office (or at least was not denied) 
that Peterlee would be unlikely to fulfil their designation responsibility 
of supplying the needs of the whole of the Easington Rural District. 1 
On this understanding, the County Council proceeded to look for sites 
outside the boundaries of the NevJ Town. At the second meeting of the 
Working Party2 (noted in the Appendix II) it was assumed that the New 
Town industrial estate would be responsible for that portion of the 
population of 30,000 not dependent on mining, which again worked out on 
their calculation as 3,000 jobs to be provided. 
Peterlee Corporation have not attempted to deny that sites should 
be available outside the boundaries of the New Town for firms requiring 
rail facility and 'absolute' surface stability.3 They have claimed, 
though, that this is not such a severe limitation as the other authorities 
have made out. To be able to prove this ~tias part of the reason why the 
Corporation desired to be free from the restrictions placed upon them by 
the agreement with the Board of Trade in 1950. 4 (This agreement handed 
over the responsibility for deciding industrial needs to a Committee 
controlled by the Board of Trade. The advantage to the Corporation of 
1. Meeting of Corporation with County Planning Officer, 30th May 1951 
(19.11), also (22.2). 
2. "Discrepancies in Statements as to Industrial Development at Peterlee" 
(Research File- Industry). 
3. Interview with ~IT. Nicholson, March 1960. 
4. For more details see the Appendix II, pp.19-22. 
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this arrangement was that the factories that were built could have their 
rents subsidised under the Distribution of Industry Acts.) The 
Corporation felt that they would be able to cater for the needs of the 
whole Rural District, apart from the exceptional industrial case. They 
did not want to compete with other sites outside their boundaries, which 
competition might be harmful to the full development of the Town. 
Two arguments for new industry were accepted by most of the regional 
authorities, the first to create a 'balanced community', and the second, 
to give employment to more women in the area, which had a very low female 
t mal l t t . 1 o e emp oymen ra 10. Even though the site at Peterlee was agreed 
by the Board of Trade to be suitable for light industry, which they 
recognised to be generally female employing, the Board still were only 
counting on a long term maximum of 500 in 1950.2 The first factory for 
Peterlee was under construction in September 1953 and a second in 
August 1954, which gave the two a potential of 800 female employees -
the actual number had reached 600 by January 1958.3 It is possible that 
the Board were satisfied with the female employment that had been provided 
by the two factories, and this partly accounted for the delays after 1954. 
1. Draft Designation Order and Explanatory Memorandum. See Appendix II 
PP• 5-6. 
2. Paper written by Dymond of the Board of Trade - in File 5P/25 
Durham County Planning Department. See Appendix II, p. 24, 
3. Notes on Industrial Development, 9th January 1958 (21.7). 
See Appendix II, p. 35, Note 3. 
of 
Note 2. 
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Even when a third new factory did come to the New Town in 1958, it was 
nearly all male employment that was provided. The first argument of 
'balanced community' is one which has no exact measurement statistically, 
and is an argumeil.t that will bend easily to other policy requirements. 
Also, the difficulties which were found in drawing population from the 
mining villages of the Rural District were -found to be partly counter-
balanced by an influx from numerous other sources, creating a 'balanced 
community' without new industry as the causal force. Nevertheless, this 
latter point only applies to the New Town and not to the whole Rural 
District, to which the argument was first intended to apply. 
The concluding points to this section concern Government policy. 
(The main conclusions on "Distribution of Industry Policy11 occur at the 
end of the chapter.) Firstly, national restrictions particularly 
affected the depressed areas. Far from the Government giving the 
depressed areas preference in boom years, they in fact used the low level 
of recorded unemployment in the areas as an excuse to make "useful 
economies" in their own estimates of expenditure. 1 When restrictions 
were needed to curb overall national inflation, again it was the Develop-
ment Areas who were proportionately the hardest hit, because they depended 
upon Government assistance. The two examples that can be quoted are the 
K. X. Lamp Factory and the additional factory for Amblers Ltd. These 
1. See P.206 of this chapter. 
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were two firms that Peterlee had managed to persuade past the preliminary 
negotiating stage. The effect of Government restrictions, it was 
claimed, prevented the K. X. firm from proceeding (even though they had 
spent £3,000 in abortive fees), and the effect of the same restrictions, 
but this time directed through the Board of Trade, forced Amblers to look 
1 
elsewhere for a factory. 
From 1958, the position underwent a radical change. Economic 
depression,added to Government rethinking on its policies in the 
Development Areas, has resulted in Peterlee going up in the scale of 
regional priorities for new industry. Independence from the control of 
the Board of Trade resulted from the inability of the Board to build 
new factories between 1956 and 1960. The Corporation themselves had 
been, almost continuously since 1950, pressing through their own Ministry 
for either special grants, permission to erect 11Factories in Advance of 
requirements", or freedom to build with loans made under section 12(1) of 
the New Towns Act. Restrictions on capital investment and certain 
administrative directives prevented the Board of Trade allowing its agent, 
the North Eastern Trading Estates, to build any Government financed 
factories in the Development Area. 2 The element of priority was 
introduced in 1958 when the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
1. Letter, Sadler-Forster to Col. H.H. Peile, 12th September, 1957. (21.4). 
2. Illustration of these points can be found in Appendix II, pp. 35-37. 
- 172 -
obtained permission from the Treasury to finance factory building at 
Peterlee under the New Towns Act. The usual New Towns pattern of help 
from the responsible Hinistry was for the first time rendered possible 
for Peterlee. The New To\tnS had been in competition for new industry 
'on the move', with the Development Areas. The ring of New Towns around 
London had been more favourably placed from the viewpoint of industry. 
Business men chose them in preference to the "Depressed Areas11 , even 
though the Board of Trade attempted to 11push11 the latter. However, the 
Board carefully guarded its rig!lts to decide for the regions under its 
control, where industry within the rrAreas" was to go, and what interests 
needed protection from potential competition. Despite being a New Town 
in a "Depressed Area", Peter lee had not received the best of both v10rlds. 
In 1958, as a concession to its status as a New Town, Peterlee achieved 
an element of priority through its own Ninistry, at a time when there 
were restrictions on the Board of Trade's ability to finance factory 
development. The only advantage of a loan through the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government was that their own Ministry saw them in a 
more favourable light. The disadvantage lay in the cost of the loan, at 
current high interest rates, compared with the comparatively low cost to 
the Corporation under the previous arrangements, of having subsidised 
factories built for them by the Board of Trade's agent. Unhappily for 
the Corporation, it did not receive from the Board the element of priority 
it thought it deserved. 
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SUMMARY OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS 
As was indicated at the beginning, this chapter •rill continue with 
an investigation of the separate problems which seem to merit more 
attention. They will be grouped under the general headings of 
'employment' and 'siting'. 
Employment 
The main initial objections to new industry to be provided in the 
New Town, or anywhere in Easington for that matter, can be traced to 
the two sources of the Trading Estates in the conurbations, and the 
'mining interest'. 
(i) The Hartlepools objection 
In the pre-designation discussions there was some mention of 
possible opposition from the Sunderland estate, but equally early on 
it was made clear that the New Town would be given responsibility for 
the Labour Exchanges of Harden, Haswell and Wingate, and not seaham, 
part of which is included in the Easington Rural District and which 
part would supply most of the labour coming from the Rural District 
which worked in Sunderland. The complaint then mainly came from the 
Hartlepools, which had abutting to it the south of the Labour Exchange 
of Harden and the south-east of Wingate. 1 The objections were lodged 
at a time when there was competition for labour in the immediate post 
1. Letter, Ridley to Silkin, 24th February 1949 (18.1). 
See Appendix II, pp. 13-14, Note 1, p. 14. 
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war, an exceptional period, and a difficult one from which to make 
forecasts. It is true that the provision for an over-large estimate 
of labour availability would tend to exert a corresponding pull on more 
distant areas. This being so, the estimates of labour availability for 
Easington assumed a justified importance, and so also does the definition 
of what should be a fair area in which industry should be allowed to 
carve out its empire, which was a subject, at no time, not openly debated 
by interested parties. The above discussion, and in fact the arguments 
that were actually used, assume that it is correct to talk about 'fair' 
and 'unfair' areas. To a certain extent, this must be so, otherwise 
there would be no 'development area'. 
The questio~, which has wide implications, can be seen to be not an 
easy one. It is no good simply labelling the argument of the Hartlepools 
as 'parochialism 1 , and the same can be said of the 'mining interest' , 
when we come to discuss it. The Corporation did not attempt to deny 
the Eartlepools claim that there was a 'fair' area; it did not accuse 
them of parochialism, but it did say that the area claimed by the 
Hartlepools was too great and was based upon the short instead of the 
long term view. The Eartlepools were expanding at the time and they 
not only wanted to maintain their hold on the female labour from 
Easington that they already had, but they wished to call upon larger 
supplies to keep pace with the expansion. The Peterlee Corporation said 
there was a limit to the number of females that could possibly be 
attracted from the Rural District, even if there was no industry 
established at the New Town. The women of the Area far from the 
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Hartlepools just would not travel the long distances. A second argument 
the Corporation used was that the Hartlepools were underestimating the 
natural increase in population which could be predicted and would fulfil 
their needs. Tile Corporation agreed that the long term problems from 
the point of view of both the Hartlepools and Easington, was a male, 
rather than a female, labour one, and that female labour would be needed 
to fill the vac~~cies in the predominantly, but not totally, male 
employing industry. 1 
The actual position has been somewhat different than was predicted. 
Except for the depression periods, there has been a surplus of female 
labour and a shortage, in certain skilled trades, for male labour. The 
unemployment figures for the Hartlepools for both male and female labour 
has been consistently higher than the average for the North-East since 
1946 Cup to 1957). The figures given here come from the book 'Tees-
Side at Mid Century' by J.W. House and B. Fullerton. This was financed 
by the North Eastern Development Association who backed the Hartlepools 
position in 1949. Here a similar attitude is taken that longer travel 
to work from outlying districts will be necessary to make up for the 
shortage in skilled male labour. The concentration is now on male, 
and not female, labour, and the claim is that the expected population 
increases on Tees-side, which they estimate will raise the labour force 
by 21,000 by 1971, (16,000 of them males), will not be sufficient~ 
1. Peterlee Industry and the Hartlepools, April and May 1950 (18.4 and 9). 
See Appendix II, p. 15, Note 1. 
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Figures of migration from the Tees-side are given and the only comments 
that they can make on them in the light of their conclusions are that 
they are "curious" and "inexplicable". The most revealing of these 
figures are that only 85% of the natural increase since 1949 elected to 
remain, and as much as 15% migrated. 1 If they cannot, in the F~tle-
pools, prevent their own population from migrating by supplying industry, 
there does not appear to be much support for their case for calling on 
the surplus population of other regions. 
Instead of there being a continuing female shortage and a male 
surplus, as was predicted by both the Corporation and the Hartlepools, 
there has been the completely opposite situation. Nevertheless, the 
desire to draw even male population to 1 travel to work 1 to the Hartle-
pools has point if the conclusions that Mr. House and Mr. Fullerton make 
are justified. First of all, though, on their own evidence on the 
Hartlepools of figures of unemployment, of expected population increases 
and migration rates, their conclusions do not appear justified. Secondly, 
their claim that Tees-side should grow more had not been sufficiently 
substantiated, even though there are in the area growth industries with 
e}~ansion potential. 
London. 
The same argument could be applied to Greater 
Though the 1 Hartlepools argument' was not openly pressed after 1949, 
probably because the justification for it had partly been removed, it 
still appeared to motivate the Board of Trade in their attitude towards 
1. House and Fullerton, "Tees-side at Mid Century", p. 433. 
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industry at Easington, or at least the removal of the argument did 
nothing to change the attitude which that argument had originally helped 
to create. 
(ii) The !'lining Objection 
The same conclusion and some of the opening remarks on the Hartle-
pools question apply equally to the objections raised by the 'mining 
interest' • 1 The post war high demand situation was the same, and the 
qua~ifications about short term economic gains weighed against long term 
gains or the value of social costs, applies also with this case. If the 
National Coal Board believed that the high level of demand was permanent, 
then was it justified in making complaints that industry at Peterlee would 
be competing with a limited labour supply? If the level of demand was 
permanent, then it is possible to claim that wages and conditions in the 
mines should have been raised so that the competition from the alternative 
industries could be met. However, the National Coal Board did act on 
the assumption of a permanently high level of demand. This did not 
justify them in restricting competition. By virtue of their position as 
"Nonopsonist buyers" of labour, they could maintain lower wages (and 
prices) than would have been the case if alternative industry was 
available. However, the National Coal Board were inaccurate in their 
forecasts. They neglected not only the possibility of a fall off in 
1. Analysis of Planning Problems, p. 28. See Appendix II, p. 28, Note 1, 
and Notes on Industry (18.2). See Appendix II, p. 13, Note 2, 
and Meetings of Regional Physical Planning Committee, especially 
24th September 1947 (16.3). 
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demand, which is understandable at the time, but they also underestimated 
the effect of modernisation and mechanisation in reducing their call on 
labour. 
The method adopted by the Coal Board was also at fault. They 
attempted to balance out the expected redundancy by providing just 
sufficient jobs. They did not account for the fact that industry would 
be needed for other reasons - for females, for the disabled, for the 
natural increase in population, all of which industry would have acted 
as a magnet on the miners unless the pits were made comparably more 
attractive. Industry would also have been required to set the 'ball 
rolling' (upon which,comment is made later) when there was no redundancy, 
a temporary form of competition which should have been tolerated. 
~furket forces need not be the sole criterion for all action, but they 
cannot be ignored. 
As the Peterlee Corporation argued, wages in the mines were by no 
means so low as to warrant fears that employment provided by new industry 
would be competitive to the pits. ~liners sho have always appreciated 
hard cash and have not gone to work because they liked it, would not be 
so easily drawn to a lower wage level. 
The restrictive arguments of the Hartlepools and the mining interest 
are further examples of the fallacy of the benefits of nation-wide 
restriction which has held sway in Government circles for a number of years. 
New industry would see an increase in the level of production, which would 
not only maintain the high level of demand for such basic industries as 
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coal, and therefore the potential power to pay higher wages, but would 
also increase productive resources, directly, as >·fell as indirectly, 
through the increased power to pay for imports. The increase on the 
supply side would in turn tend to curb the inflation. So on a national 
level, if the new industries are wisely chosen, then loce~ restrictions, 
though they may solve some problems, are a hindrance on expansion. 
There must be a careful balance between the parochial interest of 
the individual groups and the 1dder national interest, a theme wlrich is 
constantly re-occuring throughout this thesis. Too often was it the 
case of the local groups thinking far too easily that what was in their 
interest was coincident with what was best for the whole community. 
Also it was sadly true that Government agencies, whose responsibility it 
was to rationalise the issues, either could not see the national interest, 
or were too willing to take the easy course out and succumb to the most 
powerful pressures. It is impossible to say to what extent it was the 
mining interest or the Hartlepools themselves who were responsible for 
the Board of Trade adopting the attitude they did, or whether the Board 
on its own initiative, or in consultation wi.th the Hinistry of Labour, 
decided to act as guardian protector. In either case, even after the 
initial period of high demand for labour had passed, the protective cloak 
of the Board of Trade was given to the Hartlepools and the mining interest 
~t the expense of Peterlee. The significance of this protection, it can 
be surmised, gradually was reduced over time, but, unhappily, one cannot 
make any just measurement because other complications arose as the 
others declined. 
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(iii) The Availability of Labour 
Between 1950 and 1958, various sites outside the New Town have been 
agreed upon by the County Authorities and the Rural District Council 
1 
with the Board of Trade. This has meant that the availability of 
labour statistics for the New Town have not been meant to encompas9, 
necessarily, the whole of the availability of labour in the Easington 
Rural District. There have been varying indications as to the 
intentions of the Board. On·. the one hand there is evidence to suggest 
that the Board's aim was to have the Peterlee site responsible for the 
whole needs of new industry f0r the Rural District, with or~y the special 
case located outside, 2 and on the other hand, there is also evidence 
for the view that the Board thought that the New Town should be responsible 
only for its own population - 30,000. In which case, the sites outside 
the New Town were intended by the Board to cater for the other 50,000. 3 
The County Plan agreed upon with the Ministry of Housing and_ Local 
Government in 1954 made provision for two sites outside the New Town 
with an employment capacity of 1,000, but it is clear that the Board of 
Trade had agreed a further site with the County to accommodate another 
2,000 people. This site was only omitted from the final Plan because 
1. Meeting of Corporation with County Planning Officer, 30th May 1951 
(19.11), also (22.2). See Appendix II, p. 30 , Note 1. 
2. Letter, Williams to Reading, 25th October, 1950 (18.23). 
See Appendix II, p. 29 , Note 2. 
Also Pre-designation discussions. 
3. J.v!inutes of Meeting, 28th May 1954 (22.1). 
See Appendix II, p. 31 , Note 2. 
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of the later suspected instability of the site due to coal subsidence. 
Therefore, at this time, one can suppose that the Board of Trade were 
willing to agree to 3,000 jobs being provided outside the New Town in the 
Rural District. In 1958, theCounty Planning Authorities issued a Town 
Hap, in \vhich another two sites were added to the original one of 20 acres 
(1,000 jobs), m~~ng, with the additional 80 acres (4,000 jobs), a total 
of 110 acres and 5,000 jobs. It is very uncertain whether it is simply 
correct to add these figures to the Board of Trade's approval for the 
New Town's employment provision, in order to arrive at the total for the 
Rural District. When the Board makes out its own statistics for its 
own estates, these can be taken as an accurate assessment of its intention 
to provide that amount of employment. The Board's approval of the County 
Plans does not implicate it in the same responsibility. The County, in 
the eyes of the Board, often overestimates, and the Board, having no 
reason to discourage the optimism as it does not itself have to provide 
the new employment, allovls the overestimated employment figures to be 
written into the County Plans. 1 The total lack of success wlrich the 
County has had in attracting industry to the sites outside the New Town 
demonstrates its own sterile powers compared at least with the Board of 
Trade. 
The Board has been entirely consistent in its attitude, a consist-
ency which, in the light of economic changes, must amount to stubbornness. 
1. Interview with the Research Office, the Board of Trade, April 1960. 
The long term estimates made in a 1950 Board of Trade report were, for 
females, 8-10 acres (500 jobs), the same as the 11immediate need", and 
for males, the estimates made by the North Eastern Development Plan for 
redundancy in the pits of 2,500 in five years, for the Easington Rural 
District. This made 3,000 jobs in all to be provided. This figure of 
3,000 jobs was maintained throughout, though the 'raison d'etre' behind 
it underwent some change. First the unsatisfactory nature of the site 
as regards lack of rail facility and subsidence instability meant that 
more labour could not be employed on the New Town site, and secondly, 
later on it was decided that the figure of 3,000 should be maintained as 
it would coincide with the employment that they estimated would be 
suitable for a town of 30,000. It is not known whether this figure has 
been altered since 1954. 
Carrying the warnings in mind about the dangers of adding together 
the County Plan estimates and the Board of Trade estimates for the New 
To\om, we can proceed to do just that, in order to arrive at the Board's 
estimation of the employment needs of the District as a whole. 
The County Plan The New Town The Rest Total 
1951 
estimate for: 3,000 3,000 6,000 
1971 
The Town Plan 
1957 
estimate for: 3,000 5,000 8,000 
1974 
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One of the most important criterion for the determination of the 
availability of male labour was the estimates which have been made from 
time to time by the National Coal Board. The Board have not been too 
accommodating with their pronouncements, especially when the national 
figures published in the 'Plans' are wanted on a Regional and District 
basis. It is only on such a level that forward estimates are of any 
use. When the Coal Board believed there vJOuld be always a surplus of 
coal requirements over supply, and this is what estimates before 1957 
were in fact based upon, then it could really have afforded to be more 
forthcoming with its own plans, even though these were rapidly chang~ng 
at all times. It is true that the Trade Unions would n~ed to be consulted 
before publication, but even so, this t~~es only a limited length of 
time and cannot account for the roundabout way in which some local 
estimates have been obtained. With the 1959 'Revised Plan for Coal', 
which was brought out after an 'agonising re-appraisal' when demand fell, 
due to, amongst other things, the competition of oil, the whole situation 
grew uncertain. Nore than one nevJ 'variable' was thrown into the _system, 
and one can have sympathy with the Board for not, as it were, 'opening its 
mouth' too soon. But it is hoped that figures vall eventually be 
produced, because with the reductions that it is believed will be necessary 
in man-power needs in the pits, it is not sufficient just to base new 
industry policy upon vague rumour. 
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There have been two pronouncements and one rumour on which local 
estimates have been made by the variogs authorities concerned. The first 
was based on estimates made in 1949 and the second on figures produced in 
1958. The-rumours, of course, are based upon the 'Revised Plans for 
Coal'. 
In Appendix I, an attempt has been made to tabulate the various 
estimates made at different times by the interested bodies. Peter lee 
Development Corporation itself used the figures provided by the National 
Coal Board in its 1949 and 1958 estimates. The figures for Coal Board 
recruitment, together with other employment replacement figures, were 
deducted for the appropriate years from the estimated number of school 
leavers. On the 1949 estimates, the Corporation thereby arrived at the 
need for 4,950 jobs for males by 1971 and 8,700 by 1980, and on the 1957 
estimates the need for 7,680 by 1971 and 12,890 by 1980. For both 
forecasts the Corporation maintained the same figures for proposed female 
labour. These were calculated upon the basis of the need to raise the 
proportion of female to male working population to the level of the 
North-East, and to maintain that level, that is 28%. The figure they 
arrived at was 5,600 by 1971 and 6,800 by 1980. 
To compare the totals calculated by the Board of Trade and the 
County Planning Office for the needs of the New Town and the Rural 
District, as given on page 182, with the figures arrived at by the 
Corporation in their two documents, "Peterlee - Industry111 it will simply 
1. Peterlee Industry is a closed circulation document put out by the 
Development Corporation in 1958 with an addendum in 1959. The first 
figures given in ( 1) are calculated mainly on the basis of figures 
supplied by the N.C.B. in 1949, and in (2) by those given in 1959. 
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be necessary to add together the male and female totals for the two sets 
of estimates, with the following result: 
1971 
'Peterlee - Industry' County Plan 1951 
(1) 1958 10,550 (+ B.o.T. estimates 6,000 
for New Town) 
(2) 1959 12,280 To·~m Map 1957 
(+ B.o.T. estimates 8,000 
for New Town) 
The figures shown under the Town Map heading do not include the jobs 
wlrich the County should be providing in the New To\1ll - these have not 
been indicated at all in the Town Map. We only have an indication 
~1ha t provision they made for outside the To~m. The provision for the 
Town indicated is that made by the Board of Trade. It is to the Board 
of Trade that one must mainly turn for comparison of figures, not simply 
the County Council plans. 
The County Plan was, of course, turned out in 1951 upon estimates 
made at that date, whereas 'Peterlee - Industry' (1) was based upon 
estimates.made in 1957, except for pit redundancy which were both based 
upon 1949 figures. A fairer comparison with the 1951 County Plan is 
the Corporation's 'Master Plan' produced in 1953. This stated the need 
for 8,000 new jobs in manufacturing industry by 1971. 1 
1. Peterlee Master Plan, September 1952, p. 28. 
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Some of the discrepancy between the figures given in the County 
Plan and those prepared by the Corporation is that in the former, no 
allowance was made for the expected natural increases in the population, 
and secondly, no account was taken of females not registered as 
unemployed. In the Town Map this situation was altered. The New 
Town was intended ••• 
''to create conditions in which new industrial development 
may be attracted to the area in sufficient quantity to 
replace any employment lost in coalmining in future years, 
and allow not only the retenti¢n of any natural increase in 
population in the area, but also the attraction of people 
from outside". 1 
It is, of course, open to question whether the Durham County should 
aim at holding the whole of its natural increase in population ~uthin 
its o~m administrative boundaries. There is no similar issue at stake 
when one discusses the Easington Rural District. To suppose that the 
long term natural increase could not be maintained in an area where a 
New Town is being constructed is to imply that the New To~m project 
would be a failure. To a certain extent, from the point of view of 
new industry, and looked at from the angle of natural increase, this 
must be counted to be so. Peterlee Corporation have worked out the 
rate of migration from the district since 1951 up to 1957, 690 persons 
2 per annum. The percentage of the whole Rural District who migrate 
1. Easington To\vn Map, 1958, p. 11. 
2. 11Peterlee - Industry11 , p. 2. 
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each year, working on the figure given by the Corporation, is just 
under 0. 996. Between 1951 and 1957, 2,000 persons came into the 
district, mainly to the Neu TOloJIJ., from outside. Nevertheless, there 
has been a net loss of 860 persons a year. Granted the number who 
will want to change jobs, surely there should not be a net loss of 
population in these circumstances. Even though the Town Map expressed 
the desire to retain the natural increase in the district, they did add 
that, with an many as 13,600 mere people in the district in 1974, over 
1957, it is doubtful if this can be achieved. The paramount need, if 
either migration or increased travel to work is to be avoided, is more 
immigrant new industry. 
The recent cuts that are to be made in the mining programme are 
believed to intimately concern the Durham pits. The overall fall in 
the national manpower needs of the coal industry have been placed at 
anywhere between 50,000 - 70,000 men, ~epending upon whether increased 
productivity can improve coal prices relative to oil. 1 It is not known 
what proportion of these can be allocated to Durham or to the Easington 
pits. 
(iv) The Peterlee 'Hultiplier' - The Problem Stated 
A problem which has not been given a hearing by any of the regional 
authorities is the employment creating effect of various aspects of the 
New Town. To what extent has Peterlee increased incomes in the 
1. Times Review of Industry, March 1960, p. 11, London and Cambridge 
Economic Survey. "Problems of Coal and Energy Policy", E.A.G. 
Robinson. 
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R . r 1 eg:t.ont Not only the factories on the Peterlee industrial estate are 
important for an answer to this problem, but also the orders for the 
sonstruction of the Tovm placed in turn by the Corporation and then by 
the constructing firms themselves. An exhaustive inquiry is really 
necessary to give a satisfactory reply to the questions raised. This 
would not be easy even if the time and information were readily available. 
There are practical limits to the extent to which the 'multiplier' and 
the 'accelerator' submit themselves for analysis in the real world. 
Only a broad general picture can be given of where Peterlee generated 
incomes are spent, which vnll have to suffice for this thesis. 
Some of the major National Construction Companies have employed 
local men, so trBt the wages paid out are spent locally, though without 
further analysis it cannot be said where the other revenue of these 
Companies is dissipated. The factories themselves employ local people, 
so wages there have the same effect. The raw materials for the output 
of the factories come from numerous sources most of which are not local. 
The other construction companies are themselves local and it can be 
assumed that much of their revenue is expended in the North-East. An 
estimate has been made that out of the approximate £8 million that has 
1. Some aspects of this idea can be found in an article by Prof. Alan 
T. Peacock, and D.G.l11. Dosser, in Lloyds Bank Review, January 1960. 
"The New Attack on Localised Unemployment". They suggest making a 
list of trades which have a high localised employment creating effect, 
but 111hich will not suffer from cost discrepancies from being directed 
to set up in a different area from the one they would have otherwise 
chosen. 
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been spent by the Corporation on contracts placed out, £6 million have 
gone to firms in the North-East. 1 
If industry is to be built up in anticipation of unemployment, 
then incomes must be generated in a period of expansion. The fear of 
inflation ha.s prevented the Government from adhering to this policy. 
The industry that Peterlee bas managed to obtain has come as a result of 
current unemployment. This conflicts with the \ddely accepted theory 
that the best time to attract new industry to locally depressed areas 
in in a period of general national expansion. What cannot be deter-
mined without much further research is the speed of an income gener&.ting 
process, or for that matter, an Investment inducing Process, started 
locally. It is possible that industry attracted at the peak of the 
expansion may not have generated its full effect by the time a down turn 
in trade has been reached. 
Siting Problems 
There are five distinct but interrelated questions that can be 
grouped under the heading of 'the siting problem'. There is first of 
all the relative merit of diffused and concentrated industrial develop-
ment. The second, and closely connected with the first, is the problem 
of the control and responsibility of the sites. The difference between 
sites owned by agents of the Board of Trade and those O\·med by other 
Corporations vall be looked at in the 'rent and subsidy problem'. 
1· Interview, ~~. Nicklin, 13th June, 1960. 
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The last two questions that ~fill be touched upon, and which, because 
of their importance, merit fuller treatment than t~is thesis is able 
to offer, a.re the problems of 1 rail access 1 and 1 subsidence 1 • 
(i) Scattered or Concentrated Development 
There has not been much academic work done to investigate the 
actual comparative costs of firms in isolated spots of countryside, on 
their own, or with just one or two others, as against firms who are 
grouped on large estates. There is still some argument as to whether 
the large estate has a cost advantage. Whether this is so is, of 
course, very important, and all the signs point to the fact that it 
has, especially for a large number of small firms as opposed to one large 
firm. Whatever the cost discrepancy, it can be said that industrialists 
are certainly motivated by the thought of this, and anybody attempting 
to attract industry will have an easier time if he has a large estate 
than if he has a small one. 
This study is going to make no attempt to investigate why specific 
firms, who had made initial contact, did not decide to come to Peterlee. 
That is a thesis on its own. What is also relevant, but time does 
not permit it unfortunately, is to enquire from the firms who have settled 
at Peterlee the kind and scale of their costs at various levels. From 
this, one could make some deductions as to the direction of the discrep-
ancy in cost, as say, compared to firms on both an isolated trading 
estate and one near a conurbation, such as Team Valley. One feels 
almost certain that it is not only the 'grouping' that matters, but the 
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manner of the 'grouping'. Again and again, the General lVIanager of the 
Peterlee Corporation, Mr. A.V. Williams, has reiterated this point, and 
it certainly needs to be tested thoroughly. He puts it thus: 
"Although it is with the nation's capital that Peterlee's 
factories, in the main, have been built, it is perhaps one 
of the greatest of the corporation's achievements that it has 
demonstrated to the industrialists the need to measure the 
rentability of b~s own capital by reference to the advantages 
that accrue from the planned investment of new social capital."1 
A true picture will not be obtained until the New Towns, Newton Aycliffe 
and Peterlee, have been completed, when all their social advantages, as 
compared to the rest of the depressed area, have been allowed to take 
root. At the moment, the industrialists, as much as the Corporations, 
are working on trust. So long as the Corporation is in control of 
future development, one can say that the issue is purely one of time, 
and but for that, industrialists are backing a 'certainty'. If the 
attempt to diversify the industrial structure and to replace the 
declining coal industry with new industry is to succeed without drawing 
upon the conurbations to north and south, then fully planned and 
co-ordinated development on New Town lines must be the rule, rather than 
the exception. Industrialists cannot be expected to voluntarily set up 
in the isolation of a derelict mining valley, to be associated with a 
1. Talk by General Manager, Mr. A.V. Williams, to Institution of Gas 
Engineers, North of England Section, 24th September 1958, para 22. 
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settlement pattern and social capital which are the leftovers from an 
age of uninhibited exploitation. Direction of industry, on such 
lines, either by statute or by undue subsidy, only disg~ises the problem. 
Concentrated development may be the solution to the problem of 
finding sites in the west of Durham. During the interrogation by the 
Estimates Committee in 1955, Mr. Sillar of the Board of Trade stated 
the problem he was up against in that part of the County. 
"Again in the Durham part of my particular area west of the Great 
North Road, it is very hilly country. There the roads and 
services follow the valleys, and the valleys are the only fertile 
parts. That is where the best.agricultural land is, and it 
becomes very difficult to take agricultural land and turn it into 
industrial sites without encountering a considerable amount of 
opposition, and very understandable opposition too. 111 
The reply could be made that concentrated development would consume an 
equal quantity of agricultural land. TPis would, one imagines, not be 
the case because not only would certain services not be duplicated, but 
also the sensible location of housing and social services on the lower 
slopes of the valleys would likewise mean a redeployment of the most 
suitable place for industrial sites. One would not be so dependent 
upon the positioning of the old services because comprehensive re-develop-
ment would result in new ones being provided. 
1. Select Committee on Estimates, p. 103, 5th April 1955, para 654. 
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To give some idea of the spread over of small sites in the North-
East, some figures of acreage and number of factories can be given. 
Only the most general conclusions can be made without a fuller investi-
gation of the emplo~nent figures of each estate. These figures are 
not published by the Board of Trade and it is bidden by statute to be 
especially careful about revealing details of the smaller estates. 
There are, coincidentally, 33 estates administered by what was North 
Eastern Trading Estates Limited, 1 and 33 administered by the Durham 
County Council. Of the first 33 only 6 have 10 factories or over, and 
25 have 5 or under. Of the second 33, those administered by the 
County Council, 18 are 20 acres or under, and only 7 are over 50 acres. 
Host of the County Council estates are as yet undeveloped. One can 
generalise from this and say that the small estate is the rule rather 
than the exception. 
The difficulties that isolated firms have I'Tere pointed out by 
Professor Daysh and ~IT. Symonds in their book on 'West Durham'. They 
mentioned the limited quantity and quality of the labour available, the 
reluctance of key-workers and management to go into isolation, the risk 
of local unrest if it was found necessary for any reason to lay off 
workers, and the lack of contact with, in turn, markets, raw materials, 
2 
the parent firm, or new developments in the trade. The pamphlet on 
'Development Area Policy in the North-East' by Messrs. Allen, Bowden and 
1. Found in 'Industrial Estates', 1956. 
2. G.H.J. Daysh and J.S. Symonds, 'West Durham', Basil Blackwell, 1953. 
pp. 141-143. 
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Odber, stressed the corrolary of this- the benefits of 'grouped 
development'. 
"Such a centre may provide not merely markets but also a source 
of various types of labour and numerous other facilities, from 
the repair of mac]:l..inery to technical education. T~ 1 
(ii) The Problem of 'Control' 
Peterlee themselves make out arguments not only for a large estate, 
but also that it should be associated closely \dth the development of the 
Tovm proper, that is the housing and community facilities. It is an 
interesting point to conjecture what would have been their attitude if 
the designated area had been larger and had included some of the 'Western 
sites'~ later put forvrard by the County Council. Nany of the planning 
and administrative difficulties would have been wiped away. Some, of 
course, would have remained. The Corporation desired industry to be 
adjacent to the rest of the Town to attract in population which was 
proving 'sticky' in its willingness to settle in the New Town. Secondly, 
with industry close in, the transport system could be geared to bringing 
people from the outlying district in to work, at the same time as 
facilitating the travel out of miners to their pits. It would also 
1. E. Allen, A.J. Odber, P.J. Bowden, 'Development Area Policy in the 
North-East of England'. North-East Industrial Development 
Association 1957. 
2. Host of the industrial sites agreed upon with the Board of Trade to 
be outside the designated area, >dthin the Rural District, were to 
the west of the New Town. 
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associate the whole of the district in their daily lives with the town 
and the to\·m centre. The Corporation claimed also that the sites put 
forward by the County Council had most of the faults of the small and 
isolated estates in other parts of the County. Road communications 
were admitted by the County Planning Office to be bad in certain cases, 
and others were likewise admitted to be "not likely to be generally 
attractive to industrialists''· 
Those difficulties which ;..rould have been cleared away by the 
inclusion of the 'western sites' in the designated area were mainly 
bound up with the problem of 'control', a problem which is central to 
this chapter. To have included the western sites in the designated 
area would have been to admit that a problem existed, something that the 
Board of Trade were unwilling to accept. Their attitude was that they 
were responsible for all industrial development in the 'Area' and so it 
did not matter whether the site was within or without the designated area. 
If the Corporation had believed that the Board had had views identical 
with their own on the amount end timing of employment provision, then 
they too would not have been so concerned to have the estate adjacent to 
the Town and within the designated area. Mr. Silkin, the Vrinister of 
Town and Country Planning, had agreed to ~~s. Felton's request on 
behalf of the Corporation to have an estate within the designated area, 1 
and the Board of Trade bad acquiesced. In turn, there was imposed an 
agreement on the Corporation which ga.ve the Board almost total control 
of the estate. The Corporation's easy acceptance of this came because 
1. l'1inutes of Advisory Committee, 16th December 1947. (1.2). 
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of the Board's monopoly of the disposal of benefits under the Distri-
bution of Industries Act. Without these benefits, the power of 'control' 
was empty. It mattered considerably who administered the estate. For 
these reasons, the County Council estates have been far less successful 
in attracting industry than have those administered by N.E.T.E. Since 
1951, the significance of the discrepancy in powers has been gradually 
reduced and in 1958 and 1960 1 the situation radically altered. 
same, there is still a difference between the powers of the Board and 
those of the Corporation, as the situation now stands in 1960, even 
though the New Town is still in a 'Development District'. 
(iii) The 'Rent' and 'Subsidy' Question 
What were these benefits, and what were their silnificance? From 
the end of the war up to 1951, factories were let by the N.E.T.E. at 
1939 rentals for the first five years of the lease. From 1951 to 1957, 
a graduated system of rent rebates was used. In both cases the firm 
found itself, after five years, paying the 'current market value', which 
it went on paying for the whole period of the tenancy. But even the 
'current market value' contained a hidden subsidy because it was 
determined by factors derived from the attitude of the 'lessee' and 
ignored the cost side altogether, or rather did not ignore it but in 
fact compensated for it. 1 
1. E. Allen, A.J. Odber, P.J. Bowden, 'Development Area Policy in the 
North-East', p. 33. 
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First of all, on a regional scale these rents distorted the cost 
advantages and disadvantages of certain locations. This may have been 
justified in some individual cases on social grounds, but the blanket 
coverage was indiscriminate. Secondly, it lowered the general level 
of rents and made it more difficult still for landowners, other than 
the Board, to obtain a cover cost rent. For Peterlee, the full effect 
was felt when it attempted to work out rents for firms willing to 
finance the building of their own factories. N.E.T.E. insisted on 
1 full cover cost 1 rents being charged. There was an open and signifi-
cant discrepancy in rent and no firm would set up without thebenefits 
which it supposed were its, of right. Rents are not such a significant 
part of total costs, but they are a 'gloss on the gingerbread' and 
differences are most easily noticed. Entrepreneurs are not always 
completely rational. In 1957, the rent rebate was brought to an end, 
but the hidden subsidy remained. A year later, Peterlee were allowed 
to build factories for firms to rent from money loaned by the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government, through the Treasury. Rates of 
interest have been, since 1951, generally high, and so consequently 
has been the return demanded by the Treasury on loans made by it. 
It is not wrong that the development 1 areas 1 or 'districts' 
should receive subsidies. It is possible, though, to have subsidies 
without distorting the rent structure. In this case it is not true 
that 'a rose by any other nffine smells as sweet', because an undistorted 
rent acts as a valuable indicator for government as well as the 
industrialists. 
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Subsidies should clearly reflect social priorities, and not as 
at present the administrative division of labour for various kinds of 
responsibiaity in the region. The Board of Trade, Peterlee and the 
local Councils all have some responsibility for industry in the 
Easington Rural District for instance, yet the Board alone is allowed 
to subsidise industry and it has confined the subsidies to factories 
built by its own agencies. The Board could answer that the County 
Planning authorities provide the sites whilst it decides the priorities 
and steers industry. That this is not the correct picture can be seen 
by the individual efforts to attract industry on the part of rival 
local authorities, and a~so by the entrace of the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government in lending capital to Peterlee in 1958 and 1959. 
Regionally, as well as nationally, it is a case of who bawls the loudest 
gets the most. It is very unfortunate that the Board of Trade, after 
the war, could be the legitimate ground for so much criticism because it 
has partly shielded the faults in the alternative system that has 
developed. These are faults that are inherent in any process which 
allows the strongest, or the loudest, pressures to \dn a competitive 
battle. Everything that the Board undertakes does not necessarily merit 
a subsidy as compared to what the Board allows others to undertake. 
The situation may change under the 1960 Act. The Board has powers to 
make grants and loans in any direction and almost to anybody it thinks 
is deserving. If it ceases to monopolise the powers for its own 
agencies, then it can begin to act once more as arbiter in the social 
interest. 
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Rail Access 
To what extent the lack of rail access has proved a hindrance to the 
development of the Peterlee estate is difficult to decide. It is 
almost certain that to the firms who inquired apout a site at Peterlee, 
rail access was not an important factor, and on the trading estates 
which were run by N.E.T.E. the presence or absence of rail facility was 
not felt to be an issue of substance. 1 It was not a point that the 
Corporation needed to argue strongly with the Board of Trade. If the 
Board and the County wanted to set up sites outside the designated area 
for industries requiring rail access, the Corporation had no objection. 
They just claimed that there would be few firms who needed to take 
advantage of the sites and little else was needed but to wait for the 
firms to turn up in order to prove it. But the strongest effect, and 
we can only surmise how strong, was on the Board of Trade, who were 
conditioned into rejecting the possibility of male employing industry 
being set up in Peterlee, because they had concluded that such industry 
needed rail access. 
The Subsidence Problem 
Apart from the lack of rail access, the second complication which 
has caused considerable heart searching on the part of the Board of 
Trade and the Development Corporation has been the effect of 'subsidence'. 
Over time, from 1950 on, increasing knowledge about precautions, their 
1. Interview, Hr. Syrrett of the North Eastern Trading Estates Ltd., 
10th December 1959. 
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cost, and the local underground conditions, have enabled the Corporation 
to grow more confident about the possibilities of the site. The 
Corporation had realised that certain kinds of heavy industry would not 
be suitable for the Peterlee site and would require absolute stability, 
but they did not accept the Board of Trade's hypothesis that all male 
employing industry was heavy, or even that all heavy industry needed 
absolute stability. The Board were unwilling to fight the view which 
they considered was generally that of most industrialists, that 
"unstable land was no good for their factory". For their part, the 
Corporation did little to grasp the nettle by the palm and publicise 
the true facts of the situation as they became known. It was not, for 
instance, until the closing months of 1957 that the Corporation decided 
to make known to the County Council the exact nature of the stability 
position- and it was the County Council who, in their 'Plan' of 1951, 
had openly published their doubts about the site. 
As the experts have said, 1 ''within limits nearly all buildings 
could be made proof against subsidence, but the cost could be 
prohibitive". Under the industrial estate there has been one seam of 
coal which the National Coal Board have been extracting continuously 
since the construction of the t0\1n was begun. A certain amount of 
subsidence had to be expected on the site. The effect was minimised 
by careful planning involving little extra cost. Structural precautions, 
1. W.D. Dobson, Professor E.L.J. Potts, R.G.S. Roberts, and K. Wilson, 
"The Co-ordination of Surface and Underground Development at 
Peterlee, Co. Durham", p. 21. 
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though, did involve extra cost. The Corporation has worked out the 
extent of tl1is to be in the region of 556. This figure has been 
calculated from a total cost figure which included site works and the 
internal partitioning of the factory. Subtract this cost and the 
f . . 60' 1 1gure 1s nearer ~. The cost of the Ambler's factory was £250,000 
and the cost of structural precautions was £12,500. If, however, the 
cost of the machinery which has been installed in Ambler's is added in, 
which has not been done to calculate the above percentage, then the 
ffgure of 5% is brought down considerably to 1.7%. The cost of 
machinery was approximately £500,000 in the case of Ambler's, and it 
can be counted as an initial expense of the enterprise. T:b.is is not 
taken into account when the Board of Trade constructs a factory, because 
it, of course, does not bear the cost of the capital installations. 
The figure of 1.756 puts the cost of subsidence precautions into 
perspective. The figure of 5% calculated on the above basis has been 
reasonably constant and has been repeated in the latest factory 
constructed at Peterlee for Tudor Foods Limited. 2 Finding stable sites 
for industry in mining areas is a large problem. An article on the 
subject of subsidence precaution in 11The Architects Journal" (Supplement) 
October 10th, 1957, shows that Nottinghamshire is approaching the same 
problem in a new way and is building schools on severe subsidence sites 
in which the structure as a whole has been designed to allow them to 
1. Letter, R.G.S. Roberts to Author, 16th May, 1960. 
2. Interview, Mr. Nicklin, March 1960. 
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follow the predicted movement of the ground. They are costing no 
1 
more than if they were being built on stable ground. Even so, to 
allow the fear of subsidence to dominate the location of industry to 
the extent that it has is to prejudice any possibility of the planned 
co-ordination of industry with the settlement pattern. Here is a 
case where cost accounting ought to give way to a more careful analysis 
of the social gains from the long term viewpoint. If social gains are 
proven, as one must assuredly say they are, then there are two altern-
atives. Either the cost of subsidence precautions must be borne 
\villingly as a state subsidy, or, if it is a lesser cost, the coal 
beneath must be sterilised. 
A further suggestion is that the industrial estate could spread 
eastwards to the north of Harden. At first sight this is a horrifying 
idea as it would be outside the designated area, and it would mean 
tearing up some existing housing in the newest part of the Durham 
coalfield. If the Board of Trade reasserts itself on the correct 
lines, 2 then the first problem would not be so great as it was in the 
past, and as for the second, the housing is substandard development and 
the sooner it is replaced the better. The village is pillared so that 
subsidence is no problem - as long as the pillars are allowed to remain. 
Also, there is a rail head linking with the coast railway. Industry 
1. Letter, Board of Trade (Robinson) to the Author, 13th June 1960. 
2. Horden Labour Exchange has been declared one of the 'Development 
Districts' under the 1960 Local Employment Act. 
' 
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could then be accommodated adjacent to the New Town, with good communi-
cations, on a site which could take all the kinds of industry which 
could not be catered for on the existing site. 
Peterlee and National Industry Policy 
The Corporation, since its inception in 1948, has put forward the 
benefits of the co-ordinated development of housing and industry in a 
depressed area - arguments, it is true, which would come easily to a 
New Town Corporation desiring to expand. Nevertheless, it is desirable 
to determine just how much they were 'on the side of the angels', and 
such an assessment as has already been given is very one-sided and narrow. 
National policy since 1945 must be introduced to correct the balance. 
It will be no part of this work to question national policy, only the 
regional priorities in the light of it. 
Comparison with Newton Aycliffe here may be of some help to 
illustrate the change in economic behaviour of industrialists between 
1945 and 1950. The Peterlee industrial estate was not agreed upon 
until 1950. The delay caused by the 'coal problem' can, for reasons 
stated below, be said to have had a lasting effect upon the industrial 
structure of Peterlee. At the end of the war in 1945, there was a 
high labour demand which resulted in industrialists being willing to go 
to areas where, other things being equal, they would not have chosen 
to go. Newton Aycliffe, which was first a Trading Estate before it 
was designated as a New Town, received a lot of its industry in these 
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1 
early years. From 1950, the inflated demand for labour was not so 
great, but·the shortage of ravl materials was. The normal pattern of 
post war crises, culrranating in a balance of payments panic, was 
intensified because of the Korean War, and the unfavourable twist in 
2 the terms of trade. 
The policies of the Board of Trade after the war were to encourage 
dollar producing eKport industries. This must have reduced the 
number of available applicants eligible for building licences, but it 
is not possible to give any details because of the Board of Trade's 
unwillingness to part with the relevant information. Defence policies 
also restricted the choice of eligible industry. Another factor was 
the competition exerted by the New Towns around London who were, like-
wise with the development areas, receiving priority. After 1947, too, 
as has already been pointed out, there was no 'advance factory' 
building in the development areas. 
Partial relaxation in restrictions came in 1953, when a recession 
in the consumer goods industries brought about a fall in the number of 
applications for new factory building. This was followed in 1954 by 
the abandoning of the building licence control. The relaxation 
coincided with the Peterlee Corporation's second campaign for new 
industry. It will be found, quite naturally, that the Corporation 
1. Interview, }tr. Syrett, 10th December 1959. 
2. Much of this National and Regional Information comes from 'Development 
Area Policy in the North East of England' - Allen, Odber and 
Bowden, 1957. 
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increased the intensity of its pressure at times when it supposed the 
government mind was most susceptible. Towards the end of 1954, it was 
learnt that the Board of Trade were satisfied with the industrial 
provision made for Sunderland, on which they had for some time been 
concentrating their attentions. It was considered a period suitable 
for expansion. r~.E.T.E. put on the pressure on the Corporation's 
1 behalf. This secured for the Corporation their second factory, 
Alexandres Limited, which had been considering setting up in Peterlee 
since 1950. 2 
In 1955, the Government began looking around for economies in its 
own expenditure, and partly as a result of the House of Con~ons 
Select Committee on Estimates Report of that year, 3 the Treasury put 
the Development Areas amongst the list of items which would come under 
the 1 axe'. The recommendation that loans should temporarily cease was 
accepted by the Treasury. The Board of Trade also agreed to seek to 
de-schedule any area when such areas were no longer likely to be in 
4 
special danger of unemployment. They did not agree to de-schedule 
1. Letter, Williams to Coles, 15th November 1954 (20.13). 
2. The long delay was caused by a temporary clothing recession, and 
later by a desire to have a larger factory than the Board of Trade 
were willing to grant. 
3· Select Committee on Estimates 1955-56 (1-3) 
Sub-Committee E., 'Development Areas', Report P. ii-xxiv, and 'Special 
Reports' - Observations of the Board_of Trade and the Treasury, p. 3-9. 
4. Reply by the Board of Trade to Select Committee (above Note 3). 
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'part' of a Development Area, also recommended by the Select Committee. 
Even though the North-East Development Area was not de-scheduled at any 
time before the 1960 Act, financial restrictions on the Board of Trade 
were imposed. In answer to a question put to the Parliamentary 
Secretary in !'fay 1955i,,1 inquiring why the estimates for the acquisition 
of land and the erection of buildings in the Development Areas were 
£1 million do\~ on the previous year, the Parliamentary Secretary replied 
that "the low level of unemployment in these areas enabled a useful 
economy to be made". It can be seen from the table that it was the 
Development Areas which were the first to feel the effect of Government 
policy when economies were made, and this at a time when industrial 
expansion was proceeding apace, certainly in the Home Counties and 
probably in the Midlands. \-/i th this in mind, the full effects of 
Board of Trade control on Peterlee and its unprivileged position relative 
to the rest of the region can be appreciated. 
Nevi Industry in N .E. 
1,000 sq. ft. Area New Factory Space 
N.E. Home Counties N.E. Home Counties 
1951 1335 4370 1955 3353 8519 
1952 1527 5035 1956 2210 9463 
1953 2262 4572 1957 2993 9632 
1954 4978 9533 1958 2337 9244 
1. Board of Trade Journal 1955, Vol. 170. Questions Tuesday, 15th May. 
2. Board of Trade Journal, 1958, p. 1030. 
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Very soon after the Government's restrictive measures of September 
1957, came the warning signs of an impending recession. From then on 
the restrictive policy went into reverse and the traditional (post 1934) 
'depressed area' policy began to be re-asserted. A.twist was given by 
the additional facilities to be made available to certain designated 
'regions' within, and without, the Development Areas. These particular 
regions were to be helped under the 1958 (Industrial Finance) Act, and 
the emphasis was placed on loans to Industrialists, rather than the 
building of factories to rent - though this could still be done under 
the old Acts in the Development Areas. How much the old Act had fallen 
into disfavour through lack of use can be seen by Peterlee's attitude at 
this time. The emphasis was on loans to industrialists, and Peterlee 
were firmly in the belief that industry could only be attracted by means 
of factories built for the firms, and in 'advance' at that. Secondly, 
and more important, Peterlee was not included in the regions designated 
1 
under the 1958 Act in Durham County. The special assistance given to 
Peterlee by their own Hinistry of Housing and Local Government 
compensated for this exclusion, and in the words of the General Manager, 
Mr. A.V. Williams, "the Corporation at long last has become master in 
its own house and is no longer dependent on a Government agency whose 
interests have been spread over a large number of industrial estates 
2 throughout the North-East". 
1. Jarrow and South Shields were included in the first list and Sunder-
land, Pallion and Southwick were added later. 
2. Talk given by General Manager, l{r. A.V. Williams, to Institution of 
Gas Engineers North of England Section, 24th September 1958, para. 21. 
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Under the Act which came into force in April 1960, all the previous 
legislation was superseded, even the 1958 Act. The 'smaller areas 
principle' enshrined in the 1958 Act was preserved, whilst the emphasis 
on loans to industrialists was abandoned for the combination of weapons, 
which were in the previous Acts. Peterlee has been included under the 
1960 Act because Harden was declared a 'Development District', and it 
was hinted in a Parliamentary Question on 28th April, 1960, 1 that the 
fact of the New Town was part reason for the inclusion of Harden into 
the Act. Nevertheless, Harden Labour Exchange, on the 14th March, 1960, 
had 4.5% unemployment and Haswell, 4.1%, so it might well have qualified 
anyway. This most recent Act has other important clauses which will 
have to be discussed further when the regional conclusions are drawn. 
Other than the establishment of Waage Woodwool Ltd. in the New Town, 
mentioned earlier, a further industrial firm has been attracted to 
Peterlee, that of Tudor Foods Ltd., 75,000 sq.ft., with an employment 
capacity of 350. 
Conclusion 
The significance accorded to 'industry' in Peterlee was at a high 
level vd. th Hr. Clarke's 'Farewell Squalor' , but soon declined with the 
pressures of competing interests, and has slowly increased again to the 
relatively high point it is at now. In 1948, the main reasons for 
designating the New Tovm, and to many people the only ones, vvere to 
1. Board of Trade Journal, 6th May 1960, p. 983. 
28th April, 1960. 
Question asked on 
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rehouse local miners and to provide some industry for their womenfolk. 
Industry now has a much more important role to play. It must cater 
for the rundown in manpower in the pits of the district and for the 
consequent employment difficulties of the school leaving population. 
It must attempt to prevent migration not only in the Easington District 
1 itself but also in the County. Peterlee has now been seen not only to 
be the New Tovm for Easington but one of the New Tovms of County Durham, 
not just a miners 1 tovm but a New To,.m for a wider depressed area. 
Although the claims for more recognition of the Corporation might have 
been self-interested, the changes have been a vindication of the policy 
of the Corporation, especially of its General Hanager, Nr. A.V. Williams. 
He never let go of the \·Jider meaning of the Town 1 s aims right through its 
most troubled period. 
Peterlee is an oasis of co-ordinated industry and housing, attempt-
ing, under planning limitations, to create an environment fit for the 
mid-twentieth century, in a wilderness of admixed conurbation and sprawl. 
It represents a policy of placing industry in an attractive setting, not 
perpetuating outworn social capital either in isolated villages with 
scant amenity, or in conurbations which have their own overspill 
problems and which are large enough in size already. Large scale 
regional planning wlrich brings together effectively the County Borough 
1. Easington Tovm Hap No. 13, p. 11. 
The County Authorities have now accepted that Peterlee has respons-
ibilities for t.he Region as a whole. One reason may be that the 
County have had such difficulty in attracting people into the New 
Town from the immediate locality that they have fallen back on this 
solution. 
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and the County Council Authorities in the North-East is mainly absent 
at the moment. The ideals of the 1948 Pepler and ~lacfarline Plan for 
the region have been slov1ly whittled away. ~ne two New Towns repres-
ented in that Plan and in their designation orders but small parts of 
the wider conception. Since the wider conception is now absent, the 
New Towns have themselves assumed the mantle of much that has been lost. 
To the Board of Trade in 1950, the New Town was just "part of the 
general industrial development provision for the North-East development 
area" and now it has become just what the Board in the same paragraph 
said it was not, 11a separate entity connected only with the development 
1 
of a New Town". That this is so is not to be lauded. The unfortunate 
behaviour of the Board of Trade between 1950 and 1958, in the North-East 
Region, lost it its power of arbitration in the National interest. Up to 
1960, there has been a continual growth in the power of the separate 
statutory bodies in the region to influence their own industrial future. 
The period of uncertainty between 1958 and 1960 did not aid the 
situation. The New Town of Peterlee has been raised in its claims to 
priority because of the growth in its own powers of influence. The 
New Town should indeed have priority, but not at the expense of the 
regional governmental authority. ·vii thin the scope of the 'Development 
Districts', the fringe 'travel to work areas' and 'official overspill 
schemes', it appears that the 1960 Act does allow for some degree of 
1. See page 171 of this chapter, and Appendix II, p. 20. 
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regional (as apart from local) planning. These are extensive powers; 
it depends on how they are used. It also depends on how bold are the 
other authorities that are responsible for settlement planning, because 
without their prior imagination the Board can do little. 
much ground for hope in either direction. 
There is not 
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CONCLUSION 
Each chapter in this thesis has its own particular interest. 
Nevertheless, there is a guiding theme. This I hope reflects not 
only the preoccupations of the author but the importance of the subject. 
The theme is the value of new towns development for a'depressed area'. 
To be complete, much more research would have been necessary, on the 
implications of different kinds of regional settlement patterns, and 
in particular, ~he problem of Peterlee 'housing growth'. The general 
conclusion which follows will abstract some of the more valuable 
points from the individual chapters in order to comment upon them 
in the setting of the general theme. 
The introductory history revealed the broad division 
between the general moti¥e forces towards New Towns development and 
the particular motives which brought about Peterlee. It was neces-
sary to find two 'impractical idealists', Owen and Buckingham, before 
one could assert a definite individual theoretical history for 
Peterlee. All the practical examples belonged to the 'urban decent-
ralisation' school of. new towns advocates. There was certainly not 
the same theoretical justification for any of the northern New Towns 
as there was for the ring built around London. The rational arguments 
for Peterlee, as for most of the other provincial New Towns were 'ad 
hoc' and empirical. The appeasement of an area by allowing it to be 
'in the swim' was not, though, a reason which could be applied to 
Peterlee; 
Aycliffe. 
Durham had already been designated a New Town - Newton 
It was the arguments and the determination of some of the 
members of the Easington Rural District Council, and especially the 
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Surveyor, Hr. Clarke, and his Dep11ty, Mr. Lumsden, that made it 
inevitable that Easington's proj~ct would be included in the official 
list. It was partly a bluff on Easington's part that came off, for 
some of the regional officers realised that there were immense diffi-
culties for a local authority attempting to build a New Town without 
the benefits of the New Towns Act. Perhaps, as has been suggested, 
the Minister, Mr. Silkin, could not have taken the risk of the Council 
succeeding after having defended in the House of Commons that only the 
specially created 'Corporations' should have perogatives under the Act. 
In his report 'Farewell Squalor',}~. Clarke showed a clear 
understanding of most of the implications of his suggested New Town. 
The originality of this local Surveyor and Engineer is made all the 
sharper by the shortage of predecessors. The idea of 'centralising 
scattered development' was there, and also the intention of associating 
housing development with new industry. The hard fact of local bound-
aries as well as his purely local responsibilities made Mr. Clarke 
perhaps a little blind to the regional possibilities of the New Town. 
Nevertheless, it is only necessary to look for a moment at the boundary 
disputes on the edge of towns to realise that regional planning, under 
the present local government structure is impossible. Much of even 
the limited appreciation of the significance of Peterlee was allowed 
to pass when the project was commenced. It has needed the full 
resources of the Corporation as a 'pressure group' in its own right, 
to keep the potential of the town publically understood. Opposition 
interests have maintained a constant and often successful counter 
pressure. 
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Of very great interest are the opposition forces within 
the boundaries of the Rural District. The most suitable site for 
the New Town, fortunately for Mr. Clarke, lay on the west of the 
district, close to the newest and most populated existing development. 
It must have been clear to Mr. Clarke that his proposal would pass in 
the Council because of the preponderant voting power of the 'west side' 
villages. The old scattered villages in the east of the district, 
which were the ones most likely to be affected by the scheme, did not 
have sufficient representatives to decisively oppose it. 
It was only then a surface unanimity that was presented to 
the Minister. There was opposition to the scheme even in its early 
formative stages. More powerful forces were needed to stem the tide 
of a planning I~nister in the high days of planning, once the decision 
was taken by him to allow the scheme to go forward under the New Towns 
Act. These forces were to be found in the three industrial interests 
of agriculture, mining, and the 'Trading Estates'. Because of these 
the Minister had to agree to cut down the size of the town by half, 
from sixty to thirty thousand population. 
Even so, it can still be said that Peterlee had a most unfor-
tunate beginning. Even by New Towns standards the diffi~ulties must 
be judged unusually high. All New Towns Corporations are bodies 
created suddenly by statute, set up in the midst of a long existing 
and slowly developing local and regional government structure. Other 
New Towns Corporations have survived the ordeal of gaining local recog-
nition. When one is greeted, as the Durham authorities were, by a 
very bold and adventurous plan advocated with a forcefulness amounting 
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to fanaticism, then the natural result is a certain degree of 
hostility and suspicion! This indeed was at a time when the general 
feeling of 'end of war' idealism was still high. It is true that 
the Plan put forward by ~tr. Lubetkin and his team was out of the 
ordinary, again judging by New Towns standards. Notwithstanding all 
these factors his plan would most probably have survived the initial 
conservatism and today be regarded as one of the glories of modern 
Britain,- if there had been no 'coal problem'. 
What the investigation of the complicated negotiations at 
the time of the 'coal problem' revealed, was a clear picture of the 
administrative machine attempting to solve a crisis in its ranks. 
Some of the weaknesses of the system and some of its strengths were 
J_aid bare • The episode .. itself is important .for Peterlee history 
because it, explains largely why the New Town has been built on the 
pattern of a patchwork quilt. But there may be wider implications. 
There are, of course, the financial questions of subsidence precautions, 
possible compensation against damage and the loss of coal if sterili-
sation took place. Also on the same side of the balance were the 
human problems of redundancy. On the other side were to be weighed 
the multifarious social benefits of public expenditure in the New 
Town. It is to be hoped that adequate summary of these points was 
made in the chapter devoted to the subject. What it is desired to 
reiterate here is the purely administrative and political conclusion 
that the history of the episode enables us to draw. 
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Politically, the question to be decided was an easy choice 
between the two alternatives. The two sides in the case were for 
long periods evenly matched. Each had their own administrative 
advocates. With a strong central government there goes a tendency 
for regional and sectional interests to push their own point of view, 
secure in the feeling that ultimately the central authority will 
arbitrate in the 'National Interest•. There is no incentive for an 
enlightened attitude beyond that of 'enlightened self-interest' which 
always thin~ that what is good for itself must be good for the Nation. 
Secondly, central government is believed to justify its strength by 
the fact that it can withstand pressures and judge upon the rationale 
of the issues, not the strength of the personalities expressing them. 
This is to some extent a fallacy in most problems, but in this case 
the conclusion is a clear one. Two important decisions were made 
by the Lord President's Committee of the Cabinet during this episode, 
one 'for', and the other 'against•. The issues had not altered 
radically. What had, though, was the political 'standing' of the two 
sides. Thirdly, the strength of administrative negotiation, the 
willingness of competing interests to compromise and be flexible, 
which is present in most cases, was absent here. How necessary an' 
element this is was demonstrated by the lack of it. 
The last chapter was an essay on 'Regional Planning'. It 
was limited for the most part to discussion of 'industrial location', 
using the Peterlee files as the main source of evidence. It is the 
most important of the chapters. The North East, over the last thirty 
years has suffered more than the average from the changes wrought by 
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depression. The long post war inflation has brought prosperity 
nearer. Nevertheless, much of the social and industrial capital 
are the remains of a past industrial revolution. Uncertainty still 
hangs over some of the basic industries. The future of the coal 
industry and of shipping, given present trends, are definitely not 
bright. The great interest of the Peterlee and Newton Aycliffe 
experiments are that they are a break with the settlement p~ttern of 
the past, and that they are industrial New Towns in a depressed area. 
The history of Peterlee so far has been a long struggle to achieve 
this status. Designated, in the eyes of the responsible authorities, 
as a glorified housing estate, it only managed to acquire industry 
after much time and administrative pressure. The fact of the struggle 
leads us to conclude that the full theoretical implications of the 
town were not sufficiently appreciated. 
The administrative conclusions will not be stressed here, 
but it may be worth mentioning that the industrial struggle at Peter-
lee well bears out the contention that the administrative division of 
labour between the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government is a most unfortunate one. The only authorities 
who have regional and not just simply county planning responsibilities, 
are not forced to plan housing and industry together. The two central 
government departments have positive and not simply the negative 
powers of the county planners. A strong new planning Ministry with 
positive powers, regionally based, is necessary before the present 
muddle can be sorted out. The Ministry will have to combine the 
powers and regional structure of the Board of Trade with the 'good 
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intentions' of the Ministry of Housing and Laval Government. 
The then Regional Controller of the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning, in 1946, made clear that Peterlee would face 
the dilemma of being either a 11white elephant" or it would sap the 
"ini tia ti ve and the life blood of the surrounding villages". Here 
is material for important sociological research. Is Peterlee sapping 
the 'life blood' of the Easington villages? Are the problems too 
deep-rooted, or can administrative action on the 'rent discrepancy' 
question resolve most of the difficulties? Some of the early 
history of the 'housing problem' has been written in the 'Genesis' 
chapter, but there have been many developments since which are needed 
for a complete picture before judgement can be made. 
It is to be hoped that the University that is on the 
'doorstep' of the New Town will sponsor the necessary research. 
This would be assisted without doubt if the authorities, and perhaps 
Peterlee Development Corporation themselves, were to put up some 
money for a research grant. 
APPENDIX . I 
LABOUR REQUIRENENTS IN THE EASINGTON PITS 
Peterlee Development Corporation, the National Coal 
Board, the Rural District Council and the County Council have at 
some time all made their own estimates as to how fast the local pits 
would decline in their manpower needs. Because comparison of all 
their estimates is so difficult by virtue of differing base years 
from which calculations begin, and because in certain cases the 
areas of each are not the same, this table has been relegated to 
this appendix. 
Derivation of the figures 
In order to make comparison possible, all the separate 
figures were reduced to a per annum calculation of the estimated 
'reduction in the number of jobs' available in the pits over the 
separate periods stated in the table. The estimates were made at 
various dates; 
of'appearance'. 
they are listed below and in the table, in order 
1 and 2 were obtained as they were, unadulterated, except 
that they were reduced to a yearly average. 1 was the calculation 
of Nr. Clarke in 'Farewell Squalor' and was based on pre-national-
isation figures of the length of life of certain, but not all, of 
the Ea.sington pits. The ones included were Shotton, Hurton, 
Wheatley Hill, Deaf Hill, and Wingate. 1 
1. ''Farewell Squalor 11 p .59. 
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2 occurs in 'Analysis of Planning Problems', the 
booklet issued by the staff of ~tr. Lubetkin's department in the 
first years of the Development Corporation. 
3 was found in the County Council's Town Hap for the 
Easington Rural District. The number of insured males attached 
to the industry were given for 1955. In turn each of the figures 
of expected decrease were subtracted, and the results again reduced 
1 
to an average yearly basis.-
4 . was given in a document issued by the staff of the 
Peterlee Development Corporation. This was entitled 'Peterlee -
Industry'. The figures given were for the No.3 Area N.C.B. 
Jvlurton Colliery is not in the No.3 Area, but is in the To\m l\1ap, 
whereas Sherburn Hill is included in the No.3 Area and not in the 
Town !Vlap. Murton is twice as large as Sherburn, but is expected to 
decline less rapidly. Therefore, the absolute reduction in the 
number of jobs will be approximately the same in each. Th.e Town 
Map area and that of the No.3 Area N.C.B. are broadly comparable 
for the purpose of these calculations. 
Estimates altered considerably from 1957 onwards because 
of the surprising reversal in fortunes of the coal industry. The 
most. interesting result to appear from the tablearE the Easington 
Town Map figures, which were given in such an oblique form2 that on 
1. Easington Town Map, 1958, p12. 
2. The exact form in which it was put in the Town Plan was "The 
National Coal Board have estimated that employment in coalmines in 
Easington Rural District will decline from 25,667 in 1958, (figure 
in 1955 given as 29,328) to 22,792 within 10;25 years, 21 ,435' 
within 25-50 years and to 18,852 at the end of the century". ---
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Source Year estimate Estimated average reduction 
W¥ made. in the number of jobs, per yr. 
1. Farewell Squalor 1945 157 11? 177 
(1947-74) (1974-84) (1984-94) 
2. N.C.B. No.3 Area 1949 162 150 
( 1950-71) (1971- ) 
3. Ea.sington Town Hap 1957 233 54 152 
(1955-68) (1968-83) (1983-2000) 
4. Peterlee - Industry 1949 129 160 
(1958-65) (1966-71) 
II II 1958 300 360 337 
(1958-65) ( 1966-71) (1972-So) 
clarification to an annual basis, they appear even more curious. 
There does not seem to be any justification, certainly none was 
offered, as to why there should be such high initial reductions in 
manpower in the pits, which should then fall off by three quarters 
in the next period. This table, however, clarifies the narrative 
in the main body of the thesis by illustrating first, the basis of 
the Corporation's claims for new industry in its early formative 
years, and secondly, it points the reason for the change in fortunes 
of the Corporation in its relation with the Board of Trade from 1958 
onwards. 
2.(contd.) (Easington Town Map. p12.) What appears so curious is 
that they could have forecast to the. 'last man', but only within 
a time span of 25 years. 
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INDUSTRY 
Hr. Clarke's Industrial Proposals 
Mr. Clarke had incorporated into even the earliest of 
his reports, a site for new industry. This report, it will be 
remembered, was a compromise solution recommending not one new town 
but five smaller housing estates. The new proposed trading estate 
in this plan was to serve the whole of the Rural District. From the 
very first, then, it can be seen that new industry had very special 
responsibilities. Wherever the trading estate was situated it had 
to be central to the whole district. 
This idea became even more difficult to carry out once 
the one site New Town had been agreed upon by the Council. The 
East coast pit villages who had been the main supporters of the pro-
ject in the Council felt that their mining jobs were secure. Those 
on the West side of the District did not feel so happy and were 
insisting that the industrial site should be located central to the 
whole district and not adjoining to the housing site, which itself 
was over to the East. 
There was one other very good reason for keeping the 
industrial estate on the West, and that was because ~rr. Clarke's 
recommended New Town site had no immediately adjoining rail access. 
This was regarded by Mr. Clarke, as it was by other later, as an 
absolute essential. 
Contact with the Ninistry of Town and Country Planning 
Research Team of Mr. James and Miss Elliott clarified the availability 
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of labour situation; they also brought into greater prominence 
the thorny problem of 'travel to work', entailed by centralising 
housing development for pit workers. It was decided by Mr. Clarke 
and Mr. James that the catchment area for labour could be taken as 
the three Labour Exchanges, Horden, Haswell and Wingate. 
First of all we can deal with Hr. Clarke's figures, given 
in 'Farewell Squalor', for immediate availability of labour (1946). 
There were then 1,704 unemployed males •. The number of females 
available for work was calculated at 6,032, a compromise figure, 25%, 
below the national average (femaleto male labour proportion). 
Nevertheless, Mr. Clarke attempted to adhere to the highest figure 
possible in the first copy of his report, 1 but was forced on Mr. 
Tetlow's further advice to accept the lower one. 2 It was the Ministry 
of Labour who were objecting to the large estimates of female avail-
able labour. The estimates for female labour provision were again 
further lowered to 4,000 by Mr. James.3 Again the Ministry of 
Labour were the objectors. Their grounds now were that Service 
Industry, previously not accounted for, would tend to draw essential 
labour away from the.pits. 
Mr. Clarke's long term analysis took into account the 
estimated decline in the pits, and also the verbal warning that the 
natural increase in the population would have to be taken into account 
in any future reckoning. The estimated life of the pits, shown as 
1. See 'Amendments' to Outline Survey in File (14). 
2. Letter Tetlow to Clarke, 4th December 1946. (14.14) 
3. Meeting, 10th January 1947. (13.1) 
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a diagram in' Farewell Squalor' , was obtained through the Ministry 
Research Team from figures available before nationalisation. They 
did not contain, therefore, the additional modernisation and mechan-
isation proposals which in some cases would have brought forward the 
closing date of the pits. 1 In Appendix I an attempt is made to 
record in sequence the various estimates made over time of the length 
of life of the pits in the Easington Rural District. N'r. Clarke's 
calculations came from allowing for a decrease in annual output of 
one-fifth, and the availability of male labour was determined from 
these assumptions. In ten years there would be 1,704 miners made 
redundant, which would increase to 7,350 in 50 years. 2 
In 'Farewell Squalor', Mr. Clarke devoted a chapter to 
the 'Case for New Industry'. Before listing his arguments, it 
should be noted that his report was a survey of the Easington Rural 
District, and that consequently it did not occur to him as important 
to defend industry for the New Town as against industry elsewhere 
in the District. Nevertheless, Hr. Clarke defended a large trading 
estate, because with it industrial development costs could be kept 
to a minimum, and diversified employment would be within easy 
travelling distance of the whole district - at the most 3 or 4 miles, 
20 minutes travelling time.3 
1. Deduced from Hr. Clarke's criteria for estimating future redundancy 
and from letter (File 14) from Mr. Barratt of N.C.B. to ~tr. Clarke 
giving permission to use the figures. 
2. 'Farewell Squalor', p59. 
3. Letters to vfueatley Hill Labour Party. (15.14) 
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The arguments put forward for new industry in 'Farewell 
Squalor' were comprehensive. The single industry had 'adverse 
effects on social character'. The coal industry was subject to 
fluctuations, bringing in turn poverty and prosperity in quick 
succession. There was an absnece of employment for female labour. 
The young and enterprising migrated. All the above led to an unbal-
anced social and economic structure - an argument in its ovm right. 1 
Such was the case expressed in 'Farewell Squalor'. New arguments 
were added by the Corporation later, but basically all the important 
ones were incorporated in this local authority report which eventually 
led to the Minister designating a New Town. 
If these, then, were the views of the author of 'Farewell 
Squalor', influenced as he was by the Research Staff of the Regional 
Offices of the Regional Controller of the ¥dnistry of Town and Countpy 
Planning, then one can imagine that the Regional Controller himself 
could have held similar opinions. His views can be traced in the 
public speech he made before the Local Council in Varch 1947, and from 
his statements from the Chair of the Regional Physical Planning 
Committee. The counter play of opinions among the members of this 
committee and the other important local interests will also be traced 
here. They had an effect on the Regional Controller, and of course, 
on the l~ster, whose views must likewise be highlighted. 
Part of the reason why the 1'-Iinistry of Labour fought to 
keep down female labour employment provision2 was, we can assume, 
1. 'Farewell Squalor' p61. 
2. Letter Tetlow to Clarke, 4th December 1946 (14.14) 
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its concern for the Hartlepool Trading Estate, which was drawing 
some of its labour supply from Easington. Nevertheless, when Hr. 
Tetlow was asked about the Hartlepool Estate on addressing Easington 
Council on March 12th, 3 he said that the intention of the New Town 
Estate would be to take up the slack in employment, perhaps outside 
as well as within the district. They did not want people to have to 
travel up to 40 miles to work. Mr. Silkin made somewhat the same 
answer to West Hartlepool's Town Clerk at the meeting with the Local 
Authorities in August 1947.2 They did not want to attract population 
from old towns that should not be attracted, but they did not only 
want to see that the development area got the amount of industry 
necessary but that it was properly distributed. Mr. Silkin made here 
a very suggestive statement. He could have been thinking of only 
avoiding long travel to work, or it is possible he was considering 
the wider implications of the relation between industry and the 
settlement pattern. It is difficult to tell which. 
The Ideas of Mr. Tetlow, Regional Controller, Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning, and Mr. Silkin, the Minister. 
Mr. Tetlow also gave his reasons for having new industry 
in Ea.sington. He talked about the increasing mechanisation of coal, 
and the possible sources of alternative cheap power such as atomic 
energy. He said also, that reliance on a single industry was wrong. 
What they needed though was some permanent industry which had some 
1. l'1eeting Tetlow and the Counciih, 17th I-'Ia.rch 1947 (15.7) 
2. Heeting of Ninister and Local Authorities, August 27th 1947(3.2) 
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tie in the area, perhaps one based on coal. They had to make the 
area attractive to industrialists. }~. Silkin laid more stress on 
two aspects of the employment situation in the region. Nnphasis 
was laid on the necessity of creating a balanced population, and the 
need to prevent migration. The 1-iin.ister affirmed1that his policy 
for industry in the New Town was in accord with the Draft Designation 
Order issued in October 1947. 2 
"In order that the New Town might be able to develop as a 
balanced community suitable provision would be made for 
industrial employment to absorb the female labour available 
in the district and any male labour not employed in the coal 
mining industry." 
The early intentions of the authorities, as expressed in 
the various documents and speeches, are later referred to with 
intensity. Each nuance assumes a terrifying significance, not, 
one suspects, intended for such scrutiny by the authors. 
Likewise, the 'Explanatory Memorandum' 3 issued with the 
Draft Designation Order, must be scrutinised for its significant 
. 4 
mean~ng. 
1. Letter, Silkin to Ridley, 23rd ~fuxch 1949 (18.1) 
2. Statement with Draft Designation Order (3.3) 
3. Explanatory Memorandum (3.1) 
4. See p~'64of Chapter 4, and this Appendix p.25. 
The Regional Physical Planning Committee 
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The discussion of views put forward in the Regional 
Physical Planning Committee form the subject for this next paragraph. 
The opposition of the Ministry of Labour, first of all to suggested 
figures of female available labour, and their attack on the size of 
the intended population build up - because of the necessary service 
industry to support it - has already been mentioned. In August 1947 
the Committee met to discuss the proposed boundaries of the New Town, 
and it was agreed there to have a trading estate in Easington, but to 
have it separate from the town and not included within its designated 
boundaries. Neither the Durham County Planning Office nor the 
National Coal Board was present at this meeting but they were repre-
sented at a special meeting held during the next month. The general 
opinion at both meetings1 was that the trading estate was very much 
a secondary consideration - as Mr. Hanham of the I1inistry of Labour 
put it - the primary purpose of the New Town was to re-house miners. 
Mr. Dixon for the Coal Board at the September meeting went so far in 
his objections to the new estate that he said that if he had known of 
it earlier he would not have been so willing to approve the New Town. 
The reason given by the Chairman of the Committee, Hr. Tetlow, for 
not having included the trading estate in the boundaries of the desig-
nated area were twofold. First of all, he said, there was a large 
1. Meeting 26th August 1947 (17.9) 
Meeting 24th September 1947 (16.3) 
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number of comparatively modern houses in the existing villages. 
If the Estate was to be central to these it should be away from the 
New Town. Secondly, he said that the Town site was an unusual case 
because it had no rail facility. This second reason was given as an 
answer to Mr. Bates, the Durham County Planning Officer. Mr. Bates 
claimed that it was contrary to the Minister's general policy for 
Ne\•J Towns to separate housing from industrial development. There 
was a further meeting of the Regional Committee in November 1947.1 
At it, one more final reason was added to the above for not including 
the trading estate in the designated area. Mr. Tetlow said that 
there was uncertainty as to the exact siting of the trading estate. 
No allowance had been made on the plan for the New Town for such an 
estate, and it was unlikely that there would be such development on 
the site. The Regional Controller also mentioned that some doubt 
had been cast on the site North West of Shotton Colliery because of 
its proximity to explosives. Perhaps also stability of the site had 
been questioned by the N.C.B., by this date. The general uncertain 
air surrounding the idea of the trading estate was added to by Nr. 
Sullivan of the Board of Trade. At the August meeting tlie Board of 
Trade had accepted the idea of a trading estate in principle. The 
November meeting saw, however, a change in attitude. Because of the 
location and labour shortage in the Hartlepools Estate, ~tt. Sullivan 
said that he did not think that one could be considered for Ea.sington. 
There would be difficulty also in attracting suitable industry. The 
1. Meeting 18th November 1947 (17.10) 
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labour was unskilled and the road and rail connections were not so 
good as in the larger centres of population. All in all, he thought, 
housing and industry should, in this case, not proceed together. 
Withall one can conclude that amongst the Regional 
Physical Planning Committee and other local interests, except for 
the County Council and, of course, Easington themselves, there was 
not much enthusiasm for a trading estate. Whether the absence of 
rail facility and the other reasons given are the whole story why the 
estate should be separate from the designated area - one.:-can only 
surmise. The politic element may have crept in, that an estate 
within the boundaries of the designated area would be difficult to 
'control'. The Development Corporation may have been addicted to 
empire building, which would have proved most awkward for some of the 
local statutory authorities. 
The North Eastern Area Development Plan 
The recommendations of the North Eastern Development 
Plan were important and influential. 1 Pepler and Hacfarline, the 
authors of the Report, said that there would be a need for employment 
in the district. They based their conclusions on the following 
assumptions. There would be a decline in the mining industry. The 
location of industry should be as near as possible to the people's 
present homes, so that long moves into areas with which they are 
1. See, for instance, letter Silkin to Ridley 23rd I1arch 1949 (18.1) 
and speech by Minister to Local Authorities, 27th August 1947 (3.2) 
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unfamilar would be avoided. There are no large existing areas of 
expanding industry in the district which could absorb fhe surplus 
population. The Planners qualified this by the statement that 
Tees-side was estimated to need 50,000 workers durffing the following 
20 - 30 years, but the high birth rate would reduce the external 
demand for labour. The figures given for employment to be provided 
1 
at Peterlee were for 5,000 jobs in 10 years and 7,500 in 25 years. 
This was also later qualified by an addition that if output per man 
shift rose above 20 cwt in the Easington pits, then the number of 
2 jobs needed in 25 years might exceed 10,000. Immediate labour 
availability should be made up of women who want employment, men who 
are temperamentally unsuited to mining, and for those who are physic-
ally able only to do light work.3 Peterlee was though only to be a 
local regrouping and should not aim at attracting population from 
outside the district, notably from West Durham. A summing up of the 
position adopted in the Plan was that "this New Town Peterlee will 
have some industry but in the main will act as a dormitory for workers 
at a number of long life pits."4 
Influential on the County Planning Committee was the 
'Plan's' recommendation of the undustrial site for the New Town to 
be at Thornley Station.5 As with Mr. Clarke, there was no comparison 
1. The North Eastern Area Development Plan - Pepler and Hac far line, 
p.61. (Available copy in Durham County Library). 
2. Ibid. p.152 
3. Ibid. p.56 
4. Ibid. p.186 
5. Ibid. p.61 
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made by Pepler and ~acfarline as to the merits of this site compared 
to one nearer the New Town, for the same reason, which was that 
neither of them was concerned with the legal and administrative 
problems of co-ordinating industrial and housing development. 
Perhaps the Planners thought that the industrial estate would be 
included in the designated area of the New Town. The reasons 
actually given for siting the industrial estate at Thornley Station 
were that it was on the railway to Scotland, that it was adjoining 
the A19, and within easyr~ach of their new proposed motorway. 
The \nfork of the Archi teet - Planner! s Department 
The Coal Problem took up most of the time of the staff at 
Shotton Hall during most of 1949 and the early months of 1950. All 
the same, r1r. Tindall and Mr. Verrinder of the Corporation, continued 
with their research into some of the basic questions. 'I'heir findings 
were put into print in two publications: 'The Analysis' of Planning 
Problems', and 'Social and Economic Research'. The assumption 
from the very first was that industry should be situated within the 
1 boundaries of the Designated Area. From the first also, the extent 
of opposition to the fact of new industry made itself felt through 
the medium of the Regional Controller of the Board of Trade, Mr. 
Rhodes. 
1. See Minutes of first and unofficial meeting of Advisory Committee, 
16th December 1947 - Mrs. Felton on the industrial situation (1.2) 
Also 'Analysis of Planning Problems' p.54, para.18. 
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By 1950 when the 'Analysis of Planning Problems' was 
published, the objections to industry at the new town had clarified. 
The objectors can be divided into two groups: those that were opposed 
to industry anywhere in Easington, and those who wanted industry for 
the Rural District but desired that it should be situated outside 
the Designated Area. The first were the strongest influence and if 
it was not for their overal objections, the second group would have 
received much less of a hearing. As it was, a whole host of second-
ary considerations were multiplied in importance. The overall 
objections can be traced to two sources, the National Coal Board -
or, more accurately, the mining interest - and secondly, the Trading 
Estates around Easington, especially the Hartlepools. 
The Mining Interest 
The most difficult one to trace is the objection of the 
mining interest. There is no comment of the National Coal Board 
available to be quoted; the 'Analysis of Planning Problems' said 
"The N.C.B. have not made any information available to us ••• their 
fears were based on the 'Fifeshire Survey' made in 1945". 1 As has 
been seen, the l'iinistry of Labour was the most voluble objector 
during the pre-designation meetings of the Regional Physical Planning 
Committee. The Board of Trade, almost, as it were, automatically 
took up the case unprompted by any other source. It has been 
suggested that the Durham Miners may have been a strong objector 
1. 'Analysis of Planning Problems' p.28. 
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because of the fear that the local Union would be reduced in size, 
and therefore in its voice in the National Union. Whatever truth 
there is in this, it would have to be restricted to the years before 
1953 because of the co-operation in trying to attract more industry 
to Easington that the local miners' leader gave to the Corporation's 
1 General Manager from that date on. The Corporation had an answer 
to criticisms that new industry would prove competitive to the mines 
and reduce the available labour force. The main ones g~ven were 
that competition would give an added incentive to improvement of 
conditions of work in the pit. Secondly, wages in the mines would 
be able to outbid any new industry, and thirdly, the N.C.B. would be 
2 
able to mechanise their mines without having to worry about redundancy. 
The Hartlepools Argument 
Mention has already been made of the possible competition 
of industry at Easington to the Sunderland and Hartlepools Trading 
Estates. It is much easier to give evidence of Hartlepools objections 
than the N.C.B.'s because they voiced their complaints more- openly. 
They were represented at the Local Authorities meeting on August 27th 
1947, and at the Public Local Inquiry. They had managed by early in 
1949 to convince the North East Development Association of the merits 
of their case and on February 25th 1949 Lord Ridley wrote to the 
Ninister on their behalf. The interchange of correspondence is 
1. See p.38 of this Appendix. 
2. Notes on Industry (18.2) 
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interesting for revealing the misinformation of the Association and 
the confirmation of the attitude, albeit not in specific detail, of 
the Ninister, 1'-Ir. SilR:in. Suggestion had been made to the Committee 
of the Association that there would be substantial industrial develop-
ment at Peterlee. Lord Ridley said that he understood that when 
the Order had been made there would be no industrial development 
other than necessary service industry. \nlas there to be a change in 
policy? He put forward that such a change would disorganise the 
plans of the Board of Trade in relation to the riew Trading Estate at 
1 the Hartlepools. Mr. Silkin replied on the 23rd r·1arch. The 
Minister reiterated the statement issued with the Draft Designation 
Order in 1947, which he said still correctly indicated the intentions 
of the Government in regard to industry in the new town. He added 
that the report of the Consultants on the North East Development Area 
would be examined and their proposals taken into account in decisions 
on future policy. Also any greater degree of industrialisation than 
was indicated by the Draft Order Statement would only be considered 
after consultation with other departments, particularly the Board of 
2 Trade. It is proof of how much importance was placed on this 
objection by the Hartlepools that the Corporation twice devoted a 
research paper to the subject to show that their argument was less 
well founded than was apparent at first sight. 
The gist of the Corporation's reply to the Hartlepools 
1. Letter Ridley to Silkin, 24th February 1949 (18.1) 
2. Letter Silkin to Ridley, 23rd March 1949 (18.1) _ 
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question was based on the following points. The main need at the 
present of the Hartlepools was female labour but it would not be able 
to be satisfied from Easington. The women who then worked in the 
Trading Estate came from the villages nearest to it. Reluctance to 
travel long distances would prohibit the Hartlepools from drawing any 
more female labour, whereas there was a pool of approximately 8,300 
available for Easington. 1 
Other industry problems, all of which have dogged the 
later history of Peterlee, were dealt with in the two research 
publications brought out by the Architect-Planners Department. One 
problem, of course, that was left in abeyance was the effect of 
subsidence on the building of factories. The site marked out was 
in the very north of the designated area, where originally the one 
seam remaining under the eastern portion, at least, was going to be 
sterilised. The Webster report, prepared by the special technical 
committee set up by Hr. Sillin to investigate the cost and results of 
building on land liable to subsidence, also led the Corporation to 
believe that structural precautions could be taken, as with all 
2 bui)dings on 1 two seam land 1 • 
1. Peterlee Industry and the Hartlepools, April and Hay 1950 (18.4 
and 9) 
2. See Summary of the Draft Outline Plan, 13th I1arch 1950, p.5 para.17, 
and 'Webster Report' (6.2) 
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Corporation Reasons for Siting the Industrial Area 
The main reasons why the Corporation desired to have the 
industrial site within the designated area were for purposes of 
control. At the opening meeting of the Easington 'Advisory Committee' 
the Chairman of the new Corporation, Mrs. Felton, said that she had 
approached the J:.1inister to gain for the Corporation the responsibility 
1 
of managing the industrial estate - and he had agreed. This 
question of control was re-opened after Prr. Silkin had been replaced 
by Mr. Dalton in 1950. The economic and social reasons given by 
the Corporation why the industrial estate would be better off in the 
designated area were that many of the workers would be living in the 
New Town, and those that were not could come in by the most direct 
transport, which itself could be geared on a central basis. Technical 
and key workers could be associated with the New Town. Other such 
arguments were that the Town would have an 'industrial character', 
and lastly, that it would be beneficial if mother could combine the 
travel to work with the daily shopping and taking the children to 
and from school. The shops in the Town Centre would be well utilised 
from the first by incoming workers. 2 
1. Minutes of Advisory Committee, 16th December 1947 (1.2) 
2. Industry and Rail Access, 8th June 1950, (File R1 1/12 Industry 
Papers - Research) and Social and Economic Research p.166'. 
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Labour Available 
The Corporation's research team investigated all the basic 
problems, especially those that were influencing the policy makers 
in the Board of Trade. Papers were turned out on the Hartlepools 
question (already mentioned), 'Labour Availability', and the import-
ance of 'Rail Access'. Immediate availability was placed at 1,200 
workers, 300 males and 900 females. The former was the total of 
1 
males unemployed at the time, and the latter was the total required 
to maintain what the Corporation thought should be the best immediate 
male to female labour ratio. Warning was given that as industry was 
seldom either totally male or female employing, to attract too much 
female-employing industry to begin with would be to prejudice later 
changes of attracting male-employing industry, having the right male 
female ratios. The long term employment need was for 8,300 jobs, 
which was the mean between the minimum figure of 5, 800 and the maximum 
of 12,800, each extreme calculated on different assumptions of potential 
emigration from the district. The long term (1962) female labour 
target was fixed at a figure which would bring the female to male ratio 
to 33%, which was the regional average. The ratio at that time stood 
at 18.1% for the Easington Rural District. 2 
1. 'Labour Availability' ( 18.4) 
2. See 'Analysis of Planning Problems' p.26 
Rail Access 
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The paper on rail access attempted to show that its 
absence was not an important limiting factor. Their results were 
deduced from the example of 23 predominantly male-employing firms 
who had applied for sites at four New Towns. Only 3 considered rail 
access essential, another 3 considered it desirable, and the other 
17 did not require it at all. 1 It was generally true, the Corpor-
ation admitted, that the heavy industries required rail facility, 
but there were wide variations between factories in the same indus-
trial groups. Another influential factor, they claimed, was the 
container system of carrying good which allowed goods to be transported 
along road and railway with handling only once when they left the 
factory. A goods depot could be constructed at Harden. 2 
Travel to Work 
The 'Social Survey', as well as giving a great deal of 
other useful information, also threw some light on the travel to work 
question at Easington. It was found that 79% of the wage earners 
attached to the mining industry resident in the Easington district 
worked in the village where they lived. The other 21% travelled, 
(4,000 miners), of whom 600 travelled even when there was no system 
of public transport.3 This shows a very much more serious situation 
1. Industry and Rail Access- 5th June 1950. (File R1 1/12 Industry 
Papers - Research) 
2. 'Economic and Social Research' p.167 
3. Ibid. p.177 
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than was given, for instance, by Hr. Tetlow when he was Regional 
Controller of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, to ~~. Gibbs 
of the Hinistry of Labour, who raised the point of travel during a 
meeting of the Regional Physical Planning Committee. 1 Mr. Tetlow 
claimed that figures from the Miners' Welfare Association showed ·that 
travel to work was already quite usual among miners. The Social 
Survey figures put Hr. Tetlow's general comments into perspective. 
With nearly 80% of the Easington miners resident in villages near to 
the pit head, it can be easily understood that opposition might 
naturally arise later \'ihen inhabitants were asked to move to the New 
Town. 
The Institution and Administration of the Estate 
In April 1950, when the 'coal problem' had been reduced 
to a size sufficient to allow building of the town to proceed, 
considerations were once more given to the question of industry at 
Peterlee. The initial problem to be tackled was that of 'control'. 
It was clear that the Board of Trade would not tolerate a second 
government agency in the North Eastern Development Area, building 
factories in competition with them. 
"In this respect any factories that are built in Peterlee must 
be regarded, we think, as part of the general industrial 
1. Heeting of 10th January 1947. (13.1) 
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development provision for the North East Development Area 
and not as a separate entity connected only with the develop-
1 
ment of a new town". 
A similar situation had been found at East Kilbride and a 
solution of 'dual control' had been devised, which the Board of Trade 
wanted repeated at Peterlee. In this case the North Eastern Trading 
Estates Limited, the agent of the Board of Trade, would build the 
factories on land permanently leased to them. Other industrialists 
who did not want to call upon the Board of Trade would be allowed to 
erect their own factories on land leased to them by the Corporation. 
A small proportion of the industrial zone would be set aside for this 
latter purpose. 
The whole question of 'control' is bound up with the fears 
of the Corporation of complete reliance upon the Board of Trade. The 
attitude and reasonings of the Board will be given special attention 
later. For now it will be sufficient to note that in certain inter-
views it had been ascertained by the Corporation that their own esti-
mates on labour availability did not agree with the Board's, and 
likewise with both their separate appreciations of the merits of the 
2 
site selected at Peterlee. One of the Corporation's Research 
Officers had contacted East Kilbride Corporation and asked them what 
they had thought of the arrangement they had with the Board of Trade. 
1. Letter, Reading to Hardy, 6th April 1950 (18.3) 
2. Interview, West with Sillar, 29th November 1949. Tindall with 
Sillar, Sullivan and Dymond, 27th January 1950. 
(Research Files - Industry) 
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East Kilbride were not very happy because the Board of Trade were 
only giving consideration to dollar exporting industries, and there 
1 
were not many of these around. Nevertheless, with certain stipul-
ations, the Corporation at a meeting in September 1950 accepted the 
system of 'dual control'. A Standing Joint Committee was set up 
which had executive powers, consisting of the Board of Trade, N.E.T.E. 
and the Corporation. Their joint objective was ilto establish in the 
Designated Area, manufacturing industry not requiring rail access, 
as part of the reconstruction plans for the Development Area as a 
whole. 112 The Corporation achieved a say in the determination of 
policy - the selection of firms and some degree of architectural 
control, two conditions they stated they desired, before the meeting.3 
They also coaxed a clause into the agreement which assured the Corpor-
ation of the 'active good will' of the Board in seeking grants under 
the Distribution of Industries Acts.4 The Board, however, affirmed 
later that, in respect of grants for basic services under the Acts, 
the applications would have to be treated on their merits in exactly 
the same waJ as are those from Local Authorities and industrialists 
in other parts of the Development Areas.5 
1. Interview, Verrender with Matheson of East Kilbride 
12th Nay 1950 (18.8) 
2. Letter, Williams to Reading, 2nd October 1950 (18.20) 
3. Letter, Williams to Dobbie, 27th April 1950 ( 18.5) 
4. Letter, Williams to Reading, 2nd October 1950 (18.20) 
5- Letter, Reading to Williams, 19th October 1950 (18.22) 
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On the 3rd November 1950, the Joint Committee met for the 
first time. The functions of the Committee, the kind and scale of 
industry, and the planning considerations of the site, were all dis-
cussed. The Corporation wanted a group of firms linked by a common 
raw material (industry based on timber was suggested) rather than a 
heterogeneous number of firms. They wanted a balanced age structure 
and a reasonable standard of industrial welfare in the firms who came 
to Peterlee. Both the latter points were agreed, but the Corporation 
were forced to accept that they would only receive heterogeneous 
industry. The Corporation did not want heterogeneous industry 
because, they c~nsidered, it was, one, more likely to have too high 
a female male proportion, and, two, be subject to fluctuations, in 
comparison with firms based upon a homogeneous product. The Board 
of Trade, though, did not think there was any suitable male employing 
industry which did not require rail facility. Also light industry 
alone could be given safeguards against subsidence. 1 
Before going on to the question of the amount of employment 
to be provided, which was discussed at the meeting on the 3rd November 
it will be of interest to see the developing attitude of the Board up 
to that date. 
1. Interview, Tindall with Sillar, Sullivan and Dymond, 27th January 
1950. (Research Files- Industry). and General .Manager's Report 
to Industrial Sub-Committee, 30th October 1950 (18.26). 
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The Developing Attitude of the Board of Trade 
The Regional Controller when the Corporation was instituted 
in 1948 was Mr. -Rhodes. At interviews given by him to the Corporation 
and to one of the Corporation's Research Officers, Mr. Rhodes first 
of all expressed the opinion that development should be in three 
phases, the first of 3 years, the second of 10, and the last ending 
when the tovm was completed. Differing from his successor, therefore, 
Mr. Rhodes was prepared to see the long term employment need related 
to the development of the town, not to the exhaustion of the pits. 1 
The only evidence of his views on labour availability is that when 
shown the Corporation's estimation, he replied that it was an 
'interesting and theoretical exercise', but that they would have to 
accept what industries were offered and what the government policy 
of the day dictated. 2 
In November 1949, the new Controller, Mr. Sillar, gave an 
interview to Nr. West, the Co!'p9ration's Chief Estates Surveyor. 
Mr. Sillar said that he had in mind a site of 8 to 10 acres, accom-
modating 2 or 3 factories totalling about 1,000,000 sq.ft. If 
future events showed the need for further industry, considerations 
would be given to the establishment of an Estate outside the desig-
nated area. The industries provided would need to be dollar earning 
and must not draw on labour working in neighbouring localities.3 
-- 1. See this Appendix p. 25 Note 3. 
2. Interview Rhodes and Corporation, 19th ~~y 1948 (File R1, General 
Industrj - Research) 
3. Interview, West with Sillar, 29th November 1949 (Research Files 
Industry) 
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A second interview was given by Mr. Sillar to the Research 
Officer mentioned above, Mr. Tindall. Hr. Dymond, the Board's 
Research Officer, was also present. The immediate labour force for 
whom Hr. Sillar considered employment should be found was 4oo women 
and 200 men. He was prepared to accept the Corporation's long term 
estimates but thought, though he was not questioning at this stage 
the zoning plans of the Corporation, that further employment should 
be located outside the designated area. rrThe Board knew of no 
industries, employing a majority of unskilled males, which did not 
require railway facilities". 1 Two sites were mentioned on which 
'clearance' had been obtained by the Board - Shotton and Thornley 
Station, both with rail access. 
At the first meeting of the Joint Committee on the 3rd 
November 1950, figures were quoted by the Controller, Hr. Sillar, 
which were taken from a paper prepared by Hr. Dymond. This paper 
suggests finding posts for 500 women and 1,000 men by 1954. 
Redundancy would amount to 2,500 by 1957 but it was 'too small to 
2 
worry about'. The Board agreed to 'hope' that the Estate would 
provide 2,000 jobs by 1955 but did not 'anticipate' more than 1,500. 
The ultimate figure they placed as low as 2,500 men and 500 women. 3 
The main attraction of Board of Trade control and the 
reason why the Corporation accepted so easily the limitations of the 
1. Interview Tindall with Sillar, Sullivan and Dymond, 27th January 
1950. (Research Files - Industry) 
2. Paper written by Dymond of Board of Trade found in File 5P/25 
of Durham County Planning Department. 
3. Meeting 3rd November 1950 (18.29) 
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Joint Committee was that the factories that they built could be let 
at government subsidised rents of 1/9d. a square foot (1939 prices) 
1 
compared to 4/0d. a square foot, post war prices and 'economic rents'. 
This is an important aspect of the industrial situation and will be 
discussed again later. All that could be done by the Corporation 
was for them to attempt to impress on the Board their own conception 
of the situation. In an interchange of correspondence between the 
General Manager of the Corporation, }tt. Williams, and ~~. Sillar, 
the Controller, ~~- Williams first of all referred the Controller 
to the 'Explanatory Memorandum'. The passage which was important2 
was one which stated that 'sooner or later' there would be a need for 
new industry in the district, ~d this was best associated with the 
New Town. Mr. Sillar, in his reply, wrote that he thought the 
passage in the 'Hemorandum' meant to apply to the long term, when the 
coal was completely worked out. 3 In aid of his argument, Mr. Sillar 
quoted the 'Statement' accompanying the Draft Designation Order, which 
read that "provision would be made for •••• any male labour not employed 
in the coal mining industry". Hr. Williams replied that the Corpora-
tion were not anxious to take a narrow view, and that they were looking 
forward to the time, not when coal was worked out, but to the more 
immediate future when extensive mechanisation will have caused redun-
4 dancy. 
1. Interview, Mr. Nicklin, March 1960, and Interview Tindall with 
Sillar, Sullivan and Dymond. 27th January 1950. 
(Research Files - Industry) and see p. 196. 
2. Letter, ~illiams to Sillar, 20th February 1951 (19.6) 
3. Letter, Sillar to Williams, 22nd February 1951 (19.7) 
4. Draft Letter, Williams to Sillar, no date (19.8) 
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The kind of figures the Corporation were putting forward 
as targets for their industrial estate can be seen in their Master 
Plan - which was later agreed with the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government.j 
ttrt has been estimated by the National Coal Board that in 1971 
the number of men employed in the mines of the district will 
be 3,400 less than in 1949. Studies of population and indus-
trial statistics projected to 1971 seem to indicate that if 
the population increases at a normal rate unaffected by migra-
tion, there may be some 8,000 people to be employed in manufac-
turing industries, 5, 000 of whom will be men".and 3, 000 women 11 • 
To turn back one again to another aspect of the rent 
question - so strongly did the Board feel about the employment 
capacity of Peterlee, that they refused to allow the number of 
factories planned for the estate to be increased by packing in more 
factories on the same acreage. This would have kept the Estate's 
total revenue from rents up whilst maintaining a competitive level 
2 
. of rents. N.E.T.E. were also anxious about the ground rents to 
be charged to industrialists who built their ovm factories. 3 They 
probably feared the competitive element in rents that the Corporation 
might have been able to introduce. \Vith this in mind it is possible 
to appreciate the reluctance of the Board of Trade to approve grants 
1. Haster Plan, September 1952, p.28 
2. Meeting of 8th January 1951 (19.3) 
3. Sadler-Forster to General Manager, 3rd & 15th January 1951 
(19.2) & (19.4) 
under the Distribution of Industries Acts. 
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Periodically throughout 
1 its history, the Corporation have applied for such grants to cover 
the cost of basic services and so maintain low ground rents. Because 
of the depressed nature of the area, ground rents were expected by 
industrialists to be low, whereas· the expenditure on basic services 
was as high as anywhere in the country. Nevertheless, the Corpor-
ation has not as yet received any such grants to help it maintain a 
low and attractive rent. 2 
That the Board were more than just joint members of a 
policy making con~ittee can be seen by this further example. The 
Corporation, after agreement on the estate had been reached, began 
an open policy of attracting new industry. This came to the ears 
of Hr. Sillar who proceeded to write to the Corporation that he would 
not tolerate such a course of events. In the letter he set out 
clearly all the means by which the Board of Trade could make life very 
difficult for the Corporation if they continued in this policy. 
Building licences could be obtained from the ~linistry of Works only 
after the relevant production department of the Board of Trade had 
given its sponsorship. Planning consent would only be granted after 
an Industrial Development Certificate had been given by the Board of 
Trade, who must have first consulted with all other relevant depart-
ments. 3 (Sometime earlier a Ministry of Town and Country Planning 
1. See Letter, Reading to Williams, 19th October 1950 (18.22) 
Letter, Coles to Williams, 26th February 1953 (20.2) 
Letter, Williams to Syme, 21st April 1954 (20.10) 
2. Interview with Mr. Nicklin, March 1960. 
3. Letter, Sillar to Williams, 23rd July 1951 (19.18) 
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official had written a confidential letter to the Corporation saying 
that the New Town section of the I"li.nistry might be able to help 
Corporations pick up firms on the Building.Licence list of the 
1 Board of Trade, and a little later came another letter saying that 
the Minister vlas anxious to keep industrial development in the New 
Towns in step with ~ousing development).2 As if in knowledge of 
these steps, 11r. Sillar added to his letter the comment that the 
sum set aside in the capital investments progr~nme for factory build-
ing in the New Towns was purely for 'national accountancy purposes', 
and its existence does not mean exemption from stringent tests'. 
The Responsibilities of the Durham County Council 
The Board of Trade's attitude to the suitability of the 
Peterlee site compared to other possible sites in the district, had 
a most unfortunate effect on the Durham County Council plans for the 
area - unfortunate from the point of view of the Corporation anyway. 
Final judgements can be left until later. To trace this attitude 
one can turn to a letter sent by 1~-~ Reading, a senior official of 
the Board of Trade in London, to Mr. Williams of the Corporation, 
in October 1950. 1'We agree, 11 he said, ''that every effort should be 
made jointly by the Board and the Corporation to establish new 
manufacturing industry within the designated area to meet the esti-
mated employment needs of the Easington Rural District. But", he 
added, lfi think I should add that it will probably be necessary to 
1. Letter, Coles to Williams, 20th June 1951 (19.13) 
2. Letter, Barber to General Hanager, 6th March 1951 (19.14) 
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provide some sites outside the designated area for industries requiring 
rail access and assured surface stability11 • 1 Mr. Williams acknow-
ledged this by agreeing that sites would be needed outside the town 
for industries requiring rail access and "absolute" surface stability~ 
The next important event was a meeting at the County 
Planning Office with the Board of Trade and a representative of the 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning, but no representative, be it 
noted, from the Peterlee Corporation. The meeting had been called 
by the County because they were drawing up a Development Plan and 
wanted to know the line it should adopt as regards industry in the 
Easington Rural District. 3 It was not conveyed to the County, what 
was implied in pre-designation discussions, that the New Town vJOuld 
have definite responsibility for the employment needs of the whole 
Rural District. This responsibility indeed was reaffirmed in the 
letter above mentioned from ~rr. Reading. The County assumed, 
therefore, from the Board of Trade's indecision on the question at 
this meeting, that if t~e site was unstable it could not possibly 
fulfil the whole needs of the Rural District. Mr. Dymond's paper, 
mentioned earlier, was the basis for discussion. It is quite poss-
ible that the short term plans in that paper for an 8-10 acre site, 
could have been regarded at the meeting as the long term capacity 
of the whole New Town Estate. Other sites in the district were then 
discussed. Two were agreed upon, the first at Station Town Wingate, 
1. Letter, Reading to Williams, 19th October 1950 (18.22) 
2. Letter, Williams to Reading, 25th October 1950 (18.23) 
3. Interview, Bob Scarlett (Research Officer, County Planning 
Department) March 1960. 
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10 acres with an employment capacity of about 1,000, and the second 
1 
at Thornley Station, 40 acres and a capacity of about 2,000. 
All their doubts about the town site and the alternative 
estates to supplement it were incorporated into the widely distributed 
Development Plan. The Corporation attempted to have the Draft 
amended. Their attitude was that the Peterlee estate could not 
expand industrially, or even get a proper start industrially, if it 
had to compete for its male labour with at least two other sites in 
proximity to the New Town. They insisted that their employment 
target for the first five years was 2,500 (500 above that agreed to 
be 'hoped' with the Board of Trade, and 1,000 above that agreed to 
be 'anticipated'). ~rr. Geenty, the County Planning Officer, for 
his own part, was willing to press for the amendment of the County 
Plan to bring more to the forefront the significance of the New Town. 
He said there had been a considerable amount of opposition in the 
Durham County Planning Committee to the establishment of industry 
in the New Town. It would be difficult to go to the Committee with 
an amended draft. So it proved, for Mr. Geenty had to write later 
that any amendment would go against a substantive resolution of the 
County Council that sites other than in Peterlee should be provided 
in Ea.sington. 2 
When the 1950 County Council meeting with the Board of 
1. See Meeting of Corporation with County Planning Officer, 
30th May 1951 (19.11). Also (22.2) 
2. See General ~~ager's Report, 3rd June 1951 (19.10) 
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Trade took place and the decisions of the Planning Committee were 
made, much less was knovm about the stability of the site and the 
type and expense of precautionary measures than was known after 1951. 
News filtered through occasionally to the Corp~ration after 1951 that 
the County were themselves having doubts about the stability and 
suitability of the two sites at Station Town and Thornley. Never-
theless, even after 1953 when much more was known about the stability 
of the estate, two further meetings were held with the Board of Trade, 
neither of them any more favourable to Peterlee. The first was on 
the 15th April 1953 and the second on the 28th Ivlay 1954. On neither 
occasion were representatives of the Corporation present. At both 
the stability of the Peterlee estate was called into question. At 
the first the extreme step was taken of fixing the maximum long term 
employment at Peterlee at 3,000, on the basis of supplying work for 
that portion of the population of 30,000 not dependent on mining. 1 
The second meeting reaffirmed the figure of 3,000 because it was 
difficult, Mr. Sullivan said, to persuade industrialists to go to an 
area where there was a risk of subsidence. 2 It was not until 1956 
that further correspondence was opened by the Corporation with the 
County Planning authorities. In reply to a letter from the County 
Planning Officer, !vir. Geenty, asking for houses for key workers 
engaged on sites outside the New Town, the General Manager for the 
1. "Discrepancies in Statements as to Industrial Development 
at Peterlee" - Research File - Industry. 
2. Minutes of Meeting, 28th May 1954 (22.1) 
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Corporation replied that he thought that Peterlee was the only site, 
1 
and that the other two had not gained approval. Mr. Geenty, in 
turn, affirmed that the Thornley Station site had been believed to 
be unstable but that it was later given a reprieve and replaced in 
the County Plan. 2 The Station Town site had been approved by the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government in 1954 with the rest of 
County JV!ap, 3 so the General Manager had been misinformed. T'ne 
problem as the County Planning Officer saw it, was 
"to ensure that sufficient attractive sites are available 
in the Easington area to bring industrialists to the area, 
to offset the fall in employment in coal mining, and slow 
up outward migration, thus helping Peterlee reach a 
population of 30,00011 • 
Finally in the closing months of 1957, the Corporation 
the 
decided to,make the stability of the New Town industrial site clear 
to the County Planning Committee. Certain organisational changes 
had taken place as well, putting Peterlee in a more favourable 
position. These will be discussed Ihalow. The Corporation used as 
an excuse for a meeting the unsatisfactory nature, they claimed, of 
an industrial brochure brought out by the County Council. As a 
result of the explanations made by the Corporation, the County 
Planning Committee decided that - seven years after the creation of 
1. Letter, Williams to Geenty, 20th February 1956 (20.16) 
2. Letter, Geenty to Williams, 21st March 1956 (20.17) 
3. County Development Plan- Town ~~p No.13 Easington. 
Cbapter 3, p.12. 
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the Peterlee Industrial Estate - they could enter the site in the 
County Industrial Register, and that industrialists should be 
informed of the ability of Peterlee to erect factory buildings 
1 to rent. 
Factories, 'Tailor-Hade' and in 'Advance of Requ:irements' 
The question of erecting factory buildings to rent has 
its~lf a history, and is an important question worthy of some 
investigation. The first factory building commenced in September 
1953- It was for the firm of Jeremiah Ambler Limited. The second 
was for Alexandres Limited, about whom negotiations had dragged on 
for a number of years since the estate was established. 2 The first 
recorded employment at Alexandres was in December 1955. Both the 
factories were partly financed by the Board of Trade, and both were 
built by North Eastern Trading Estates Limited. By January 1958, 
employment in the firms had reached 800 men and 600 women (their 
capacity is 1,000 men and 800 women), and by that date also no other 
industrial development had been definitely scheduled. N.E.T.E. 
claimed that since 1953 no government financed factories had been 
built elsewhere in the North East which might have come to Peterlee, 3 
and Peterlee Corporation, for their part, said that there was nothing 
4 
to suggest that industry would not settle at Peterlee. 
1. Letter, Williams to Geenty, 23rd January 1958 (21.8) 
Report of Chief Engineer to General Jifanager, 14th February 1958 
(21.11). Letter Geenty to Williams, 3rd February 1958 (21.10) 
2. Negotiations were first entered into in June 1950 (Annual Report 
1951, p.229) 
3. Notes on Industrial Development, 9th January 1958 (21.7) 
4. Letter Williams to Dobbie, 20th Feb.1953 (20.1) and meeting with 
Mr. Shinwell and E.R.D.C., 24th January 1958 (21.9) 
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To verify these latter combined statements li'Tould need a paper in 
itself. But for now the above comments will suffice to illustrate 
the reasons for the anxiety of the Corporation to assume more 
responsibility for the industrial development of the New Town. The 
initial agreement with the Board of Trade, of course, allowed the 
Corporation to let plots of land to industrialists who were willing 
to arrange the building and financing of their own factory. But 
they could not build themselves either to order or in advance of 
requirements. To deal with the question of Advance Factories 
first, a memorandum brought out by the Corporation in 1954 illustrates 
the need for them succinctly. 
"The present scheme for development by the Corporation and 
North East Trading Estates Limited, provides for the industr-
ialist who is prepared to wait twelve months or more between 
the granting of an Industrial Development Certificate and his 
comm~ncing industrial operations, and also for the industrialist 
who is prepared to lay out his capital in building. Experience 
has shown, however, that industrialists as a class prefer to 
utilise capital in technical development, industrial research 
and marketing organisation, in preference to tying it up in 
b "ld. fl 1 Ul l.llg • 
Before October 1947, at which date Sir Stafford Cripps made certain 
cuts in capital investment, the building of factories in advance of 
requirements was allowed. Added to the other factors, such as the 
1. Memorandum on Advance Factories, 5th January 1954 (20.9) 
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inflated post war demand, advance factories helped the high rate of 
development in the scheduled areas before that date. The reverse 
statement has also been made that the cessation of 'Advance' factory 
building was part reason why such development in the areas fell off 
1 from that date on. 
As early as July 1952, }rr. Sadler-Forster on the Corpor-
a tion 's behalf, wrote to Nr. Nacmillan, then the Jviinister of Housing 
and Local Government, to make a plea for 'Advance Factories' at Peter-
lee. Mr. Jvlacmillan's reply was very sympathetic, but the risks invol-
ved and the current restrictions on capital expenditure made the 
situation difficult. He agreed, though, that such an 'Advance Factory' 
might well have "set the ball rollingn for the industrial estate, 3 and 
with this agreement the ~unister must have taken the matter a stage 
further because from time to time information began to come filtering 
. 4 through that he was engaged in discussing the subject at a h1gh level. 
Pressure was kept up by the Corporation during 1954 and 1955 which did 
not result in permission being granted.5 The pressure was probably 
reduced because of the investment restrictions, in the first place 
6 in 1957, though a further plea was written into the 1957 Annual 
Report, and, in the second, the eventual granting in August 1958, of 
1. Development Area Policy in the North East of England -
Allen, Odber, and Bowden, 1957, p.18. 
2. Letter, Sadler-Forster to Hacmillan, 24th July 1952 (19.23) 
3. Letter, ~~cmillan to Sadler-Forster, 12th August 1952 (19.24) 
4. Letter, Barber to \"Jilliams, 5th March 1953 (20.3) 
5. Letter, Williams to Sadler-Forster, 28th June 1953 (20.14) 
6. Report of the Development Corporations, Jv~ch 1957 p.331 
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permission to build factories themselves, with money borrowed from 
the ~linistry of Housing and Local Government, through the Treasury. 
This change in policy was very welcome to the Corporation 
as it was a break with their dependence on the Board of Trade. North 
Eastern Trading Estates Limited, who were the Board of Trade's agent, 
continued in their help to find new industries for Peterlee, even 
though restrictions on capital investment and certain administrative 
directives prevented the Board of Trade allowing N.E.T.E. to build 
any government financed factories in the Development Area. Permiss-
ion to build gave the Corporation the privilege for a time of being 
the only government financed agency in the 'Area'. The only major 
snag in such an enviable position was that the loans made by the 
• 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government under New Towns Act, came 
through the Treasury, at the current rate of interest, necessitating 
in turn high cover cost rents. The way permission came for the 
Corporation to build and rent its own factories was that in 1958 the 
firm of \vaage \IJoodwool Limited were found who wanted a factory in the 
New Town and an application for a loan was made to the f'linistry of 
Housing and Local Government under Section 12 (1) of the New Towns 
Act 1946. This was granted in August 1958, and with it the tacit 
assumption that the Corporation could submit similar claims in the 
future. 
The r1lining Interest 
The last important regional interest which is worthy of 
further examination is that of 'Mining', which includes the National 
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Coal Board and the Durham Miners. lack of information makes this 
only the briefest of sketches. What one really needs to complete 
the picture is some information about the channels by means of which 
the mining interest managed to affect the estimates of employment made 
by the 1'-1inistry of labour, on the one hand, and on the other, the 
distribution of industry facilitated by the Board of Trade. The 
estimates themselves are not so difficult to trace and will be given 
in the summary. 
As the National Coal Board were legally responsible for 
the damage caused by subsidence, they naturally desired to be con-
sulted on the erection of factory buildings. Their original owner-
ship of the land allowed them to insist on a restrictive covenant 
being inserted into the conveyance of the land which enforced the 
need for the Coal Board's prior approval to structural precautions 
in the factories. 1 The Board of Trade were anxious about this, but 
the Corporation felt it was reasonable. When, however, at a later 
date the Coal Board were consulted at a meeting arranged to clear 
the industrial site with them, it is of interest that an attempt was 
made to call in question the whole idea of an industrial estate at 
Peterlee. They were obviously here not thinking of the compensation 
problem but of the effect the estate would have on the local employ-
ment situation. In the light of this N.E.T.E.'s answer, that priority 
would not be given to the Peterlee site over and above others in the 
1. Letter Sydenham to ·williams, 30th October 1950 (18.25) 
Letter Reading to Williams, 19th October 1950 (18.22) 
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Development Area - which seemed to satisfy the members of the Coal 
1 Board present - stands 9ut in importance when one tries to understand 
why there is so little industry at Peterlee. During the years bet-
ween 1950 and 1957 there was little or no communication with the 
Corporation by the Coal Board on anything but matters relating to 
the structural precautions to be incorporated in factories. An 
attempt in 1957 by an official of No.3 Area, Northern Division, to 
help Peterlee by suggesting that a maintenance shop to repair local 
pit props be set up on the Estate, did not come to anything. It 
had not had the blessing of his superiors anyway, and the idea con-
2 flicted \rith their headquarters' policy for repair of pit props. 
The attitude of the Durham Niners' Union was altogether 
different. This applies from at least 1953. For in that year we 
know that, for instance, i'1r. Sam \'Iatson the miners' leader, wrote to 
the 11inistry of Housing and Local Government suggesting he should 
lead a deputation of Union members ·to the r1inister to impress upon 
him the urgency of bringing industry to Peterlee. The i'1inis try 's 
reply, from Hr. Dobbie, said that deputations do not solve problems, 
and that they all knew at the Ministry what the nature of the problem 
was, but that "this was a really tough one".3 The correspondence 
was passed on to the Corporation. The General Nanager wrote to Hr. 
Watson that "so far as the IVJinistry is concerned no prompting is 
1. Heeting, 20th November 1950 (18.30) 
2. Letter, Williams to Charlesworth, 1st March 1957 (21.2) 
Letter, Langford-Holt to Williams, 3rd Hat 1957 (21.3) 
3. Letter, Dobbie to Watson, 19th June 1953 (20.4) 
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required, but such a delegation might do good with the Board of 
1 Traden. Later, on Hr. I..Jatson 's suggestion that pressure could be 
exerted on the Board of Trade through the Miners' Lodges, Hr. Williams 
replied that he was in whole-hearted agreement. nit is logical to 
use the organisations in this area who are most concerned with present 
2 
and future employment 11 • 
Publicity 
The Corporation had one other ally in their struggle to 
gain recognition for their site, VII'. Shinwell, the Hember of Parlia-
ment for Easington, who asked questions in the House on behalf of 
Peterlee and arranged conciliatory meetings between the Corporation 
and the Easington Council. At various periods the Council expressed 
disquiet at the shortage of industry in the district, and it was only 
in 1958 that feeling rose to a sufficient pitch to provoke the 
necessity of a meeting. Questions were asked of the Corporation 
by Councillors, such as: were there any special difficulties peculiar 
to the New Town which kept industry away - lack of rail access, 
subsidence, or the hardness of the water? In reply, the blame was 
. 
laid by the Corporation and N.E.T.E. on national conditions and 
denied altogether that 11the fault lay with local conditions at 
Peter lee 11 • 3 One ru1swer to a question put by M~. Shinwell to the 
1. Letter, Williams to Watson, 23rd June 1953 (20.5) 
~. Letter, Williams to Watson, 1st July 1953 (20.6) 
3. Meeting with Hr. Shinwell and Representative of E.R.D.C. 
24th January 1958 (21.9) 
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President of the Board of Trade angered the Corporation considerably. 
It raises also the general question of 'publicity'. The question 
in the House, asked on 2nd August 1957, wanted to know from the 
President whether he was aware that the New Town of Peterlee had only 
two light industries for a population expected to reach 20,000 in the 
next few years. Jllr. Erroll, the Parliamentary Secretary, replied 
that the Board of Trade were trying to interest suitable fir·ms in 
1 Peterlee, but so far had found none \filling to go there. This 
answer was what Hr. Sadler-Forster called 11rank bad publici ty11 • The 
Parliamentary Secretary had given the impression that industrialists 
had 11taken one sniff" at it and fled away". '~e had made no refer-
ence to the fact that the unwillingness of his Department to use the 
powers conferred on it by the Distribution of Industries Act to 
finance the building of industrial premises cost Peterlee the Ambler 
No.2 factory, and the effect of Government policy on the car and 
2 
vehicle industry cost Peterlee the K.X. lamp factory". 
With the tight hold government had on the location of 
industry in the Development Areas, there was little scope for initi-
ative on the part of Peterlee to advertise its wares. At varying 
intervals certain steps were taken. A display panel was suggested 
and agreed upon for the Board of Trade Interview Room. An indus-
trial brochure - of doubtful quality - was produced, the press and 
1. Board of Trade Journal, August 1959. 
2. Letter, Sadler-Forster to Col. H.H. Peile, 12th Sept.1957 (21.4) 
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television vJere contacted for articles and l)rogrammes on the Tovm, 
progress reports given to interested industrial magazines, and even 
unsigned advertisements inserted in the main local papers. At one 
stage the Corporation even toyed with the idea of engaging the 
1 
assistance of a firm of public relations experts. In the summer 
of 1953 1\fr. Williams, the General Hanager of the Corporation, thought 
the licensing procedure of the Board of Trade a little easier, and 
so decided to pay a visit to a leading industrialist in the ~~dlands 
to see if he could persuade expanding industries to extend their 
operations to the North East. The written reply from the industr-
ialist was informative. 
"You can take it from me that there is not a single industrial 
concern that I know of, situate in the 11idlands, that wants to 
move out, because the services and the labour are both cheaper 
and more co-operative than in any other area. I am afraid 
as long as Hidland towns offer industrial sites, our problem 
in the Midlands area is going to grow, and the Government is 
the only body which can, by Act of Parliament, force industry 
2 to develop in other areas". 
1. Scattered over the four files - 18, 19, 20, 21. 
See specifically: 
(a) Letters, 18th April 1956 (21.;1:) 
(b) Letter, Sadler-Forster to Williams, 16th January 1958 (21) 
(c) Letter, Sadler-Forster to Williams, 15th November 1957(21) 
(d) Meeting at Board of Trade, 10th June 1954 (20) 
2. Letter, Owen to Williams, 3rd July 1953 (20.7) 
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Mr. Sadler-Forster in 1957 placed an increasing reliance 
on 'publicity' to attract industry, in place of governmental help. 
The Board of Trade could not be relied on to build factories to let 
under the Distribution of Industries Acts. 
"So far as the North East is concerned the Acts are dead, 
or almost dead. The Treasury has a stranglehold on 
Departmental spending and therefore the prospect of the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government doing very much 
on specially attractive terms is not very much brighter 11 • 1 
It is7very difficult question to assess whether the 
Corporation did enough to publicise itself, but it is clear that 
the initial dependence on the Board of Trade sterilised initiative. 
This also probably partly accounts for the spasmodic and diffused 
efforts of the Corporation when such attempts were made. 
1. Letter, Sadler-Forster to Col.H.H.Peile, 12th September 1957 (21.1) 
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His present allies had been his secret allies since 
he entered Parliament. Hibbert again spoke of 
peace, retrenchment, reform and civil and religious 
liberty and said that the Conservatives stood in the 
way of achieving such things. Spinks asserted that 
the Conservatives wanted to preserve and improve 
institutions and attacked Liberals as renegade "Tories" 
holding office £or power and position. 
Local connection, social position and good party 
organisation carried the day. Platt was placed at 
the head of the poll with 1122 votes, followed by 
Hibbert with 1105. The two Conservative candidates 
were soundly defeated with 898 votes for Cobbett and 
846 for Spinks. 
